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1. Introduction	  
	  
“I	  am	  not	  afraid	  of	  anything,	  except	  for	  God	  and	  poison	  gas.”	  	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Iraqi	  officer.1	  	  	  The	   Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  was	   the	   longest	   interstate	  war	   in	   the	  20th	   century,	   and	   lasted	   from	  1980	  to	  1988.	  When	  the	  war	  was	  over,	  none	  of	  the	  strategic	  aims	  the	  two	  belligerents	  had	  had	  in	  the	  initial	  phases	  of	  the	  war	  were	  achieved.	  The	  war	  showed	  how	  devastating	  war	   can	  be,	   and	   the	   Iraqi	   and	   the	   Iranian	  population	  became	  victims	  of	   death,	   horror	  and	  suffering.	  An	  estimated	  200,000	  Iraqis	  and	  500,000	  Iranians	  lost	  their	  lives.2	  At	  least	  twice	  as	  many	  were	  injured.	  Iraq	  estimated	  that	  30,000	  Iranians	  lost	  their	  lives	  because	  of	  chemical	  weapons.3	  	  Many	  more	  were	  injured,	  and	  some	  suffers	  from	  injuries	  related	  to	  chemical	  weapons	  today	  as	  well.	  Gas	  had	  not	  been	  used	  in	  warfare	  in	  such	  an	  extent	  since	  World	  War	  I,	  but	  during	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	  frequently.	  	  The	   first	   serious	   allegations	   of	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   came	   in	   1983,	   when	  Iranian	  troops	  became	  victims	  to	  poisonous	  gas.	  Incidents	  of	  use	  of	  gas	  followed	  the	  next	  years	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  all	  signs	  pointed	  to	  Iraq	  as	  the	  violator	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol,	  which	  forbids	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  How	   could	   Iraq	   use	   chemical	   weapons	   frequently	   for	   five	   years	   without	   the	  Security	  Council	  interfering?	  This	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	   Council	   in	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war.	   This	   thesis	   therefore	   discusses	   the	   Security	  Council’s	  responses	  to	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	  The	  war	  started	  a	  year	  after	  the	  Islamic	  revolution	  in	  Iran,	  and	  a	  year	  after	  Saddam	  Hussein	  took	  power	  in	   Iraq.	   Did	   these	   events	   influence	   the	   Security	   Council’s	   responses	   to	   the	   use	   of	  chemical	   weapons?	   Did	   other	   factors,	   such	   as	   political	   alliances,	   individual	   member	  state’s	   political	   agendas,	   financial	   reasons,	   or	   strategic	   reasons	   play	   a	   part	   in	   the	  Security	  Council’s	  politics	  toward	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons?	  This	  thesis	  will	  look	  into	  these	   aspects,	   and	  discuss	   how	   the	   Security	  Council	   responded	   to	   the	  use	  of	   chemical	  weapon	  and	  what	  reasons	  that	  lay	  behind	  their	  response.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  As	  quoted	  in	  Hilterman,	  A	  Poisonous	  Affair,	  16.	  2	  Johnson,	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  War,	  192-­‐193.	  The	  numbers	  are	  estimates.	  3	  Spiers,	  A	  History	  of	  Chemical	  and	  Biological	  Weapons,	  109.	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  Research	  Questions	  	  The	   topic	   is	  narrowed	  by	   two	  specific	   research	  questions	   to	  approach	   the	  subject	   in	  a	  constructive	  way.	  The	  first	  research	  question	  is:	  	  	  	  
How	  did	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  respond	  to	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  the	  
Iran-­Iraq	  war?	  	  	  The	  second	  research	  question	  elaborates	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  first	  question:	  
	  
Why	  did	  the	  Security	  Council	  respond	  the	  way	  it	  did?	  	  	  Some	  notes	  should	  be	  made	  on	  the	  content	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  The	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  War	  started	   in	  1980,	  but	   the	   first	   reliable	  reports	  of	   the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  appeared	  three	  years	  later,	  and	  1983	  is	  thus	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  research	  and	   discussion	   of	   the	   research	   questions.	   The	   UN	   was	   not	   officially	   notified	   about	   it	  before	  1983	  either.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  thesis	  is	  written	  chronologically,	  because	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  must	  be	   seen	   in	   connection	   to	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	  war,	   and	   the	   responses	   of	   the	   Security	  Council.	   It	   will	   also	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   Security	   Council’s	   responses	   must	   be	   seen	   in	  connection	  with	  the	  events	  in	  the	  war.	  A	  chronological	  presentation	  also	  shows	  how	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  developed	  through	  the	  war.	  	  The	  thesis	   is	  divided	  into	  three	  main	  chapters.	  Each	  chapter	  presents	  a	  stage	  of	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  the	  war.	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  Hypotheses	  
	  Based	  on	  general	   knowledge	  about	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	   and	  on	   the	   context	  of	   it,	   several	  hypotheses	   were	   formulated	   as	   possible	   answers	   to	   the	   research	   questions	   before	  research	  was	  conducted.	  	  A	   hypothesis	   to	   the	   first	   research	   question,	   How	   did	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	  
respond	  to	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  the	  Iran-­Iraq	  war?,	  is:	  	  	  
The	  Security	  Council	  did	  not	  respond	  hard	  enough	  to	  stop	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  UN	  did	  not	  respond	  decisively	  hard	  enough	  to	  prevent	  Iraq	  from	  using	  chemical	  weapons,	  since	  they	  were	  used	  repeatedly	  throughout	  war.	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  condemned	  Iraq	  for	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  but	   that	   it	   is	  unlikely	  that	   the	  Council	   implemented	  any	  effective	  measures	  to	  stop	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  	  	  This	   research	   question	   must	   be	   elaborated	   with	   further	   hypotheses.	   The	   Security	  Council	  did	  not	  respond	  decisively	  hard	  enough,	  because:	  	  
1.	  The	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  disagreed	  on	  what	  measures	  which	  should	  be	  taken	  
to	  punish	  and	  prevent	  further	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  It	   is	   of	   great	   importance	   that	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war	   took	   place	   in	   a	   world	   politically	  dominated	   by	   the	   Cold	   War,	   where	   two	   of	   the	   permanent	   members	   of	   the	   Security	  Council	  had	  fundamental	  conflicting	  interests	  and	  ideologies.	  The	  two	  states,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  USSR,	   and	  a	  hypothesis	   is	   that	   they	  disagreed	  on	  what	  measures	  which	   should	  be	  taken	   to	   punish	   and	   prevent	   further	   use.	   A	   strong	   political	   response	   would	   demand	  close	  cooperation	  on	  what	  decisions	  that	  should	  be	  made,	  which	  was	  difficult	  at	  the	  time.	  When	  two	  of	  its	  members	  disagreed	  on	  what	  to	  do,	  it	  paralysed	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  act	  decisively	  and	  stop	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  	  
2.	  The	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  minor	  problem	  in	  a	  bigger	  picture.	  Another	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   was	   perceived	   as	   a	   minor	  problem	   in	   a	   bigger	   picture	   for	   the	   Security	   Council.	   The	   two	   superpowers	   were	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occupied	  with	  their	  own	  problems,	  and	  none	  of	  them	  were	  interested	  in	  escalating	  their	  internal	  conflicts	  by	  getting	  involved	  in	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	  	  	  
3.	   The	   Security	   Council	   did	   not	  want	   to	   implement	   efficient	  measures	   against	   the	   use	   of	  
chemical	  weapons,	  because	  the	  Council	  favoured	  Iraq	  over	  Iran.	  	  There	  was	   a	   new	   political	   situation	   in	   the	   region.	   The	   regime	   in	   Iran	  was	   difficult	   to	  predict,	  and	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  challenged	  and	  criticised	  other	  countries	   in	  the	  region,	  countries	   in	  the	  West,	  and	  communist	   ideology.	  An	  Iranian	  victory	  would	  mean	  a	  new,	  unpredictable	  situation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  for	  the	  superpowers.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  loose	   its	   ally	   Iraq,	   and	   the	   US’	   ally	   Saudi	   Arabia	   could	   be	   in	   danger	   A	   hypothesis	   is	  therefore	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  did	  not	  want	  to	  implement	  efficient	  measures	  against	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  because	  the	  Council’s	  member	  states,	  especially	  the	  US	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  favoured	  Iraq	  over	  Iran.	  	  	  
4.	  Iraq	  cooperated	  with	  the	  Security	  Council.	  Iraq	   was	   willing	   to	   negotiate	   a	   peace	   after	   the	   initial	   offensive,	   while	   Iran	   wished	   to	  continue	  the	  war	  to	  win.	  A	  hypothesis	  is	  therefore	  that	  the	  Council	  did	  not	  do	  anything	  about	  the	  issue	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  because	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  alienate	  Iraq	  as	  well.	  Peace	   would	   be	   further	   away	   if	   neither	   of	   the	   belligerents	   were	   interested	   in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Security	  Council	  regarding	  peace.	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  Historiography,	  Sources	  and	  Methods	  
	  
	  Historiography	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  rich	  literature	  on	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	  Many	  journalists	  and	  military	  strategists	  published	   analyses	   of	   the	   war	   dynamics	   during	   the	   conflict	   and	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath.	   Their	   main	   focus	   was	   to	   describe	   what	   happened	   in	   the	   war,	   and	   the	  international	  impact	  and	  implications	  of	  it.4	  	  The	   Gulf	   war	   (1990	   -­‐1991)	   overshadowed	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war,	   especially	   in	  American	  research	  literature	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Some	  historians	  drew	  lines	  between	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  and	  the	  Gulf	  war,	  and	  some	  focused	  on	  the	  US’	  role	  in	  the	  conflicts.5	  	  The	  American	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  led	  to	  a	  renewed	  historical	  focus	  on	  Iraq	  in	  Western	  research	  literature,	  and	  it	  also	  reignited	  an	  interest	  for	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	  The	  fall	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  regime	  led	  to	  an	  opening	  of	  previously	  closed	  Iraqi	  documents,	  and	   it	   has	   provided	   researches	   with	   new	   information,	   which	   has	   contributed	   to	   a	  changed	   understanding	   of	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war.6	  Other	   recent	   research	   conducted	   by	  historians	  focuses	  much	  more	  on	  specific	  areas	  of	  the	  war,	  e.g.	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Kurds	  and	  the	   role	   of	   third	   party	   states	   in	   the	   war,	   than	   on	   the	   entire	   war.7	  However,	   when	  studying	   secondary	   literature	   on	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war,	   there	   was	   surprisingly	   little	  literature	  in	  the	  field	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  The	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  included	  in	  descriptions	  of	  the	  warfare,	  but	  was	  rarely	  given	  specific	  attention	  or	  treated	  as	  a	  field	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  There	  was	   in	  other	  words	  room	  for	  an	  analysis	  with	   focus	  on	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	   weapons,	   and	   how	   the	   Security	   Council	   responded	   to	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons	  in	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war,	  and	  why	  the	  Council	  responded	  the	  way	  it	  did.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  E.g.	  Anthony	  Cordesman	  and	  Abraham	  R.	  Wagner’s	  The	  Lessons	  of	  Modern	  Warfare	  vol.	  II:	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  
War,	  Dilip	  Hiro’s	  The	  Longest	  War	  and	  Christopher	  C.	   Joyner’s	  The	  Persian	  Gulf	  War.	  Lessons	  for	  Strategy,	  
Law	  and	  Diplomacy.	  	  	  	  5	  E.g.	  Adam	  Tarock’s	  The	  Superpower’s	  Involvement	  in	  the	  Iran-­Iraq	  War.	  6	  E.g.	  Nigel	  Ashton	  and	  Bryan	  Gibson’s	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  War:	  New	  International	  Perspectives	  7	  E.g.	  Joost	  R.	  Hilterman’s	  A	  Poisonous	  Affair	  and	  James	  D.	  Blight’s	  Becoming	  Enemies:	  US-­Iran	  relations	  and	  
the	  Iran-­Iraq	  war,	  1979-­1988.	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Sources	  	  The	  approach	  to	  the	  research	  questions	  has	  been	  problem-­‐oriented,	  i.e.	  specific	  research	  questions	  were	  formulated	  first,	  and	  sources	  have	  been	  found	  afterwards.8	  	  The	  primary	  sources	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  mainly	  the	  official	  records	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  Only	  the	  Security	  Council	  documents	  regarding	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  and	  chemical	  weapons	   have	   been	   studied.	   The	   official	   records	   include	   letters	   to	   and	   from	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   and	   member	   states,	   Security	   Council	   resolutions,	   verbatim	   records	  from	  Council	  meetings,	  statements,	  notes	  and	  reports.	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   official	   records	   of	   the	   Security	  Council.	   They	   include	   only	   the	   official	   records,	   and	   not	   what	   was	   discussed	   behind	  closed	   doors	   as	   documents	   and	  meeting	   records	   are	   classified	   according	   to	   content.9	  	  The	   real	   opinions	  of	   the	  member	   states	   and	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  might	   therefore	  be	  hidden,	  and	  it	  has	  therefore	  been	  useful	  to	  look	  in	  other	  directions	  to	  spot	  their	  stands.	  This	   point	   will	   be	   elaborated	   on	   in	   the	   paragraph	   regarding	   secondary	   sources.	   .	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  incidents	  where	  there	  are	  no	  responses	  from	  the	  Security	  Council	  also	  answers	  the	  research	  questions.	  	  Secretary-­‐General	  Javier	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar’s	  own	  memoirs	  have	  been	  an	  additional	  primary	  source	  of	  information,	  which	  has	  helped	  to	  understand	  the	  actions	  of	  both	  him	  and	  the	  Security	  Council.	  The	  memoirs	  have	  to	  be	  read	  critically	  as	  well,	  since	  they	  are	  written	   by	   Pérez	   de	   Cuéllar	   himself	   and	   are	   thus	   influenced	   by	   his	   opinions	   and	   his	  views	  in	  retrospect	  of	  the	  war.	  The	  memoirs	  are	  not	  complete,	  and	  he	  has	  also	  had	  the	  possibility	  to	  edit	  his	  memoirs,	  and	  leave	  out	  relative	   information	  and	  other	  details	  he	  has	  found	  unsuitable.	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  Council’s	  response	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  war	  and	  of	  third	  party	  states’	  interests	  in	  the	  area.	  Secondary	  literature	  has	  provided	  background	  information,	  and	  it	  has	  helped	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  Security	  Council	   responded	   the	  way	   it	   did,	   especially	   in	   cases	  where	   the	  official	   records	  of	   the	  Security	  Council	  have	  been	  inadequate.	  Some	  of	  the	  secondary	  literature	  deserves	  extra	  attention:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Tosh,	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  History,	  120.	  9	  UN,	  ”Editorial	  Manual:	  Categories	  of	  Distribution	  of	  Documents	  and	  Meeting	  Records.”	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Andrea	   Charron’s	   book	   UN	   Sanctions	   and	   Conflicts:	   Responding	   to	   Peace	   and	  
Security	  Threats	  has	  been	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  when	  they	  are	  faced	  with	  a	  conflict.	  Her	  book	  is	  neutral,	  reflected	  and	  discusses	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  a	  clear	  way.	  	  Cordesman	  and	  Wagner’s	  The	  Lessons	  of	  Modern	  Warfare	  Volume	  II:	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  
War	  was	  published	   in	  1988,	  but	   it	   is	   still	  one	  of	   the	  most	  detailed	  descriptions	  on	   the	  warfare	   operations.	   It	   has	   been	   one	   of	   the	   most	   useful	   works	   in	   this	   thesis	   in	   the	  exploration	   of	   the	   events	   in	   the	  war.	   Robert	   Johnson’s	  The	   Iran-­Iraq	  War,	   which	  was	  published	  in	  2011	  is	  a	  more	  recent	  contribution	  to	  the	  field.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  used	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  works	  in	  this	  thesis	  in	  mapping	  the	  events	  of	  the	  war.	  	  
The	  Superpowers	  Involvement	  in	  the	  Iran-­Iraq	  War	  by	  Adam	  Tarock	  has	  been	  the	  main	  source	  for	  understanding	  why	  the	  Security	  Council	  responded	  as	  it	  did.	  The	  book	  gives	  a	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  interests	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  US	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  It	  was	   important	  to	  use	  a	  source	  that	  was	  published	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Cold	  war,	  as	  new	  information	  which	  provided	  new	  perspectives	  of	  their	  roles	  were	  released	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	  	  Joost	  R.	  Hilterman’s	  A	  Posionous	  Affair	   from	  2007	   is	   the	  most	   thorough	  analysis	  on	   chemical	   weapons	   in	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war.	   It	   gives	   a	   detailed	   presentation	   of	   the	  bombing	  of	  Halabja,	  but	  also	  a	  concise	  description	  of	  the	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  it	  as	  well.	  	  Methods	  	  The	  research	  questions	  and	  the	  sources	  have	  decided	  what	  method	  that	  should	  be	  used.	  	  The	  most	  important	  method	  has	  been	  critical	  analysis	  of	  sources.	  Critical	  analysis	  of	   sources	   is	   necessary	   when	   working	   with	   documents,	   and	   has	   been	   conducted	  throughout	  all	  work	  with	  primary	  sources,	  but	  also	  with	  secondary	  sources.	  	  The	   thesis	   also	   has	   elements	   of	   comparison.	   The	   responses	   of	   the	   Security	  Council	   and	   the	   Secretary	   General	   are	   discussed	   chronologically	   to	   see	   changes	   and	  development	   in	   their	   actions.	   Comparison	   has	   also	   been	   an	   important	   method	   in	  exploring	   why	   the	   Security	   Council	   responded	   the	   way	   it	   did.	   Reasons	   have	   been	  discussed,	   evaluated,	   compared	   to	   each	   other.	   Comparison	   helps	   explain	   what	   has	  happened	  systematically	  and	  to	  see	  changes	  over	  time,	  in	  this	  case	  from	  1983	  to	  1988.	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2. Historical	  background	  
	  
	  The	  History	  of	  Chemical	  Weapons	  	  
	  Chemical	   weapons	   are	   basically	   toxic	   chemicals,	   which	   are	   contained	   in	   different	  delivery	   systems,	   e.g.	  missiles	   or	   bombs.10	  They	   are	   categorized	   as	   a	  weapon	   of	  mass	  destruction,	   together	   with	   biological	   weapons,	   nuclear	   weapons	   and	   radioactive	  weapons,	  and	  are	  thus	  one	  of	  the	  most	  damaging	  types	  of	  weapons	  on	  earth.	  	  Chemical	  weapons	  are	   categorised	   into	   groups	  according	   to	   their	  qualities,	   and	  the	  most	  well	  known	  are	  choking	  agents,	  blister	  agents,	  blood	  agents,	  and	  nerve	  agents.	  The	  qualities	  of	  the	  agents	  are	  also	  reflected	  in	  their	  names.	  Choking	  agents	  attack	  the	  respiratory	  system,	  nerve	  agents	  attack	  the	  nervous	  system,	  blister	  agents	  affect	  the	  skin	  and	  blood	  agents	  attack	  blood	  cells.11	  	  It	  was	  mainly	  mustard	  gas	  and	  nerve	  agents	  that	  were	  used	  during	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	  Mustard	   gas	   is	   known	   as	   “the	   king	   of	   the	  war	   gases”,	   and	   got	   is	   name	   from	   the	  yellowish	  colour	  that	  it	  sometimes	  has,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  distinct	  smell.12	  The	  effects	  are	  often	  delayed,	  but	  when	   they	  come	   they	  damage	   tissue	   in	  eyes	  and	  skin,	   create	  blisters	  and	  burns,	  can	  cause	  loss	  of	  eyesight	  for	  a	  time,	  and	  kill	  if	  high	  concentrations	  are	  inhaled.13	  	  Tabun	  is	  a	  nerve	  gas,	  and	  nerve	  gases	  are	  regarded	  as	  worse	  than	  mustard	  gas.	  They	  act	  more	  quickly,	  and	  affect	   the	  victim	   through	   inhalation	  or	  absorption	   through	   the	  skin.	  Nerve	   gases	   attack	   the	   nervous	   system	   and	   lead	   to	   uncontrollable	   muscular	   activity,	  which	   can	   cause	   loss	   of	   the	   respiratory	   system,	   and	   in	   the	   end	   be	   lethal.	   It	   can	   also	  release	  a	  poison	  to	  accumulate	  within	  the	  body.	  Nerve	  gases	  can	  also	  cause	  dimness	  of	  vision,	  breathing	  problems,	  nausea	  and	  vomiting.	  Nerve	  gases	  can	  kill	  within	  15	  minutes,	  but	  most	   often	  within	   one-­‐two	   hours,	   but	   it	   depends	   on	   the	   amounts	   the	   victims	   are	  exposed	  to.14	  	  	  So	  why	  are	  chemical	  weapons	  regarded	  as	  worse	  than	  conventional	  weapons?	  	  First	  of	  all,	  chemical	  weapons	  do	  not	  only	  create	  physical	  suffering.	  It	  is	  as	  much	  feared	  and	   exploited	   for	   its	   psychological	   impact.	   Chemical	   weapons	   with	   its	   characteristic	  impact	  on	  victims	  are	  dreaded	  among	  soldiers	  who	  have	  experienced	  it,	  as	  most	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  OPCW,	  ”Brief	  Description	  of	  Chemical	  Weapons.”	  11	  Idem.	  12	  Spiers,	  A	  History	  of	  Chemical	  and	  Biological	  Weapons,	  15.	  13	  Idem.	  	  14	  Idem.	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attacked	   survive,	   and	   rumours	   about	   it	   spread	   quickly	   both	   among	   soldiers,	   but	   also	  among	   civilians.	   Second,	   chemical	  weapons	   spread	  uncontrolled	   according	   to	  weather	  conditions	  and	  do	  not	  differ	  between	  soldier	  and	  civilian.	  Third,	   if	  one	  allows	  chemical	  weapons	  to	  be	  used	  in	  one	  war,	  the	  limits	  might	  be	  pushed	  further	  in	  the	  next	  one	  and	  other	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  might	  be	  the	  next	  step.	  It	   is	  therefore	  important	  to	  uphold	  the	  norm	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  should	  not	  be	  used.	  This	  argument	  was	  crucial	  during	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	   as	   the	  world	  was	   in	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   Cold	  War,	   and	   is	   still	  current	  today	  as	  states	  fear	  the	  implications	  if	  hostile	  groups	  get	  their	  hands	  on	  it.	  	  	  Chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	  in	  a	  major	  scale	  for	  the	  first	  time	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  France	  used	  grenades	  filled	  with	  tear	  gas	  in	  August	  1914,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  German	  attack	  with	  chlorine	  gas	  at	  Ypres,	  Belgium,	   in	  September	  the	  same	  year.15	  It	   is	  estimated	  that	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  during	  World	  War	   I	  caused	  over	  1	  million	  casualties	  and	  90,000	  deaths,	  but	  many	  of	  those	  who	  were	  injured	  suffered	  from	  it	  both	  physically	  and	  psychologically	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  their	  lives.16	  	  The	   chemical	  weapons	  used	  during	  World	  War	   I	  were	  neither	   efficient	   nor	  did	  they	   give	   any	   advantage	   in	   the	   overall	   picture	   of	   the	   war.	   The	   weapons	   were	   not	  developed	  enough,	  but	  the	  use	  of	  it	  during	  World	  War	  I	  launched	  serious	  research	  and	  development	  efforts	  were	  made	  on	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons.17	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war,	  many	  countries,	  especially	  USA,	  sought	  an	  armament	  reduction	  as	  a	  measure	  to	  prevent	  a	  new	  world	  war.	  Chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons	  were	   a	   part	   of	   the	   reduction	   talks,	   but	   chemical	   substances	   could	   not	   be	   forbidden	  altogether,	   because	   it	   was	   crucial	   in	   other	   industries	   as	   well,	   e.g.	   the	   pharmaceutical	  industry.	   However,	   it	   proved	   difficult	   to	   agree	   on	   something	   as	   long	   as	   agreements	  included	  disarmament	  of	  other	  arms	  as	  well.	  	  	  The	  Geneva	  Protocol	  	  The	   Washington	   Treaty	   of	   1921	   is	   an	   example	   of	   how	   difficult	   it	   was	   to	   agree	   on	  armament	  reduction.	  It	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons	  in	  war,	  but	   the	   treaty	  did	  not	   come	   into	   force.	   It	   had	   several	   other	   arms	   reduction	   clauses	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  OPCW,	  ”Brief	  History	  of	  Chemical	  Weapons	  Use”	  16	  Idem.	  17	  Spiers,	  A	  History	  of	  Chemical	  and	  Biological	  Weapons,	  27-­‐40.	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well,	   and	   France	   refused	   to	   ratify	   it	   because	   it	   was	   too	   comprehensive.18	  The	   topic	  remained	   of	   current	   focus,	   however,	   and	   USA	   seized	   the	   opportunity	   to	   promote	  disarmament	  again	  when	  the	  conference	  Control	  of	  the	  International	  Trade	  in	  Arms	  was	  held	  in	  Geneva	  in	  May	  1925.	  The	  part	  that	  dealt	  with	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons	  in	  the	  Washington	  Treaty	  from	  1921	  was	  rewritten,	  and	  all	  other	  disarmament	  measures	  were	  left	  out.	  It	  proved	  more	  successful.	  	  The	  Geneva	  Protocol	  was	  signed	  by	  44	  states	  17	  June	  1925,	  among	  them	  France,	  Germany,	   Great	   Britain	   and	   USA. 19 	  Parties	   to	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   accepted	   that	  asphyxiating,	  poisonous	  or	  other	  gases	  in	  addition	  to	  bacteriological	  methods	  of	  warfare	  were	  prohibited.	  Each	  state	  was	  bound	  to	  it	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  was	  ratified,	  and	  more	  states	  signed	  and	  ratified	  the	  Protocol	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.20	  Even	  though	  it	  was	  a	  major	  achievement,	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   was	   still	   a	   limited	   agreement,	   which	   had	   many	  loopholes.	   The	   British	   Professor	   in	   Strategic	   Studies	   of	   Leeds	   University,	   Edward	   M.	  Spiers,	  emphasises	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol:	  	  	  
It	   failed	   to	   address	   R&D	   (research	   and	   development),	   production,	   possession	   or	  
transfer	   of	   such	  weapons,	   avoided	   any	   reference	   to	   how	   the	   agreement	   could	   be	  
verified	  or	  enforced,	  and	  allowed	  states	  who	  ratified	   it	  to	  enter	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  
following	  reservations:	  first,	  that	  it	  was	  binding	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  states	  who	  
were	   a	   party	   to	   the	   protocol,	   and	   second,	   that	   it	   would	   cease	   to	   be	   binding	  
whenever	   enemy	   states	   used	   gas	   warfare.	   In	   effect,	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   became	  
known	  as	  a	  “no	  first	  use”	  agreement.21	  	  	  	  	  Since	  it	  was	  only	  binding	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  states	  parties	  to	  it,	  it	  did	  not	  hinder	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  against	  groups	  or	  organizations	  without	  state	  status.	  The	  Protocol	  did	  not	  gain	  the	  political	  weight	  that	  USA	  hoped	  it	  would	  have	  either.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  was	   that	   the	   American	   Senate	   did	   not	   ratify	   the	   agreement	   before	   50	   years	   later,	   in	  1975.22	  The	  loopholes	  also	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  states	  that	  had	  made	  reservations	  to	  use	  chemical	   or	  biological	  weapons	   against	   states	   that	  were	  not	  party	   to	   the	   treaty.	  Many	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Spiers,	  A	  History	  of	  Chemical	  and	  Biological	  Weapons,	  49.	  19	  Ibid.,	  50.	  	  20	  UN,	  ”The	  Geneva	  Protocol.”	  	  21	  Spiers,	  A	  History	  of	  Chemical	  and	  Biological	  Warfare,	  50-­‐51.	  22	  ICRC,	   ”Protocol	   for	   the	  Prohibition	   for	  Asphyxiating,	  Poisonous	  or	  Other	  Gases,	   and	  of	  Bacteriological	  Methods	  of	  Warfare.	  Geneva,	  17	  June	  1925.”	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colonial	  powers	  used	  chemical	  agents	  against	  rebellions	  in	  third	  world	  countries	  in	  the	  1920s	   and	   1930s,	   but	   did	   not	   break	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   since	   the	   colonies	   had	   not	  signed	   the	   treaty,	   or	   the	  use	   of	   chemical	   agents	  were	  used	   against	   rebel	   groups.	  Both	  Iraq	   and	   Iran	   are	   parties	   to	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol.	   Iran	   ratified	   it	   in	   1929,	   while	   Iraq	  ratified	   it	   in	   1931,	   and	   Iraq	   was	   one	   of	   the	   countries	   that	   made	   reservations	   on	  ascending	  it:	  Iraq	  became	  a	  party	  to	  the	  Protocol,	  but	  was	  only	  bound	  to	  it	  towards	  other	  states	   subject	   to	   it.23	  	   This	  means	   that	   Iraq’s	   obligation	   to	   it	  would	   cease	   if	   an	   enemy	  power’s	  armed	  forces	  or	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  enemy	  did	  not	  respect	  the	  Protocol.	  	  	  Chemical	  weapons	  after	  1925	  	  The	  interwar	  years	  were	  characterised	  by	  political	  unrest	  and	  a	  Europe	  in	  change,	  and	  many	   countries	   continued	   their	   research	  and	  development	  on	   chemical	   and	  biological	  weapons	  since	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  did	  not	  prohibit	  research.	  No	  state	  leaders	  wanted	  to	  risk	  its	  security	  if	  it	  became	  involved	  in	  a	  new	  war	  where	  the	  counterpart	  had	  chemical	  or	   biological	  weapons.	   Even	   though	   the	  weapons	   had	   its	   negative	   sides,	   it	  was	   also	   a	  versatile	  weapon	  seen	  with	  a	  military	  strategist’s	  eyes:	  it	  could	  be	  launched	  from	  planes,	  tanks	  and	  ships,	  as	  well	  as	   it	  did	  not	  kill	  everyone	   in	   its	   target	  zone;	   it	   simply	  put	   the	  counterpart	  out	  of	  play	  both	  in	  defensive	  and	  offensive	  warfare.24	  	  	  	  Despite	   all	   the	   shortcomings,	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   was	   respected	   during	   the	  following	  decades,	  and	  neither	  the	  Allies	  nor	  the	  Axis	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  but	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  followed	  opened	  for	  further	  research	  on	  such	  weapons.	  In	  the	  Cold	  War	  period,	  both	  USA	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  intensified	  its	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons	  programmes,	  and	  developed	  huge	  amounts	  of	  sarin	  and	  mustard	  gas	   in	   addition	   to	   biological	  weapons.	   The	   gases	   had	   become	  more	   refined	   and	  more	  lethal,	  and	  the	  military	  had	  learned	  from	  WWI	  and	  colonial	  wars	  in	  the	  third	  world	  how	  to	  use	   it	   tactically.	  The	   cold	  war	   remained	  cold,	   and	  never	   turned	   into	  a	  direct-­‐armed	  conflict	  between	   the	  USA	  and	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Still,	   chemical	  weapons	  were	  sold	  and	  proliferated	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  which	  would	  prove	  fatal.	  	  Iraq	   had	   come	   under	  military	   rule	   in	   1958	  when	   General	   Abd	   al-­‐Karim	   Qasim	  overthrew	   the	  monarchy,	   and	   the	   country	  was	  declared	   a	   republic.	   Both	   the	  Republic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  ICRC,	  ”Iraq’s	  Reservation	  Made	  on	  Accession.”	  	  24	  Spiers,	  A	  History	  of	  Chemical	  and	  Biological	  Warfare,	  48.	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and	  the	  Baathist	  regime,	  which	  seized	  the	  power	  ten	  years	  after	  Qasim’s	  coup,	  sought	  to	  strengthen	   its	   power	   and	   position	   in	   the	   Middle	   East,	   and	   one	   of	   its	   means	   was	   a	  modernization	  of	  the	  military.25	  	   Iraqi	  officers	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  1960s	   to	  be	   trained	  within	   chemical	   and	  biological	  warfare	  programmes,	   and	  military	  training	   facilities	  were	   set	   up	   around	   the	   country	   so	   Iraqi	   soldiers	   could	   practice	   gas	  warfare.	   Many	   Western	   countries	   were	   contacted	   by	   Iraq	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   offered	  lucrative	   contracts	   for	   equipment	   and	   chemicals	   in	   return,	   which	   could	   be	   used	   to	  manufacture	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons.	  Many	  companies	  did	  not	  want	  to	  sell	  to	  Iraq	   and	   declined	   the	   offer,	   but	   some	   accepted	   the	   deals,	   among	   them	   German	  companies.	   Iraq	   started	   production	   of	   chemical	   agents	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1980s,	  and	  specialized	  in	  mustard	  gas,	  and	  the	  nerve	  gasses	  sarin	  and	  tabun.26	  	  	  
The	  Security	  Council:	  Responsibilities	  and	  Expectations	  	  	  The	  Security	  Council	  	  The	  United	  Nations	  was	   founded	  after	  World	  War	   II,	   in	  1945.	  The	  organization’s	  main	  purposes	   are	   to	   keep	   peace,	   establish	   cooperation	   and	   friendship	   among	   states,	   to	  improve	   social	   conditions	   and	   human	   rights.	   The	   powers	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   are	  vested	  in	  the	  Charter,	  which	  is	  accepted	  by	  all	  member	  states.27	  194	  states	  are	  members	  of	  the	  UN.	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  are	  two	  of	  them.	  	  The	   Security	   Council	   is	   one	   of	   the	   United	   Nations’	   main	   bodies.	   The	   Council’s	  main	  responsibility	  is	  to	  maintain	  peace,	  oversee	  international	  law	  and	  prevent	  conflicts.	  In	  grave	  situations,	  the	  Security	  Council	  can	  impose	  sanctions	  and	  also	  authorize	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  prevent	  conflicts	  or	  to	  restore	  peace.28	  The	  Security	  Council	  is	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  UN	  internationally	  recognized,	  and	  is	  made	  up	  of	  15	  countries	  from	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  10	   of	   them	   are	   voted	   in	   for	   a	   two-­‐year	   period	   by	   the	   General	   Assembly,	  which	   again	  consists	   of	   the	   194	   member	   states.29 	  The	   other	   five	   members	   of	   the	   Council	   are	  permanent	   members.	   They	   are	   the	   US,	   Russia	   (until	   1991	   the	   Soviet	   Union),	   the	   UK,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Tripp,	  A	  History	  of	  Iraq,	  144.	  26	  Spiers,	  A	  History	  of	  Chemical	  and	  Biological	  Weapons,	  102-­‐103.	  27	  UN,	  ”UN	  at	  a	  Glance.”	  28	  UN,	  ”The	  Security	  Council.”	  	  	  29	  As	  of	  July	  2014.	  UN,	  ”The	  Security	  Council”.	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China	  and	  France.	  The	   five	  permanent	  members	  have	   the	  power	   to	  veto	  a	  decision	  or	  resolution,	  and	  thus	  have	  more	  power	  than	  the	  other	  member	  states.30	  	  	  What	  can	  the	  Security	  Council	  do	  when	  confronting	  a	  conflict?	  	  The	   General	   Assembly	   of	   the	   UN	   had	   adopted	   a	   resolution	   (37/98D)	   in	   1982,	   which	  called	   for	   measures	   to	   uphold	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   of	   1925.31	  The	  Security	  Council	  was	  thus	  obliged	  to	  confront	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  But	  what	  can	  the	  Security	  Council	  do	  when	  they	  are	  confronted	  with	  a	  violation	  of	  international	  law?	  Andrea	  Charron,	  Assistant	  Professor	  and	  Deputy-­‐Director	  of	  the	  Centre	  for	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Manitoba,	  Canada,	  argues	  that	  the	  Council	  has	  five	  options	  when	  confronting	  a	  conflict:32	  	  	  	  
1.	  Do	  nothing.	  	  
2.	  Recommend	  peaceful	  methods	  of	  dispute	  settlement	  as	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  VI	  of	  
the	  Charter,	  e.g.	  negotiations,	  arbitrations,	  or	  investigation	  of	  a	  conflict.	  	  
3.	   If	   peace	   is	   damaged	   or	   international	   peace	   is	   endangered,	   article	   40	   may	   be	  
invoked.	  It	  calls	  upon	  parties	  concerned	  to	  comply	  with	  measures	  the	  Council	  deems	  
necessary.	  
4.	   If	   peace	   is	   damaged	   or	   international	   peace	   is	   endangered,	   article	   41	   may	   be	  
invoked.	  It	  adopts	  measures	  “short	  of	  force”,	  i.e.	  sanctions.	  
5.	   If	   peace	   is	   damaged	   or	   international	   peace	   is	   endangered,	   article	   42	   may	   be	  
invoked.	  It	  adopts	  measures,	  which	  include	  the	  application	  of	  armed	  forces.33	  	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Security	  Council	  has	  the	  possibility	  to	  take	  a	  number	  of	  measures	  to	  deal	   with	   international	   conflicts,	   but	   the	   most	   common	   are	   missions	   and	   sanctions	  though.34	  	  Sanctions	   can	   be	   both	   preventive	   and	   punitive,	   and	   are	   unlimited	   in	   terms	   of	  whom	  it	  sanctions	  or	  what	  it	  sanctions.	  Charron	  writes	  that	  the	  Council	  must	  “tailor	  the	  sanction	   to	   suit	   the	   conflict”	   and	   the	   conflict	   dictates	   what	   sanctions	   that	   should	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  UNSC,	  ”Voting	  System	  and	  Records.”	  20.10.2014.	  	  31	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar,	  PIlgrimage	  for	  Peace,	  141.	  32	  University	  of	  Manitoba,	  ”Dr.	  Andrea	  Charron.”	  33	  Charron,	  UN	  Sanctions	  and	  Conflict,	  2.	  34	  Ibid.,	  1.	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taken.35	  However,	  for	  a	  decision	  or	  a	  measure	  to	  be	  implemented,	  it	  needs	  9	  affirmative	  votes	   out	   of	   15	   votes	   and	   no	   vetoes	   by	   the	   permanent	   members. 36 	  Unanimous	  agreement	   among	   the	   permanent	   members	   is	   therefore	   crucial.	   It	   should	   also	   be	  mentioned	   that	   states	   are	  not	   compelled	   to	  operate	   sanctions	  or	  measures	   applied	  by	  the	  Council.	  	  So	   what	   can	   the	   Security	   Council	   do	   when	   international	   law,	   like	   the	   Geneva	  Protocol	   is	  violated?	  Basically,	   the	  Council	  has	   the	  power	   to	   take	  whatever	  measure	   it	  finds	   suitable.	  Charron	  argues	   that	   the	  measure	  must	   tailor	   the	   conflict,	   and	   the	   same	  goes	  with	  international	  law:	  the	  measure	  must	  tailor	  the	  violation	  and	  the	  context	  it	  has	  been	   committed	   in.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war	   where	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   was	  violated,	   the	  Council	  could	   for	   instance	  have	  encouraged	  UN	  member	  states	  not	  to	  sell	  chemical	  component	  to	  Iraq.	  It	  is,	  as	  Charron’s	  five	  points	  show,	  natural	  to	  start	  with	  a	  light	  measure,	  and	  then	  increase	  the	  pressure	  and	  restore	  to	  harder	  means	  if	  the	  violator	  does	  not	  compel	  to	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  role	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  is	  the	  chief	  administrative	  officer	  of	  the	  entire	  UN,	  and	  works	  in	  close	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Security	  Council.	  It	  is	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  who	  shall	  bring	  matters	   he	   considers	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   international	   peace	   and	   security	   to	   the	   Security	  Council.	  The	  Security	  Council	  and	  other	  main	  bodies	  of	  the	  UN	  can	  entrust	  him	  functions,	  which	  he	  has	  to	  act	  according	  to.37	  The	  role	  of	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   is	   in	  other	  words	  wide	   and	   complex,	   and	   it	   is	   very	   much	   up	   to	   each	   individual	   Secretary-­‐General	   to	  understand	  and	  evaluate	  what	  the	  role	  carries.	  	  Javier	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar	  from	  Peru	  was	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  the	  period	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis,	   i.e.	  1983-­‐1988.	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar	  assumed	  office	  in	  1982,	  succeeding	  Kurt	  Waldheim	   from	   Austria,	   and	   resigned	   in	   1991.38	  As	   will	   be	   seen	   in	   this	   thesis,	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Charron,	  UN	  Sanctions	  and	  Conflict,	  1.	  36	  UNSC,	  ”Voting	  System	  and	  Records.”	  	  37	  UN,	  ”The	  Role	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.”	  38	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar,	  Pilgrimage	  for	  Peace,	  front	  flap.	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The	  Iran-­Iraq	  War	  	  	  The	   war	   between	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	   began	   in	   September	   1980,	   and	   was	   a	   result	   of	   both	  complex	  underlying	  causes	  and	  immediate	  causes.	  	  The	  border	  between	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	  had	  been	  a	   subject	   of	   dispute	   since	   the	  16th	  century	   when	   Iraq	   came	   under	   Ottoman	   rule,	   and	   the	   Shatt	   al-­‐Arab,	   an	   important	  waterway	  on	  the	  southern	  border	  of	  the	  two	  countries,	  was	  the	  core	  of	  the	  problem.39	  The	  river	  was	  important	  for	  both	  countries	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  and	  strategic	  value,	  and	  both	  countries	  claimed	  control	  rights	  over	  it.	  The	  Shatt	  al	  Arab	  was	  especially	  important	  to	  Iraq.	  Iraq	  has	  a	  short	  coastline,	  and	  the	  Shatt	  al	  Arab	  was	  Iraq’s	  only	  direct	  outlet	  into	  the	  Persian	  Gulf.	  Its	  importance	  increased	  when	  oil	  was	  discovered	  in	  the	  1920s,	  and	  the	  Shatt	  became	  an	  important	  communication	  line.40	  	  	  
	  Map	  1:	  Southern	  Iraq.	  Source:	  Google	  Maps.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  In	  Farsi:	  Arvand	  Rud.	  	  40	  Ingebrigtsen,	  Konflikten	  mellom	  Iran	  og	  Irak,	  14.	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Another	   factor,	   which	   was	   an	   underlying	   cause,	   was	   the	   ethnic	   difference	  between	   the	   two	   countries.	   The	   Iranians	   are	   Persians,	   a	   people	   with	   Indo-­‐European	  roots,	   and	   who	   speak	   Persian,	   while	   Iraqis	   are	   Arabs	   and	   speak	   Arabic.	   In	   addition,	  religious	  differences	  have	  contributed	  to	  strain	  the	  tensions	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  60-­‐65	  %	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   population	   are	   Shia	  Muslims,	   but	   32-­‐37	  %	   are	   Sunni,	   while	   the	  population	  of	  Iran	  are	  mainly	  Shia	  Muslims.41	  	  Both	   countries	  also	  have	  a	   considerable	  population	  of	  Kurds,	  which	  has	   caused	  tensions	   between	   the	   two	   neighbours	   in	   the	   20th	   century.	  When	   the	  Ottoman	   Empire	  was	  dissolved	  after	  WWI	  the	  Kurdish	  areas	   in	  what	  today	  are	   in	  Turkey,	   Iran	  and	  Iraq	  were	  divided.	  The	  creation	  of	  Iraq	  led	  to	  unrest	  among	  the	  Kurds,	  and	  the	  unrest	  turned	  into	  rebellion	  against	  Iraqi	  authorities	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Iraq	  blamed	  Iran	  for	  supporting	  the	  Kurds	  up	  against	  Baghdad,	  while	  Iran	  blamed	  Iraq	  for	  supporting	  Iranian	  Kurds	  against	  Tehran.	   The	   allegations	   were	   rooted	   in	   reality,	   and	   both	   countries	   used	   the	   strategy	  repeatedly	  during	  the	  20th	  century.42	  	  The	   relationship	   between	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	  was	   not	   only	   dominated	   by	   hostilities.	  There	  were	  also	  periods	  of	  cooperation	  and	  peace	  between	  the	  two	  neighbours.	  Border	  disputes	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  problem	  were	  settled	  in	  the	  1975	  Algiers	  Agreement.	  It	  was	  a	  peace	  agreement	  negotiated	  by	  Egypt,	  which	  made	  the	  Iranian	  shah	  to	  stop	  supporting	  the	  Kurdistan	  Democratic	  Party	   (KDP).,	  while	   Iraq	  had	   to	   accept	   thalweg	   (the	  median	  line)	  of	   Shatt	   al	  Arab	  as	   the	  border.	  That	  way	  both	   countries	  were	  allowed	   to	  use	   the	  waterway	  for	  transport	  of	  goods.43	  	  The	  immediate	  factor	  that	  triggered	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  was	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini’s	  seizure	  of	  power	  in	  Iran	  in	  1979.	  The	  new	  rule	  in	  Iran	  was	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  the	   Baath	   party	   rule	   in	   Iraq,	   and	   the	   new	   leader	   of	   Iran	   sought	   to	   spread	   the	   Islamic	  revolution	  to	  other	  countries.	  Saddam	  Hussein,	  who	  was	  Sunni,	  knew	  that	  Iraq	  with	  its	  large	  Shia	  population	  was	  a	  target.44	  Iraq	  had	  since	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  national	  state	  sought	  to	  be	  a	  leading	  power	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  Saddam	  understood	  that	  the	  time	  was	   ideal	   for	   him	   to	   hit	   when	   Iran	   was	   split	   and	   unstable	   after	   the	   revolution.	   In	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addition,	  Iran	  had	  distanced	  itself	  from	  its	  former	  powerful	  friend	  USA	  and	  other	  former	  allies,	  so	  Saddam	  knew	  that	  Iran	  was	  basically	  alone.45	  	  	  The	  Algiers	   agreement	  had	   settled	   the	  major	  disputes	   for	   a	   time,	   but	  both	   Iran	  and	  Iraq	  blamed	  the	  counterpart	   for	  violating	  their	  borders	  and	  territories	   in	   the	  year	  leading	  up	   to	   the	  outbreak	  of	  war.46	  	   Saddam	  Hussein	  declared	   the	  Algiers	  Agreement	  void	   17	   September	   1980.	   The	   conflict	   escalated	   the	   following	   days,	   and	   the	   full	   war	  broke	  out	  five	  days	  later	  when	  Iraq	  invaded	  Iranian	  territory.47	  	  Iraq	   advanced	   into	   Iranian	   territory	   the	   following	  months,	   but	   it	   became	   clear	  that	  Iran	  would	  not	  give	  up.	  Saddam	  had	  thought	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  to	  be	  unstable	  and	  weak,	  and	  imagined	  a	  war	  would	  be	  an	  easy	  win	  for	  Iraq.	  He	  was	  mistaken.	  An	  attacking	  state	  proved	  to	  be	  what	  Iran	  needed:	  An	  enemy,	  which	  the	  country	  could	  unite	  against.	  It	  also	  needed	  a	  strong	  leader	  and	  Khomeini	  thus	  managed	  to	  consolidate	  his	  power.	  After	  the	  initial	  Iraqi	  offensive	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  the	  war	  settled	  into	  a	  stalemate.48	  	  	  Iran’s	  forces	  were	  disorganised	  and	  on	  the	  defensive	  in	  the	  first	  period	  of	  the	  war,	  but	   they	   got	   over	   the	   initial	   chaos,	   and	   reorganized	   parts	   of	   the	   military	   system	   in	  addition	   to	   rally	  among	   the	  population	  so	   the	  armed	   forces	   increased.49	  Iran	  began	   its	  counterattack	   in	   May	   1981,	   and	   had	   recaptured	   almost	   all	   of	   its	   areas	   by	   June	   1982	  when	  the	  final	  Iraqi	  troops	  withdrew	  from	  Iranian	  territory.50	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  had	  no	   intentions	  to	  stop	  at	   the	  border.	  He	  saw	  the	  Iranian	  advantage	  in	  the	  war	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  Baath	  party	  and	  continued	  the	  Iranian	   offensive.	   Iraq,	   once	   the	   tide	   had	   turned,	   was	   willing	   to	   negotiate	   a	   peace	  brokered	   by	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council,	   but	   Ayatollah	   Khomeini	   refused	   to	   accept	   the	  resolutions	  UN	  proposed	  unless	  Saddam	  resigned.51	  The	   Iraqi	   leader	   ruled	   that	  option	  out,	  so	  the	  war	  continued	  and	  escalated	  the	  following	  years.	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  Map	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  The	  Gulf	  region.	  Source:	  Google	  Map.	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3. The	  First	  Attacks	  with	  Chemical	  Weapons	  	  	  
	  Autumn	  1983:	  The	  First	  Reports	  of	  Use	  of	  Gas	  	  Rumours	  of	  the	  use	  of	  poison	  gas	  had	  circulated	  since	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  war,	  but	  the	  rumours	  had	  never	  gained	  any	  attention	   in	   international	  media	  or	   in	   international	  politics.	   Iraq	  might	   have	   used	   tear	   gas	  when	   they	  withdrew	   from	   Iranian	   territory	   in	  1982,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  reports	  or	  data	  confirming	  this.52	  	  	  The	  Land	  war	  in	  1983	  	  The	  first	  reliable	  reports	  of	  use	  of	  illegal	  gases	  came	  in	  1983.	  At	  that	  time,	  fighting	  took	  place	  at	  central	  parts	  of	  the	  border	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  and	  neither	  Iran	  nor	  Iraq	  managed	   to	   conquer	   significant	   areas	   of	   land,	   and	   Saddam	  Hussein’s	   “quick	  war”	   had	  turned	  into	  a	  long	  and	  bloody	  conflict.53	  It	  was	  clear	  at	  this	  point	  that	  the	  Iranian	  forces	  were	  much	  better	  organized	  than	  they	  had	  been	  in	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  land	  Iraq	  had	  conquered	  in	  the	  first	  offensives	  was	  retaken	  by	  Iran.	  Iraq	  initiated	  a	  war	  in	  the	  Gulf	  in	  1983	  as	  well,	  where	  Iraqi	  air	  fighters	  attacked	  Iranian	  oil	  tankers	  and	  oil	   installations.	  France	  had	  sold	  Super-­‐Etendard	  fighter	  planes	  with	  Exocet	  missiles	  to	  Iraq	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1983,	  which	  made	  Iraq’s	  air	  force	  superior	  over	  Iran’s.54	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  divert	  some	  of	  Iran’s	  attention	  from	  the	  border	  war,	  to	  lead	  off	  resources	  and	  to	  injure	   Iran’s	   economy.55	  Still,	   it	   did	   not	   hinder	   the	   land	   war	   from	   continuing	   and	  escalating	  in	  1983.	  	  The	  land	  war	  had	  been	  a	  war	  of	  attrition	  since	  1982,	  but	  the	  standstill	  changed	  in	  1983.	  Iran	  launched	  an	  offensive,	  Wal	  Fajr,	  in	  February,	  which	  was	  directed	  at	  the	  road	  between	   Basrah	   and	   Baghdad,	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   cities	   in	   Iraq	   and	   the	   capital.56	  Even	  though	  Wal	   Fajr	  was	   a	  massive	   attack,	   a	  much	  more	  modern	   and	  well-­‐equipped	   Iraqi	  army	  stopped	  them	  and	  the	   Iranian	  gains	  were	   limited,	  much	  because	  of	  Saddam’s	  air	  force.57	  Two	  months	   later	   the	   Iranians	  attacked	  again	  as	  a	  part	  of	   the	   initial	  offensive,	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but	  yet	  again	  Saddam’s	  air	   force	  saved	   Iraq	  as	   it	  had	  done	   in	   the	   first	  Wal	  Fajr	  attack.	  Khomeini	   and	   his	   advisers	   in	   Iran	   understood	   that	   they	   had	   to	   change	   their	   tactics	   if	  they	  wanted	  to	  succeed.	  Instead	  of	  launching	  one,	  big	  attack,	  Iran	  planned	  to	  stretch	  the	  front	  along	  the	  border	  and	  attack	  several	  places	  at	   the	  same	  time.	   Iran	  also	  wanted	  to	  open	  a	  new	  front	  at	  Iraq’s	  weakest	  point;	  in	  the	  north	  of	  Iraq	  where	  the	  population	  was	  mainly	  Kurdish	  and	  hostile	  to	  the	  regime	  in	  Baghdad.58	  A	  third	  offensive,	  Wal	  Fajr	  II,	  was	  therefore	  launched	  in	  July	  1983.	  Iranian	  forces	  together	  with	  Kurdish	  groups	  advanced	  quickly	  into	  Iraqi	  territory	  in	  the	  north	  and	  managed	  to	  break	  off	  the	  route	  between	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  areas	  in	  Iran,	  where	  Saddam	  had	  encouraged	  and	  helped	  the	  population	  rebel	  against	  the	  regime	  in	  Tehran.	  Iraqi	  forces	  eventually	  stopped	  the	  Iranian	  advances,	  but	   the	  area	  became	  a	  headache	   to	  Saddam	  Hussein	  as	   Iraqi	  Kurdish	  groups	  and	   Iran	  teamed	  up.59	  It	  was	  obvious	   that	   Iran	  had	  gained	   the	   initiative	   in	   the	  war.	  Wal	  Fajr	   III	  took	  place	  from	  Mehran	  on	  the	  central	  front	  from	  30	  July	  until	  10	  August.	  The	  Iranians	  managed	  to	  take	  some	  Iraqi	  territory,	  but	  the	  costs	  were	  high.	  Estimated	  deaths	  in	  the	  region	  were	  12,000.60	  Iraq	  counter	  attacked	  with	  helicopters	  and	  aircraft,	  and	  the	   first	  reliable	  reports	  of	  use	  of	  poisonous	  gas	  started	  to	  emerge	  in	  international	  media.	  	  Iraq’s	   chemical	  weapons	   programme	  had	   been	   developed	   since	   the	   1960s,	   and	  Saddam	  Hussein	  was	  both	  bold	  and	  crazy	  enough	  to	  consider	  using	  it,	  despite	  Iraq	  being	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol.	  Iraq	  was	  under	  heavy	  pressure,	  and	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  his	  advisors	  had	  to	  halt	  the	  Iranian	  progress	  at	  any	  cost	  if	  they	  wanted	  to	  save	  Iraq	  and	  remain	  in	  power.	  An	  easy	  option	  was	  to	  incorporate	  gas	  in	  their	  warfare.	  Unofficial	  reports	  from	  July	  1982	  claim	  that	  Iraq	  had	  used	  tear	  gas	  to	  stop	  Iran	  from	  using	  human	  waves	   attacks.	   Human	   waves	   were	   an	   attack	   strategy	   where	   waves	   of	   thousands	   of	  unprotected	  Basij	  volunteers,	  the	  Iranian	  paramilitary	  militia,	  attacked	  and	  tried	  to	  run	  down	   Iraqi	  defence	   lines.	   Iranian	   forces	   thought	   the	   gas	  was	   a	  poisonous	   gas,	   so	   they	  fled	  the	  area.	  Tear	  gas	  is	  not	  lethal,	  and	  it	  has	  only	  temporary	  effect	  on	  the	  victims,	  but	  it	  had	   showed	   Iraqi	   officers	   how	   chemical	   weapons	   could	   be	   used.61	  Considering	   the	  situation	   in	   the	   war	   Iraq	   came	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   advantages	   of	   chemical	  weapons	   were	   worth	   giving	   it	   a	   try,	   despite	   the	   negative	   implications	   it	   might	   have.	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International	   response	   was	   probably	   one	   of	   the	   heaviest	   arguments	   for	   not	   using	  chemical	  weapons,	  as	  Iraq	  was	  dependent	  on	  support	  from	  other	  states.	  	  	  Iran	   continued	   their	   strategy	   of	   stretching	   the	   front	   line,	   and	   attacked	   again	   in	  October	  1983.	  The	  Wal	  Fajr	   IV	  offensive	  was	  successful	   from	  an	  Iranian	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  Iraq	  was	  pushed	  further	  back	  into	  Iraqi	  territory.	  Iraq	  eventually	  managed	  to	  stop	  the	   Iranian	   offensive,	   but	   new	   rumours	   appeared,	   claiming	   scud	   missiles	   and	   bombs	  with	  mustard	  gas	  were	  fired	  against	  civilian	  targets	  in	  Iran.62	  	  	  November	  1983:	  The	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  becomes	  a	  UN	  issue	  	  The	   rumours	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   were	   for	   the	   first	   time	   reported	   to	   the	   Secretary	  General	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   November	   1983.	   In	   letters	   sent	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General,	  Iran	   accused	   Iraq	   for	   using	   gas	   in	   the	   warfare.	   The	   use	   had	   taken	   place	   on	   several	  occasions	   in	   various	   sectors	   of	   the	   front	   the	   past	   weeks,	   and	   the	   Iranian	   UN	  representative	   submitted	   a	   report	   subsequently	   with	   detailed	   information	   about	   the	  attacks.	  Iran	  requested	  that	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  should	  send	  a	  fact-­‐finding	  mission	  to	  investigate	  and	  examine	  the	  medical	  and	  military	  evidence	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  so	  facts	  could	  be	  established.63	  Three	  letters	  concerning	  the	  same	  matter	  followed	  the	  two	  next	  weeks,	  and	  reported	  of	  an	  alarming	  escalation	  of	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  Iran	  later	  informed	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   that	   samples	   of	   sand	   and	   chemical	   artillery	   had	   been	  received	   from	   the	  Piranshahr	  area,	  which	  was	  attacked	  on	  25	  October,	   and	   that	   these	  samples	  would	  be	  available	  as	  evidence	  of	  Iraq’s	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  to	  a	  mission	  sent	  by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General.	   Iran	   also	   submitted	   a	  detailed	   report	   of	   the	   attack	   that	  affected	   Iranian	   troops	   with	   burning	   in	   the	   throat,	   difficulties	   breathing,	   coughing,	  wetness	  of	  eyes	  and	  nose,	  nausea	  and	  senselessness.	  The	  Iranian	  representative	  to	  the	  UN,	   Said	   Rajaie-­‐Khorassani,	   also	   attached	   pictures	   of	   the	   victims,	   and	   informed	   that	  several	  other	  attacks	  had	  been	  carried	  out	  as	  well,	  mostly	  in	  the	  Khorramshahr	  area	  in	  southern	  Iran.64	  	  	  Iran	   reported	  of	   two	  more	  attacks	  on	   civilians	   in	   the	  middle	  of	  November.	  One	  attack	  hit	  the	  town	  of	  Baneh	  in	  northwestern	  Iran,	  where	  31	  persons	  were	  injured,	  and	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  Wagner,	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four	  died.65	  The	  other	  attack	  had	  aimed	  at	  the	  village	  of	  Bademjan	  on	  21	  October,	  where	  11	   had	   died	   and	  many	  more	  were	   injuries.66	  	   Khorrasani	  wrote	   several	   letters	   to	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  November,	  where	  he	  repeated	  the	  request	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  send	  a	  mission	  to	  investigate	  and	  verify	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  and	  highlighted	  the	   importance	   that	   it	   should	  happen	  before	   the	   traces	  of	   the	  use	  disappeared,	  which	  chemical	  weapons	  do	  with	  time.67	  	  The	  Iraqi	  Government	  rejected	  the	  accusations,	  and	  claimed	  that	  the	  allegations	  were	  a	   trick	   to	  divert	   the	  attention	  of	   the	  UN	  from	  the	   Iranian	  aggression	  against	   Iraq	  and	   that	   Iran	   rejected	   the	   Security	   Council	   resolutions	   calling	   for	   peace.	   Iraq	   also	  opposed	  that	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  should	  give	  “any	  response	  to	  the	  Iranian	  allegations,	  through	  the	  dispatch	  of	  either	  a	  representative	  or	  an	  expert	  or	  a	  team	  of	  experts	  […..]”	  The	   attention	   should	   be	   at	   achieving	   peace,	   not	   at	   Iranian	   “procrastination	   tactics”,	  which	  aimed	  to	  disengage	  states	  from	  international	  obligations.68	  	  
	  The	  Council	  and	  the	  Secretary-­General’s	  First	  Responses	  	  	  Iran	  had	  broken	  off	  all	   contact	  with	   the	  Security	  Council	   since	  1980.	  Tehran	  criticized	  the	  Security	  Council	   for	  not	   condemning	   Iraq	   for	   the	   aggression,	   and	  viewed	   this	   as	   a	  favouring	  of	   Iraq.	  The	   Iranian	  representative	   thus	  only	  had	  contact	  with	   the	  Secretary	  General,	  whom	  Iran	  still	  thought	  was	  impartial.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  this,	   and	   he	   writes	   in	   his	   memoirs	   that	   he	   deliberately	   distanced	   himself	   from	   the	  Security	   Council,	   so	   Iran	   would	   not	   abandon	   talks	   altogether.69	  Still,	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  had	  to	  have	  certain	  relations	  to	  the	  Security	  Council,	  as	  only	  the	  Council	  could	  make	  decisions.	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The	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  response	  	  Despite	   Iran’s	   requests	   to	   send	   a	   mission	   to	   confirm	   the	   allegations,	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  did	  not	   answer	   Iran’s	   first	   letters,	   nor	  did	  he	   take	   the	   request	   to	   the	  Security	  Council.	   Instead,	  he	   focused	  on	  establishing	  communication	  between	  Iraq	  and	  Iran.	  He	  worked	  out	  an	  eight-­‐point	  plan,	  which	  should	  be	  the	  focus	  for	  negotiations	  between	  the	  two	   parties.70	  The	   Secretary-­‐General’s	   eight	   points	   served	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   discussions	  related	  to	  a	  negotiated	  settlement,	  where	  the	  main	  aim	  was	  a	  cease	  fire	  and	  withdrawal	  of	  all	  forces	  to	  agreed	  lines.71	  The	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  first	  official	  comment	  to	  Iran’s	  requests	  came	  in	  a	  report	  published	  in	  mid	  December.	  The	  report	  was	  submitted	  in	  pursuance	  of	  paragraph	  4	  of	  UNSC	   resolution	   540	   of	   1983,	   which	   condemned	   breaches	   on	   humanitarian	   law,	  affirmed	   the	   right	   to	   navigate	   in	   international	   waters,	   and	   which	   had	   urged	   the	  Secretary	  General	  to	  continue	  his	  peace	  efforts.72	  In	  the	  end	  of	  the	  report,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  brought	  to	  attention	  that	  Iran	  had	  requested	  a	  new	  mission	  to	  the	  conflict	  areas	  to	  update	  the	  report	  from	  May.	  Iran’s	  suggestion	  had	  been	  that	  the	  mission	  could	  carry	  out	  inspections	  in	  both	  countries,	  but	  Iraq	  had	  not	  been	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  on	  such	  a	  matter.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  argued	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  practically	  to	  send	  a	  fact-­‐finding	  mission	  as	  long	  as	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  did	  not	  agree.	  Iraq	  argued	  that	  the	  aspect	  of	  chemical	   weapons	   could	   not	   be	   seen	   isolated	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   war.73	  Because	   of	  Iraq’s	  stand	  to	  the	  issue,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  argued	  that	  nothing	  more	  could	  be	  done.	  Instead,	   he	   and	   his	   Special	   Representative,	   Olof	   Palme,	  would	   continue	   their	   effort	   to	  settle	  the	  conflict.74	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   referred	   to	   Iran’s	   letters,	   but	   did	   not	  mention	  why	   Iran	  wanted	   the	   report	   updated,	   and	   he	   did	   not	   put	   any	   pressure	   on	   Iraq,	   despite	   the	  violation	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  and	  the	  General	  Assembly	  resolution,	  which	  called	  for	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  to	  be	  upheld.	  There	  can	  be	  many	  reasons	  to	  the	  hesitation	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	   to	   do	   something	   specific	   about	   the	   allegations	   of	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons.	   Iraq	  had	  been	  willing	   to	  negotiate	  since	   Iran	  had	  taken	  over	   the	   initiative	   in	  the	  war.	   Iraq	  had	  also	  participated	   in	  peace	  talks	  with	  the	  Security	  Council.	   In	  autumn	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  Cuellar,	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1983,	   peace	   was	   the	   Secretary-­‐General’s	   primary	   aim.	   Iran,	   on	   the	   other	   side,	   had	  boycotted	   the	   Security	   Council	   since	   1980,	   and	   refused	   to	   participate	   in	   negotiations	  with	  Iraq.	  This	  made	  it	  more	  complicated	  for	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  (and	  the	  Council)	  to	  criticise	  Iraq	  or	  investigate	  the	  allegations	  against	  Iraq,	  since	  Baghdad	  cooperated.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  might	   have	   feared	   that	   if	   he	   complied	  with	   Iran’s	  wishes,	   he	  would	  loose	  the	  Iraqi	  willingness	  to	  end	  the	  war.	  Any	  hopes	  of	  a	  peace	  agreement	  might	  have	  been	  overshadowed	  if	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  looked	  into.	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  did	  not	  take	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  for	  a	  reason.	  The	   relationship	   between	   Iraq	   and	   third-­‐party	   states	   had	   improved,	   while	   the	  relationship	  between	   Iran	  and	   third-­‐party	  states	  crumbled.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  had	  previously	  in	  1983	  not	  called	  on	  the	  Council	  to	  meet	  and	  deal	  with	  the	  war	  as	  a	  threat	  on	  international	   security,	   because	   he	   regarded	   it	   as	   unlikely	   that	   the	   Council	  would	   take	  effective	   action.75	  If	   the	   Council	   would	   take	   action	   to	   secure	   international	   peace,	   the	  Council	  would	  not	  take	  action	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  especially	  not	  when	  both	  superpowers	  tilted	  towards	  Iraq.	  	  Despite	   the	  evasive	  response	   from	  the	  Secretary	  General,	   it	  seemed	  that	  he	  still	  enjoyed	  respect	  from	  Iran,	  because	  they	  continued	  to	  contact	  him	  and	  to	  look	  to	  him	  for	  solutions.	   Iran	   blamed	   the	   international	   community	   instead,	   and	  was	   disappointed	   by	  the	  response	  to	  the	  issue.	  Khorrasani	  called	  it	  “a	  failure	  to	  their	  responsibilities.”76	  	  	  Spring	  1984:	  New	  allegations	  and	  the	  first	  specific	  action	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  	  The	  warfare	  slowed	  down	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  1983,	  because	  of	  the	  rainy	  season,	  and	  the	  war	  came	  to	  a	  new	  standstill.77	  	  	  The	  Kurds	  continued	  their	  guerrilla	  warfare	  against	   Iraqi	   troops	   in	   the	  north	   in	  1984,	  so	  a	  considerable	  part	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  had	  to	  be	  stationed	  to	  fight	  in	  the	  north.78	  This	  was	  of	  course	  an	  advantage	  for	  Iran,	  as	  it	  lessened	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  central	  and	  the	   southern	   front.	   The	   Kurdish	   rebellion	   in	   northern	   Iraq	   allowed	   Iran	   to	   focus	   on	  central	  parts	  of	  the	  border.79	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  86.	  79	  Cordesman	  &	  Wagner,	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  War,	  178.	  
	   31	  
Khorsassani	  continued	  to	  send	  letters	  to	  the	  Secretary	  General	  in	  the	  first	  months	  of	  1984,	  where	  they	  encouraged	  him	  to	  send	  missions	  to	  Iran	  to	  confirm	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used.	   Iraq	  continued	  to	  oppose	   it.	  The	  appeals	   from	  Iran	  to	   the	  UN	  had	   also	   caught	   media’s	   attention.	   Especially	   Western	   media	   started	   to	   dig	   into	   the	  allegations	   about	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons,	   which	   put	   pressure	   on	   the	   Security	  Council	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  breach	  of	  international	  law.80	  	  In	  February,	  three	  months	  after	  the	  first	  letters	  from	  Iran,	  the	  Secretary	  General	  announced	  that	  he	  planned	  to	  send	  a	  mission	  to	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq.	  He	  declared	  that	  it	  was	  his	  duty	  to	  dispatch	  a	  mission	  to	  investigate	  allegations	  from	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  of	  attacks	   on	   civilian	   targets.	   The	  mission	  would	   be	   dispatched	  when	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	   had	  agreed	  on	  its	  functions.81	  	  Iraq	  had	  as	  mentioned	  opposed	  a	  fact-­‐finding	  mission,	  because	  they	  insisted	  that	  it	  was	  more	   important	   to	  work	  on	  a	  peace	  solution	   instead.	   Iraq	  highlighted	   that	   they	  were	   subject	   to	   Iranian	   aggression,	   and	   that	   Iraq	   had	   welcomed	   peace	   talks	   and	  resolutions,	   contrary	   to	   Iran.82	  However,	   Iraq	   changed	   its	   stand	   in	   a	   letter	   dated	   18	  February	  1984	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  initiative,	  and	  welcomed	  a	  mission.	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  did	  not	  specify	  investigation	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  as	  a	  purpose	  of	  the	  mission,	  nor	  did	  he	  refer	  to	  the	  resolution,	  which	  the	  General	  Assembly	  had	  adopted	  in	  1982.83	  The	  treatment	  of	  prisoners	  of	  war	  and	  attacks	  on	  civilians	  with	  conventional	  weapons	  were	  areas	  of	  international	  law	  that	  Iran	  had	  also	  violated,	  and	  a	  focus	  on	  this	  as	  well	  might	  have	  contributed	  to	  make	  Iraq	  more	  willing	  to	  accept	  a	  mission.	  	  	  The	  mission	  was	  not	  sent	  before	  March	  and	  the	  war	  continued	  in	  the	  meantime.	  	  Iran	  attacked	  Iraq	  again	  on	  22	  February,	  and	  the	  target	  was	  the	  road	  between	  Baghdad	  and	   Basrah	   this	   time	   as	   well.	   Several	   Iranian	   divisions	   went	   through	   the	   Hawizeh	  marshes,	  which	  is	  a	  difficult	  terrain	  to	  move	  troops	  and	  military	  equipment	  through.	  It	  took	   time,	   which	   again	   made	   it	   an	   easy	   target	   for	   Iraqi	   counterattacks.	   The	   Iranian	  attack	  was,	  however,	  well	  planned	  and	  backed	  by	  air	  support,	  so	  100,000	  Iranian	  troops	  advanced	   through	   the	   area.	   Iran	  was	   successful	   further	   south	   as	  well.	  Majnoon	   Island	  and	   the	   outskirts	   of	   Qurna,	   a	   city	   north	   of	   Shafi,	   and	   within	   the	   reach	   of	   the	   Basra-­‐	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Baghdad	   highway	   were	   captured	   by	   Iran.84	  The	   Majnoon	   Island	   is	   an	   island	   in	   the	  middle	  of	  Majnoon	  oil	  field,	  Iraq’s	  biggest	  oilfield	  and	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  richest,	  and	  was	  therefore	  important	  to	  take	  for	  the	  Iranians.	  	  Iraq	   had	   not	   been	   prepared	   for	   the	   attack,	   but	   all	   available	   resources	   were	  mobilized	   to	   strike	   back	   just	   in	   time	   before	   Iran	   took	   Qurna.	   The	   southern	   part	   of	  Majnoon	  was	  also	  retaken,	  but	  the	  counterattacks	  had	  its	  cost:	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  once	  again	  used.85	  	  According	  to	  Khorassani,	  yellow	  gas,	  most	  likely	  mustard	  gas,	  had	  been	  released	  on	   28	   February	   in	   Khaybar	   and	   700	   claimed	   casualties.86	  This	  was	   the	   biggest	   attack	  with	   chemical	   weapons	   so	   far	   in	   the	   war.	   Khorassani	   claimed	   that	   Iraq	   had	   used	  chemical	   weapons	   against	   Iranian	   troops	   the	   previous	   days	   also,	   then	   in	   the	   area	   of	  Hawizeh	  marshes.87	  400	  soldiers	  had	  been	  killed	  or	  wounded	  in	  the	  attack,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  gas	  it	  had	  sunk	  into	  the	  marshes,	  which	  made	  its	  effect	  last	  longer.88	  All	  together,	  Iran	  claimed	  that	  1200	  had	  lost	  their	  lives	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Iraqi	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  while	  another	  5000	  were	  injured	  in	  forms	  of	  blisters,	  breathing	  problems	  and	  eye	  problems.89	  	  Iraq	  managed	  to	  stop	  the	  Iranian	  offensive,	  but	  the	  marshes	  prevented	  Saddam’s	  troops	   from	  striking	  back.	  The	   Iraqi	  military	  was	  modern	  with	   tanks,	  military	  vehicles	  and	  heavy	  armed	  troops,	  something	  that	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  fight	  light	  Iranian	  infantry	  in	  the	  marshy	  landscape.	  Still,	  after	  three	  weeks	  of	  fighting	  Iraq	  managed	  to	  push	  Iranian	  troops	   back,	   and	   the	   important	   road	   between	   Basrah	   and	   Baghdad	   was	   still	   in	   Iraqi	  hands.	  But	   the	  battle	  had	   its	   cost.	   500,000	   soldiers	  participated,	   and	  27,000	   lost	   their	  lives.90	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  Map	  4:	  Clip	  of	  southern	  Iraq.	  Source:	  Google	  Maps.	  	  	  	  American	  responses	  to	  the	  new	  revelations	  	  Iran	   sent	  many	   of	   the	   gas	   victims	   to	   European	   hospitals	   for	   treatment.	   Patients	  were	  sent	  to	  hospitals	  in	  Stockholm,	  Vienna	  and	  London,	  and	  the	  issue	  gained	  more	  attention	  when	  European	  doctors	  saw	  what	  cruel	  weapons	  they	  had	  been	  exposed	  to.	  	  American	  journalists	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  US	  Government	  to	  find	  out	  if	  they	  knew	  about	  the	  use,	  and	  whether	  they	  planned	  to	  do	  anything	  about	  it.	  The	  topic	  of	  chemical	  weapons	   became	   a	   delicate	  matter	   for	   the	   US	   since	   they	   had	  worked	   to	   improve	   the	  relations	  to	  Iraq	  in	  the	  last	  three	  years.	  But	  as	  a	  world	  power,	  which	  viewed	  themselves	  as	  a	  protector	  of	  human	  rights,	   they	   could	  not	   ignore	   it	   either.	  The	  US	   concluded	   that	  Iraq	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  a	  public	  comment	  5	  March	  1984.	  It	  further	  condemned	  the	  use	  and	  asked	  both	  countries	  to	  respect	  international	  law.91	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The	  first	  UN	  mission	  to	  investigate	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  	  The	   US	   statement	   put	   indirectly	   a	   pressure	   on	   the	   UN	   as	   the	   superior	   international	  peacekeeping	  organization.	  As	  mentioned,	  after	   repeated	  requests	   from	  Iran	   to	  send	  a	  mission	  to	  confirm	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  sent	  a	  mission	  to	  Iran	   from	   13	   March	   to	   19	   March	   1984.	   Even	   though	   it	   was	   not	   mentioned	   in	   the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	   letter	   to	   Iran	   and	   Iraq,	   the	   mission’s	   main	   task	   was	   to	   find	   out	  whether	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	  in	  Iran	  or	  not,	  and	  if	  it	  had	  been	  used;	  what	  kind	  of	  and	  to	  what	  extent.92	  	  The	   mission	   consisted	   of	   four	   specialists	   within	   the	   field	   of	   chemistry,	   one	   of	  them	  specializing	  in	  atomic,	  biological	  and	  chemical	  weapons.	  The	  specialists	  examined	  evidences	  on	   sites	  where	   chemical	  weapons	  were	   claimed	  used,	  weapons	  which	  were	  claimed	  to	  have	  contained	  chemical	  substances,	  and	  patients	  who	  were	  claimed	  to	  have	  injuries	  that	  resulted	  from	  chemical	  weapons.	  In	  addition	  were	  samples	  from	  sites	  and	  weapons	  sent	  to	  laboratories	  in	  Europe	  to	  be	  examined	  there.	  The	  report	  reached	  a	  clear	  conclusion:	  Chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used,	  more	  specifically	  tabun	  and	  mustard	  gas,	  in	  the	  forms	  of	  aerial	  bombs.93	  	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   showed	   that	   he	   took	   the	   allegations	   seriously	   when	   he	  sent	  a	  mission	  to	  Iran	  to	  investigate	  the	  Iranian	  allegations	  of	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  Iran	  was	  also	  satisfied	  with	  his	  effort.	  	  	  The	  Secretary	  General’s	  response	  to	  the	  mission’s	  report	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  commented	  the	  findings	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  a	  public	  note.	  He	  wrote:	  “the	  Secretary	  General	  [….]	  cannot	  but	  deplore	  that	  their	  unanimous	  conclusions	  substantiate	  the	  allegations	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  have	  been	  used.”	  He	  also	  highlighted	  the	   importance	   of	   observing	   that	   international	   law	   was	   being	   complied	   with,	   and	  referred	   to	   a	   statement	   two	   days	   before	   the	   report	   was	   published	   where	   he	   had	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  Report	   of	   the	   specialists	   appointed	   by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   to	   investigate	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   by	   Iran	  concerning	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons:	   Note	   by	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   Secretary-­‐General.	   (Published	   26.3.1984)	   UNSC	  document	  S/16433.	  93	  Idem.	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condemned	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons	   “wherever	   and	  whenever	   this	  may	   occur.”94	  The	  Secretary	  General	  ended	  his	  note	  by	  writing	   that	  he	  believes	   that	   the	  only	  way	   to	  stop	  the	  violation	  of	  humanitarian	  law	  is	  by	  ending	  the	  war.95	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   did	   not	   condemn	   Iraq	   for	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons,	  even	   though	   the	   report	   stated	   that	   it	   was	   only	   Iranians	   who	   had	   been	   affected	   by	  chemical	  weapons.	  He	  deplored	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used,	  and	  declared	  that	  such	  weapons	  should	  not	  be	  used	  anywhere	  at	  any	  time.	   In	  other	  words,	   Iraq	  was	  not	  made	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  mission	  and	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  warfare	  and	  the	  political	  deadlock	  in	  the	  Security	  Council,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  and	  Olof	  Palme	  decided	  to	  continue	  to	  act	  individually	  from	  the	  Council.96	  	  	  	  The	  Security	  Council’s	  response	  to	  the	  report	  	  When	   the	   report	   showed	   that	   chemical	   weapons	   had	   been	   used	   it	   challenged	   the	  Security	  Council	  in	  new	  ways:	  their	  response	  towards	  the	  issue	  could	  be	  essential	  in	  the	  already	  strained	  relationship	  with	  Iran,	  but	  their	  response	  could	  also	  affect	  the	  relations	  with	  Iraq.	  In	  addition,	  the	  response	  would	  send	  signals	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  as	  well.	  	  	  	  The	  Security	  Council	  met	  to	  discuss	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  mission	  in	  the	  end	  of	  March.	  	  The	  representatives	  of	  the	  permanent	  member	  states,	  in	  addition	  to	  Egypt,	  India,	  Malta,	  Netherlands,	  Nicaragua,	  Pakistan,	  Peru,	  Ukrainian	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republic,	  Upper	  Volta	  (later	  Burkina	  Faso)	  and	  Zimbabwe	  were	  present	  at	  the	  meeting.	  The	  president	  made	  a	  statement	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  its	  members,	  where	  they	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	   weapons	   and	   referred	   to	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   of	   1925.	   Further	   on	   he	  condemned	  all	  violations	  of	  humanitarian	  law,	  and	  urged	  both	  parties	  to	  oblige.	  Finally	  he	  recalled	  previous	  resolutions,	  and	  called	  for	  a	  cessation	  of	  hostilities.97	  	  Despite	   the	   report	   that	   said	   chemical	   weapons	   had	   been	   used,	   the	   Security	  Council	  did	  not	   take	  action.	  The	  Council	   condemned	   the	  use	  of	   chemical	  weapons,	  but	  Iraq	   is	  not	  addressed	  directly	   in	   this	  declaration	  either,	  and	  what	   is	   interesting	   is	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94 	  Report	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   the	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   appointed	   by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   to	   investigate	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   by	   Iran	  concerning	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons:	   Note	   by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General.	   (Published	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   UNSC	  document	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  95	  Idem.	  96	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar,	  Pilgrimage	  for	  Peace,	  142.	  	  97	  UNSC	  2514th	  meeting	  30.3.1984.	  UNSC	  document	  S/PV.2524.	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both	  parties	  are	  addressed	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  breaking	  humanitarian	   law.	  The	  rights	  of	  prisoners	  of	  war	  were	  a	  big	  issue	  during	  the	  war,	  and	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  were	  criticized	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  them,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  countries	  attacked	  civilian	  areas.	  When	  half	  of	   the	  statement	  concerned	  another	  aspect	  of	   the	  war	  than	  what	  the	  report	  was	  about,	  it	  lost	  some	  if	  its	  importance,	  and	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  did	  not	  pay	  much	  attention	  to	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  This	  was	  the	  only	  meeting	  in	  1984	  which	  discussed	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  despite	  Iran’	  reporting	  of	  several	  more	  instances	  even	  after	  the	  report	  on	  Iraq’s	  use	  of	  them.	   The	   Council	   adopted	   one	   resolution	   in	   1984,	   which	   concerned	   attacks	   on	  merchant	  vessels	  in	  the	  Gulf.98	  It	  shows	  that	  the	  flow	  of	  oil	  was	  much	  more	  important	  to	  the	  Council	  than	  the	  issue	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  The	  report	  did	  not	  address	  Iraq,	  and	  no	  specific	   actions	   were	   taken	   by	   the	   Council	   to	   stop	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons.	   20	  instances	  of	  gas	  attacks	  were	  reported	  by	   Iran	  after	   the	  publication	  of	   the	  report.	   Iraq	  denied	  that	  they	  had	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  In	  the	  response	  to	  the	  report,	  Iraq	  criticized	  the	  Council	  for	  focusing	  on	  minor	  aspects	  of	  the	  conflict.99	  	  Iran	  complained	   to	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   that	  nothing	  was	  done,	  and	  pointed	  out	   that	  even	  though	  countries	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  no	  one	  did	  anything	  to	  prevent	  it.100	  Companies	  in	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  Great	  Britain	  sold	  components	  that	  could	  be	  used	  for	  the	  production	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  According	  to	  Hilterman,	  the	  American	  export	  restrictions	  did	  not	  prove	  efficient	  either,	  and	  Iraq	  had	  probably	  reached	  a	  point	  where	  they	  were	  more	  or	  less	  self-­‐supplied	  with	  equipment,	  material	  and	  substances	  to	  produce	  chemical	  weapons	  themselves.101	  	  	  	  
Iran	  and	  Iraq’s	  Relations	  With	  the	  UN	  and	  Third-­Party	  States	  
	  
	  Some	   notes	   should	   be	  made	   on	   the	   relations	   between	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	   and	   the	   Security	  Council	   and	   third	  party	   states	   in	   the	   first	   years	   of	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	   This	   can	   explain	  why	   the	   Secretary	   General	   and	   the	   Security	   Council	   responded	   to	   the	   first	   chemical	  weapons	  allegations	  with	  hesitation	  and	  an	  evasive	  condemnation.	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Iran,	  Iraq	  and	  the	  UN	  
	  It	  was	  expected	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  would	  condemn	  Iraq	  for	  the	  aggression	  when	  Iraq	   invaded	   Iran	   in	  September	  1980.	  For	  some	  reason,	   the	  Council	  did	  not,	  despite	   it	  being	  a	  responsibility	  manifested	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  Instead,	  the	  Council	  urged	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  to	  settle	  their	  disputes.	   In	  practice,	  this	  meant	  that	  a	  ceasefire	  should	  happen	  even	  though	  Iraqi	  forces	  were	  still	   in	  Iranian	  territory.	  The	  Council	  also	  equalized	  Iran	  and	   Iraq,	  even	   though	  one	  part	   initiated	   the	  war	  and	   the	  other	  part	  defended	   itself.102	  Because	  of	   this,	   Iran	  broke	  off	  all	  communications	  with	   the	  Council,	  and	  accused	   it	   for	  siding	  with	  Iraq.103	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  1980,	  Kurt	  Waldheim,	  appointed	  former	  Swedish	  Prime	  Minister	   Olof	   Palme	   as	   special	   representative	   to	   try	   to	  mediate	   in	   the	   conflict.	   Palme	  enjoyed	  respect	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  worked	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  peace	  where	  Iraq	  would	  withdraw	  its	  forces.	  However,	  Iran	  insisted	  that	  Iraq	  had	  to	  withdraw	  its	  troops	  from	   Iranian	   territory	   before	   negotiations	   could	   begin,	   while	   Iraq	   insisted	   that	   a	  ceasefire	   should	   be	   implemented	   first.	   In	   addition,	   Iran	   refused	   to	   negotiate	   with	  Saddam	  Hussein.104	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  was	  a	  long	  road	  until	  peace	  would	  be	  achieved.	  Despite	  the	  efforts,	  Palme	  and	  Secretary-­‐General	  Waldheim	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  make	  any	  progress.	  However,	  it	  was	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  war	  that	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	   sent	  Olof	   Palme	   to	   try	   to	  mediate	   between	   the	   two	  belligerents,	   because	   Iran	  appreciated	  the	  efforts	  and	  had	  good	  relations	  to	  both	  Secretary-­‐General	  Waldheim	  and	  from	   1982	   to	   Secretary-­‐General	   Pérez	   de	   Cuéllar.	   As	   long	   as	   there	   were	   no	  communications	   between	   the	   Council	   and	   Iran,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  was	  crucial.	  Iraq,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  had	  a	  good	  relationship	  with	  both	   the	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  two	  secretaries-­‐generals	  during	  the	  whole	  war.	  To	  Iraq’s	  advantage,	  the	  Security	  Council	   did	   not	   condemn	   Iraq	   for	   the	   aggression.105	  Iraq	   also	   enjoyed	   respect	   in	   the	  Council	  for	  its	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	  and	  negotiate.	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Iran,	  Iraq	  and	  the	  two	  Superpowers	  	  The	   relations	   between	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	   and	   the	   Security	   Council	   has	   to	   be	   seen	   in	  connection	  with	   the	  belligerents	   relations	  with	   the	   individual,	   permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Council,	  and	  especially	  the	  two	  Superpowers.	  In	  the	  Cold	  war,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  dominated	  and	  split	  the	  Security	  Council	  into	  two	  camps.	  France	  and	  the	  UK	  were	  close	   allies	   of	   the	   US.	   China,	   despite	   being	   a	   communistic	   state,	   had	   been	   in	   an	  ideological	  battle	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  since	  early	  1960s,	  because	  they	  disagreed	  over	  the	   communistic	   ideology.	   The	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   China	  were	   therefore	   not	   allies,	   and	  China	  played	  its	  own	  game	  according	  to	  its	  own	  interests.106	  China	  did	  not	  involve	  itself	  in	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war,	  but	  was	  one	  of	  Iran’s	  main	  suppliers	  of	  weapons.107	  	  Both	   the	  US	  and	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  declared	  neutrality,	   and	   that	   they	  would	  not	  interfere	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war.108	  However,	  the	  reality	  by	  1983	  was	  different	  than	  their	  official	  policies.	  	  	  The	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  Iran	  and	  the	  US	  deteriorated	  after	  the	  Islamic	  revolution,	  when	  the	  Shah,	  who	  was	  a	  close	  friend	  and	  ally	  of	  the	  US,	  was	  thrown,	  and	  the	  American	   embassy	  was	   taken	  hostage.	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	   did	  not	   try	   to	   improve	  the	   relationship	  with	   the	   US	   either	  when	   he	   labelled	   the	   US	   as	   “the	   great	   Satan”	   and	  declared	  the	  West	  as	  an	  enemy	  of	  Iran.109	  The	  US	  had	  imposed	  economic	  and	  diplomatic	  sanctions	   on	   Iran,	   and	   encouraged	   other	   states	   to	   limit	   their	   trade	   with	   Iran.110	  As	   a	  result	  of	  the	  cold	  relationship	  with	  Iran,	  the	  ties	  between	  Iraq	  and	  the	  US	  were	  rebuilt	  slowly	  but	   steadily,	   especially	   after	  President	  Reagan	   came	   to	   office	   in	  Washington	   in	  1982.	   The	  US	   sought	   to	   get	   some	   influence	   in	   one	   of	   the	   countries,	   despite	   its	   official	  policy	  of	  neutrality	  and	  non-­‐involvement.	  111	  	  Iran’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  also	  rocky	  during	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  had	  limited	  communications	  with	  Iran	  as	  long	  as	  Iran	  was	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  the	  US.	  When	  the	  new	  regime	  took	  power	  in	  1979,	  Moscow	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	   improve	   the	   relations	   between	   Iran	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   but	   it	   did	   not	   take	   long	  before	   Moscow	   realised	   that	   a	   relationship	   with	   the	   new	   Islamic	   regime	   would	   be	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challenging.	  Iran	  condemned	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  December	  1979,	  and	  Khomeini	   declared	   communists	   as	   enemies	   of	   Iran.	   Iran	   was	   also	   suspicious	   of	   the	  relationship	   between	   Moscow	   and	   Baghdad.112	  The	   Soviet	   Union	   also	   voted	   against	  economic	   sanctions	   against	   Iran	   for	   holding	   hostages	   at	   the	   American	   Embassy	   in	  Tehran	   in	   the	   Security	   Council	   in	   February	   1980.	   The	   sanctions	   were	   passed	   in	   the	  Council,	   but	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   helped	   Iran	   economically	   by	   being	   a	   transit	   country	   for	  equipment	  and	  goods.113	  The	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war	  in	  1980	  made	  the	  Soviet	  double	  game	  even	  more	  difficult,	  as	  it	  would	  not	  be	  easy	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  maintain	  relations	  to	  both	   belligerents.	   When	   the	   war	   broke	   out,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   limited	   its	   direct	   arms	  export	   to	   Iraq,	   and	   started	   facilitating	   arms	   to	   Iran.114 	  The	   arms	   sales	   were	   not	  perceived	  well	  in	  Baghdad,	  but	  Iraq	  needed	  all	  the	  arms	  it	  could	  get,	  so	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  play	  along	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  game	  in	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  war.	  	  	  Iraq’s	  communications	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  also	  improved	  after	  a	  period	  of	  lukewarm	  relations	   in	   the	  1970s.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  supported	   Iraq	  with	  arms	  and	  advisors	   since	   the	   Baath	   party	   came	   to	   power,	   but	   the	   crackdown	   of	   the	   Iraqi	  Communist	  Party	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  condemnation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  Soviet	  support	  of	  Ethiopia	  in	  the	  Ethio-­‐Somali	  War	  (1977-­‐1978)	  had	  led	  to	  troubled	  relations	   between	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   Iraq.115	  However,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  wanted	   to	  preserve	  its	  relation	  to	  Iraq,	  and	  it	  became	  a	  major	  foreign	  policy	  goal	  in	  1979.	  	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  was	   already	  an	  ally	  of	   Iraq,	   and	   Iraq	   thus	  became	  one	  of	   few	  countries,	  which	  both	  superpowers	  tilted	  towards,	  and	  the	  tilt	  was	  evident	  in	  1983.	  	  	  Iran,	  Iraq	  and	  their	  relations	  with	  other	  Gulf	  States	  	  Some	  notes	  should	  be	  made	  on	  Iran	  and	  Iraq’s	  relations	  to	  other	  states	  in	  the	  region	  as	  well,	   since	   they	   did	   not	   cry	   out	   about	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   either.	   The	   new,	  Islamic	  regime	  in	  Iran	  did	  not	  only	  present	  a	  new	  day	  for	  the	  US	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  it	  also	  presented	  a	  new	  reality	  for	  other	  Gulf	  States.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	   the	   relations	  between	   Iran	  and	  other	  Gulf	   states	  deteriorated.	  All	  other	  Gulf	  States	  except	  Iran	  are	  Arab,	  and	  dominated	  by	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  except	  Oman,	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which	  follow	  Ibadi	  Islam.116	  The	  new	  regime	  in	  Iran	  threatened	  to	  spread	  the	  revolution,	  which	  was	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  ruling	  regimes	  in	  the	  other	  Gulf	  States.	  According	  to	  Khomeini,	  monarchies	   and	   secular-­‐nationalist	   governmental	   forms	  were	   not	   “Islamic”.117	  Second,	  there	  was	   a	   general	   conception	   that	   the	   Iranian	   regime	   of	   Ayatollah	   Khomeini	   was	   a	  threat	  to	  both	  regional	  and	  internal	  stability.	  	  Iraq,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  improved	  its	  relations	  to	  other	  Arab	  Gulf	  States	  since	  1975.	   Saddam	  Hussein	  moved	  more	   and	  more	   away	   from	   the	   nationalist	   Baath-­‐party	  agenda	  when	  he	   came	   to	  power	   in	  1979,	   and	   focused	  on	  Pan-­‐Arabism	   instead.	  As	   the	  war	  went	  on,	  Saddam	  Hussein	  referred	  more	  and	  more	  to	  Pan-­‐Arabism.118	  	  	  When	  the	  war	  broke	  out	  in	  1980,	  the	  Gulf	  States	  more	  or	  less	  supported	  Iraq.	  No	  one	  condemned	   Iraq	   for	   the	   invasion,	   and	   no	   one	   sided	  with	   Iran.119	  As	   a	   response	   to	   the	  new	  regime	  in	  Iran	  and	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war,	  the	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council	  (GCC)	   was	   formed	   in	   1981.120	  Together	   the	   six	   states,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   Kuwait,	   Bahrain,	  Oman,	   Qatar	   and	   the	   United	   Arab	   Emirates,	   would	   be	   stronger.121	  Both	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  organization,	  but	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  later,	  the	  GCC	  was	  by	  no	  means	  neutral.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Consequences	  of	  the	  First	  Response	  	  	  The	  responses	  from	  the	  Secretary	  General	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  probably	  had	  long-­‐lasting	  consequences	  for	  the	  war.	  	  First	   of	   all,	   the	   Security	   Council’s	   lack	   of	   an	   immediate	   response	   to	   the	   use	   of	  poison	   gas	   may	   have	   encouraged	   Saddam	   Hussein	   to	   continue	   its	   use,	   because	   his	  actions	  did	  not	  get	  any	  implications	  in	  the	  international	  society.	  	  Second,	   the	   lack	  of	   response	   can	  be	   seen	  as	   a	   signal	   of	   indifference	   to	  whether	  states	   followed	   international	   laws	   or	   not.	   In	   the	   worst-­‐case	   scenario,	   it	   could	   have	  encouraged	   other	   states	   to	   use	   chemical	   weapons	   also.	   Chemical	   weapons	   are	   as	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mentioned	   weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction	   alongside	   biological	   weapons,	   radiological	  weapons	  and	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Accepting	  them	  is	  considered	  as	  opening	  the	  door	  for	  an	  acceptance	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Third,	   not	   reacting	   against	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   in	   the	   initial	   stages	  probably	  contributed	  to	  the	  course	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  war.	  	  Decisive	  action,	  both	  in	  forms	  of	  punitive	  measures	  and	  preventive	  measures,	  might	  have	  prevented	   Iraq	   from	  using	  chemical	  weapons	  again.	  	  Fourth	  and	  last,	   the	   lack	  of	  response	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  use	  of	  poison	  gas	  became	  a	  source	  of	  irritation	  for	  the	  Iranian	  Government.	  Tehran	  had	  since	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war	  accused	  the	  Council	  for	  favouring	  Iraq,	  and	  Iran	  had	  boycotted	  the	  Council	  since	  1980.	  	  The	   lack	   of	   response	   to	   the	   allegations	   of	   chemical	  weapons	   did	   not	   affect	   the	  relationship	   between	   Iran	   and	   the	   Secretary-­‐General,	   but	   it	   certainly	   did	   not	   improve	  Iran’s	  impression	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  and	  Iran	  continued	  its	  boycott	  of	  the	  Council.	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4. Escalation	  
	  	  The	  fighting	  continued	  around	  Qurna	  in	  southern	  Iraq	  in	  1984.	  Iran	  tried	  to	  attack	  again	  in	  April,	  but	  the	  Iraqis	  made	  use	  of	  the	  Tigris.	  They	  led	  the	  water	  from	  the	  river	  to	  the	  marshes,	   making	   it	   hard	   for	   Iranian	   infantry	   to	   proceed	   and	   the	   fighting	   reduced	  gradually	  as	  a	  result	  of	  it.122	  The	  situation	  remained	  like	  this	  the	  entire	  summer,	  and	  Iraq	  used	  the	  halt	  in	  the	  fighting	  to	  arm	  up,	  enrol	  more	  men	  and	  strengthen	  their	  defences.123	  	  	  Iran	  attacked	  on	  the	  central	  front	  in	  October	  again,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  result	  in	  anything.124	  	  The	  Iranian	  representative	  to	  the	  UN,	  Khorassani,	  reported	  of	  four	  incidents	  of	  chemical	  weapons	   against	   Iranian	   forces	   between	   August	   1984	   and	   January	   1985,	   and	   three	  incidents	   between	   January	   1985	   and	   March	   1985.	   Only	   one	   of	   the	   attacks	   led	   to	  hospitalization	  of	  8	  people,	  while	  the	  others	  caused	  minor	  health	  issues.125	  	  Attacks	   with	   chemical	   weapons	   decreased	   significantly	   in	   the	   summer	   and	  autumn	  of	  1984.	  It	  is	  unknown	  whether	  it	  was	  the	  American	  condemnation,	  the	  export	  ban,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  mission,	  or	  if	  it	  was	  the	  Security	  Council’s	  condemnation	  of	  it	  that	  prevented	  Iraq	  from	  using	  it.	  Some	  researchers	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Iran	  did	  not	  launch	  any	  large-­‐scale	  attacks	  in	  this	  period,	  so	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  attack	  with	  poison	  gas.	   Other	   researchers	   claim	   that	   Iraq	   used	   this	   period	   to	   improve	   and	   refine	   their	  chemical	  weapons	  arsenal.	   Iraq	  continued	  to	   import	  components,	  which	  could	  be	  used	  in	   the	   manufacturing	   of	   chemical	   weapons,	   from	   Europe,	   especially	   from	   Western	  Germany.126	  	  It	  might	  be	  a	  combination	  of	  these	  factors	  that	  made	  Iraq	  slow	  down	  on	  its	  attacks,	  but	  it	  is	   quite	   obvious	   in	   retrospect	   that	   Iraq	   had	   not	   abandoned	   its	   chemical	   weapons	  programme.	  1985	  experienced	  new	  large-­‐scale	  attacks	  with	  poison	  gas.	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  Johnson,	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  War,	  88.	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  Ibid.,	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  Letter	  26.3.1985	  from	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  Iran	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1985:	  Increased	  Use	  of	  Gas	  	  	  Iranian	  inquiries	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  spring	  1985	  	  Even	  though	  the	  UN	  mission	  confirmed	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  1984,	  in	  addition	  to	   condemnation	   of	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons,	   1985	   is	   a	   year	   where	   chemical	  weapons	   attacks	   increased	   in	   quantity.	   Iran	   pointed	   out	   this	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  and	   the	   Security	   Council	   several	   times	   during	   1985.	   The	   first	   letter	   concerning	   this	  matter	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  5	  February	  1985	  when	  Khorassani	  transmitted	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  Iranian	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Ali	  Akbar	  Velayati.	  In	  this	  letter	  he	  informed	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	   Iraq’s	  continuing	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  Velayati	  was	  alarmed	  of	  Iraq’s	  non-­‐existing	  response	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐Generals	  appeal	  to	  refrain	  from	  chemical	  weapons,	  which	   increased	  the	  risk	  of	  new	  attacks.	  Velayati	  also	  blamed	  “the	   obstructionist	   policies	   of	   certain	   countries	   that	   prefer	   the	   preservation	   of	   their	  imperialist	  interests	  to	  the	  upholding	  of	  international	  law”	  that	  nothing	  had	  been	  done	  previously.127	  As	   a	   result,	   Velayati	   requested	   that	   legal	  means	   should	   be	   used	   to	   stop	  Iraq	   from	  using	   chemical	  weapons.	  According	   to	  Velayati,	   a	   “practical	  option”	  was	   the	  only	   solution;	   anything	   else	   would	   be	   regarded	   as	   negative	   from	   an	   Iranian	   point	   of	  view.128	  He	   did	   not	   elaborate	   on	   what	   this	   practical	   option	   could	   be,	   but	   Iran	   had	  previously	  asked	  for	  a	  permanent	  UN	  mission	  to	  be	  based	  in	  Tehran,	  which	  would	  be	  a	  preventive	   solution.	   Sanctions	  were	   another	   option,	  which	  would	   have	   been	   punitive.	  Velayati	  warned	  that	  there	  was	  other	  effective	  ways	  to	  stop	  Iraq	  without	  explaining	  this	  further,	  but	  wrote	  that	  this	  was	  a	  last	  option,	  which	  Iran	  did	  not	  want	  to	  resort	  to	  yet.129	  	  Iran’s	  concerns	  over	  Iraq’s	  lack	  of	  response	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐Generals	  appeal	  not	  to	  use	  chemical	  weapons	  was	   repeated	   in	   letters	   in	  winter	  1985.	  Seyed	  Ali	  Khamenei,	  president	   of	   Iran,	   sent	   one	   letter	   18	  March	   1985.130	  He	  warned	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  that	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  not	  just	  a	  violation	  of	  international	  law,	  but	  also	  a	  trampling	   of	   international	   law	   in	   general,	   which	   could	   lead	   to	   a	   weakening	   of	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international	  rules,	  treaties	  and	  laws.	  Khamenei,	   like	  Velayati,	  also	  requested	  a	  specific	  measure	   to	   avoid	   future	   chemical	   weapons	   attacks,	   and	   suggested	   that	   a	   UN-­‐sent	  mission	   stationed	   in	   Tehran	   would	   prevent	   Iraq	   from	   using	   chemical	   weapons.	   He	  questioned	  why	  such	  an	  easy	  measure	  could	  not	  be	  conducted,	  and	  repeated	  the	  threat	  of	   harder	   means	   if	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   continued.131 	  By	   warning	   of	   the	  weakening	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  international	  norms	  and	  laws,	  he	  made	  the	  issue	  relevant	  to	  all	   countries.	   Years	   of	   cooperation	   and	   respect	   of	   international	   law	   were	   now	  endangered.	  	  Land	  operations	  in	  spring	  1985	  	  The	  fighting	  slowed	  down	  in	  the	  winter,	  and	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  had	  used	  the	  wet	  season	  in	  the	  end	  of	  1984	  to	  build	  up	  their	  armies.	  	  Iraq	  knew	  that	  Iran	  would	  attack	  again	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  wet	  season	  was	  over,	  so	  the	  Iraqi	  defence	   lines	   were	   strengthened	   and	   artillery	   was	   added	   to	   the	   already	   superior	  firepower.132	  The	  Iranians	  had	  also	  learned	  from	  their	  faults	  and	  organized	  their	  forces	  better,	   trained	   them	   better,	   planned	   new	   attack	   methods	   and	   acquired	   more	  equipment.133	  Despite	   Iraq’s	   strengthening	   of	   the	   defence,	   it	   did	   not	   hold	   when	   Iran	  launched	  Operation	  Badr	  around	  the	  Hawizeh	  marshes	  in	  March	  1985.	  The	  Iranians	  had	  attacked	   Iraqi	   positions	  with	   small	   patrol	   boats	   in	   the	  winter	  months	   of	   1984/85,	   so	  Iraqi	  defence	  positions	  were	  already	  pressed.	  	  The	  Iranians	  pushed	  6	  kilometres	  further	  into	  Iraqi	  territory	  in	  Operation	  Badr,	  and	   finally	   managed	   to	   break	   across	   the	   highway	   between	   Basra	   and	   Baghdad.134	  However,	  the	  Iranian	  success	  did	  not	  last	  for	  long.	  Iraq	  stroke	  back	  almost	  immediately,	  using	  massed	  artillery	  and	  air	  strikes.	  After	  nine	  days	  Iran	  was	  back	  at	  where	  they	  had	  started,	  but	  with	  8000-­‐12,000	  soldiers	  less	  than	  when	  the	  battle	  started.135	  	  	  Chemical	   weapons	   had	   only	   been	   used	   sporadically	   and	   in	   small	   scale	   since	  spring	  1984,	  but	  new,	  massive	  attacks	  in	  1985	  changed	  this.	  The	  Iranian	  representative	  to	  the	  UN	  reported	  of	  the	  chemical	  attacks	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  14	  March	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1985.	   Iraq	  had	  used	  chemical	  weapons	   in	   the	  southern	  war	   front	  around	  the	  Hawizeh	  marshes	  against	  Iranian	  soldiers	  on	  two	  occasions.	  The	  Iranian	  representative	  claimed	  that	  180	  Iranian	  soldiers	  had	  been	  injured	  from	  the	  attack,	  but	  the	  numbers	  would	  have	  been	  higher	  was	  it	  not	  for	  the	  weather	  conditions,	  which	  had	  worked	  against	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  gas.136	  A	  second	  letter	  was	  sent	  a	  week	  later	  with	  a	  detailed	  report.	  A	  new	  attack	  had	   taken	  place	   in	   the	  morning	  16	  March	  when	  six	   capsules	  were	  dropped	   from	   Iraqi	  planes.	   According	   to	   the	   Iranian	   representative,	   a	   greyish-­‐white	   smoke	   had	   ascended	  into	   the	   air.	   Iranian	   experts	   believed	   it	   to	   be	   cyanide,	   phosphorous	   and	  mustard	   gas.	  Four	   other	   attacks	   had	   taken	   place	   since	   16	   March,	   and	   200	   soldiers	   had	   been	  hospitalized	  with	  eye	  and	  skin	  irritation,	  breathing	  problems	  and	  general	  weakness.137	  Altogether,	  Iraq	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  delivered	  by	  aerial	  bombardment	  and	  shells	  on	  28	  occasions	  between	  13	  and	  20	  March.	  Mainly	  nerve	  gas	  and	  vesicant	  agents	  were	  used,	  according	  to	  the	  Iranian	  UN	  representative.138	  	  The	  use	  of	  gas	  increased	  in	  1985.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  Iranian	  offensives.	   Iraq	  was	  pressured,	  and	  used	  all	  means	   to	  strike	  back.	  The	  responses	   from	  the	   Security	  Council	   in	   1983	   and	  1984	  had	  been	   tolerable	   for	   Iraq,	   and	   the	  use	   could	  thus	  continue	  without	  it	  getting	  any	  implications.	  	  	  
	  The	  Council	  and	  the	  Secretary-­General’s	  Responses	  to	  the	  Acceleration	  
	  
	  A	  new	  approach	  by	  the	  Secretary	  General	  	  The	   escalation	   of	   warfare	   made	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   realize	   that	   a	   comprehensive	  peace	  was	   impossible	   to	  achieve	  at	   that	  point.	  He	   therefore	  presented	  seven	  points	   in	  spring	  1985,	  which	  should	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  mediation,	  and	  which	  he	  hoped	  should	  lead	  to	  a	  de-­‐escalation	  of	  the	  war:139	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Letter	  14.3.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  .	  UNSC	  document	  S/17031.	  	  137	  Letter	  21.3.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/17046.	  138	  Letter	  11.4.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/17096.	  139	  The	  Seretary-­‐General’s	  plan	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  ”the	  eight-­‐point	  proposal”,	  but	  it	  consisted	  only	  of	  seven	  substantive	  points.	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar,	  Piligrimage	  for	  Peace,	  144.	  
	   46	  
-­	  Cease	  all	  attacks	  on	  civilian	  population	  centres,	  thus	  reinstating	  the	  moratorium	  
of	  12	  June	  1984.	  
-­	  Cease	  all	  interference	  with	  civil	  aviation	  in	  the	  airspace	  of	  the	  other	  side.	  	  
-­	   Observe	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   of	   1925.	   [Print	   in	   boldface	  marked	  by	  thesis	  author]	  
-­	  Cease	  all	  attacks	  against	  unarmed	  merchant	  vessels	  of	  any	  flag	  or	  ownership.	  	  
-­	  Refrain	  from	  attacking	  designated	  ports,	  terminals	  and	  related	  facilities.	  	  
-­	  Cooperate	  with	  the	  ICRC	  in	  arranging	  an	  exchange	  of	  POWs.	  	  
-­	   Maintain	   continuing	   contact	   with	   the	   Secretary-­General	   on	   the	   observance	   of	  
these	  arrangements	  and	  on	  further	  steps	  toward	  normalization	  of	  the	  situation.140	  	  	  	  As	   can	   be	   seen,	   the	   issue	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   was	   one	   of	   the	   seven	   points.	   The	  Secretary-­‐General	  had	  finally	  understood	  that	  “minor	  aspects	  of	  the	  war”	  had	  to	  be	  given	  attention	  if	  there	  should	  be	  any	  hope	  of	  Iranian	  participation	  in	  negotiations.	  	  Both	   Iran	  and	  Iraq	  rejected	  the	  points	  at	   first,	   so	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  went	   to	  Tehran	  and	  Baghdad	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  leaders	  of	  both	  countries.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  had	  also	   visited	   Baghdad	   and	   Tehran	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   April	   1985.	   He	   had	   met	   with	  Saddam	  Hussein,	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Foreign	  Minister	  Tariq	  Azziz,	  and	  Deputy	  Foreign	  Minister	   Ismat	  Kittani	   in	  Baghdad,	  and	  President	  Khamenei,	  Rafsanjani,	  Prime	  Minister	  Mousavi,	   Foreign	  Minister	  Velayati	   and	  Deputy	  Foreign	  Minister	  Kazempour-­‐Ardebili.	  All	  aspects	  of	  the	  war	  had	  been	  discussed,	  and	  both	  countries	  welcomed	  peace,	  but	   Iran	   had	   said	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Security-­‐Council	   to	   condemn	   Iraq	   for	   its	  aggression	  in	  addition	  to	  other	  breaches	  of	  international	  law	  were	  serious	  obstacles.	  The	  aspect	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   was	   of	   particular	   importance	   to	   Iran.141	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	  would	  convey	  this	  information	  to	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  Iran	  then	  accepted	  the	  eight	  points	  unconditionally,	  but	  Iraq	  did	  not.142	  	  In	  his	  memoirs,	  Secretary-­‐General	  de	  Cuéllar	  expresses	  how	  difficult	  it	  was	  to	  do	  anything	  about	  the	  situation,	  because	  he	  lacked	  support	  from	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	   the	   Security	   Council.	   He	   sensed	   that	   the	   permanent	   members	   did	   not	   mind	   a	  continuation	   of	   the	   conflict.143	  The	   Soviet	   Union	   already	   sold	  war	   equipment,	   directly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar,	  Pilgrimage	  for	  Peace,	  144.	  	  141	  Report	  12.4.1985	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/19097.	  142	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar,	  Pilgrimage	  for	  Peace,	  146-­‐148.	  	  143	  Ibid.,	  149.	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and	   indirectly,	   to	   both	   belligerents.	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   France	   had	   sold	   bomber	  planes	  to	  Iraq,	  but	  started	  to	  sell	  advanced	  weapons	  systems	  to	  Iran	  as	  well.144	  Later,	  it	  would	   be	   known	   that	   the	   US	   also	   sold	   weapons	   to	   Iran.	   Three	   of	   the	   permanent	  members	   of	   the	   Security	   Council	   thus	   benefitted	   economically	   of	   the	  war.	   This	   shows	  how	  problematic	  the	  war	  was.	  Three	  of	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  made	  money	  on	  the	  war,	  which	  might	  have	  led	  them	  to	  positions	  where	  they	  were	  not	  interested	  in	  ending	  the	  war.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  published	  a	   report	   concerning	   the	   last	  months’	  work	   regarding	  the	  situation	  between	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  12	  April	  1985.	  In	  addition	  to	  his	  travel	  to	  the	  Middle	  East,	  he	  had	  had	  meetings	  with	  the	  Deputy	  Foreign	  Minister	  of	  Iran	  and	  with	  the	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Iraq	  in	  the	  mid	  of	  March	  1985	  in	  New	  York.	  The	  new	  report	  of	  renewed	  use	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  come	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   informed	   that	   he	   had	   presented	   proposals	   to	   both	   Iran	  and	   Iraq,	   which	   aimed	   to	   reduce	   the	   warfare	   and	   to	   pursue	   peace.	   In	   addition	   to	  specifically	  address	  the	  attacks	  on	  civilian	  areas	  and	  on	  unarmed	  ships,	  he	  addressed	  the	  topic	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  which	  was	  of	  particular	  concern.	  Examination	  of	  victims	   in	  London	  and	  Vienna	  had	  showed	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  still	  used,	  and	  he	  reminded	  the	   belligerents	   of	   the	   laws	   they	   were	   subject	   to	   through	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol.145	  He	  repeated	  his	  previous	  condemnation	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  “wherever	  and	  whenever”	  it	  occurred.146	  	  	  A	   reduction	   of	   hostilities	   was	   a	   part	   of	   the	   Secretary-­‐General’s	   plan	   towards	  negotiations	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  and	  eventually	  peace,	  and	  he	  continued	  to	  work	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	   “points	   for	  discussion	   in	   relation	   to	  negotiated	   settlement”,	  which	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  had	  suggested	  in	  the	  meetings	  in	  New	  York	  in	  1983.	  He	  also	  urged	  the	  Security	  Council	   to	   invite	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  to	  take	  part	   in	  the	  future	  examinations	  of	  the	  war.147	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   did	   not	   address	   Iraq	   in	   the	   condemnation	   of	   chemical	  weapons	  this	  time	  either,	  but	  repeated	  his	  rather	  general	  comment	  saying	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  should	  not	  be	  used	  anywhere	  or	  at	  any	  point.	  The	  Secretary	  General	  tried	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar,	  Pilgrimage	  for	  Peace,	  149.	  	  145	  Report	  12.4.1985	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/17097.	  	  146	  Idem.	  147	  Idem.	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as	  objective	  and	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  both	  belligerents.	  He	  was	  the	  only	  person,	  who	  had	  good	  relations	  to	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq,	  and	  he	  did	  not	  risk	  alienating	  Iraq	  by	  being	  general	  in	   his	   condemnation.	   Besides,	   he	   did	   not	   have	   the	   power	   to	   punish	   Iraq	   for	   using	  chemical	  weapons.	  The	   failure	   to	  address	   Iraq	  was	  an	   issue	   that	  provoked	   the	   Iranian	  leadership,	   but	   Iran	   never	   accused	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   for	   being	   partial	   or	   not	  condemning	  Iraq.	  Iran	  blamed	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  	  Did	  the	  Security	  Council	  favour	  Iraq?	  	  The	  Iranian	  representative	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war	  accused	  the	  Security	  Council	  for	  favouring	   of	   Iraq.	   Iran	   had	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   war	   viewed	   the	   actions	   and	  opinions	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  be	  partial	  and	  siding	  with	  Iraq,	  even	  though	  Iran,	  as	  they	  saw	  it,	  was	  the	  victim	  of	   Iraqi	  aggression.	  The	  claimed	  tilt	  of	   the	  Security	  Council	  towards	   Iraq	   was	   a	   serious	   obstacle	   to	   Iran	   when	   it	   came	   to	   negotiations,	   and	   the	  Iranians	  demanded	  that	  the	  Council	  had	  to	  be	  neutral	  if	  peace	  should	  be	  achieved.	  This	  was	  also	  mentioned	  specifically	  in	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  report.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  did	  not	  comment	  on	  these	  accusations	  in	  his	  report,	  but	  promised	  to	  inform	  the	  Security	  Council	  as	  well	  as	  Iraq	  on	  Iran’s	  stand.148	  	  In	   his	   statement	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   reminded	   the	   Council	   that	   his	   foremost	  duty	  was	  to	  end	  the	  war,	  but	  as	  the	  conflict	  went	  on	  he	  was	  obliged	  to	  reduce	  the	  war’s	  negative	  effects	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  attacks	  on	  civilian	  targets,	  prisoners	  of	  war,	  safety	  for	  navigation,	  civil	  aviation,	  and	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  Iran	  repeated	  its	  demand	  for	  accepting	  a	  ceasefire:	  Iraq	  had	  to	  be	  condemned	  as	  the	  aggressor,	  and	  Iraq	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  reparations.	  These	  were	  unrealistic	  demands	  for	  Iraq.	  	  	  Today	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  Iraq	  who	  ignited	  the	  war	  when	  they	  invaded	  Iran	  in	  1980,	   but	   the	   opinion	  was	   different	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Some	   viewed	   the	   escalation	   of	   the	  conflict	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  breakout	  as	  Iran’s	  fault,	  and	  a	  condemnation	  of	  Iraq	  as	  the	  war	  aggressor	   seemed	  unfair	   to	  many.	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   say	  30	  years	   later	  whether	   they	   really	  believed	  that	  Iran	  was	  the	  one	  who	  provoked	  an	  Iraqi	  attack,	  or	  whether	  they	  claimed	  that	  Iran	  was	  the	  one	  to	  blame,	  because	  they	  sided	  with	  Iraq.	  	  In	   1985	   it	   was	   quite	   obvious	   that	   Iraq	   struggled	   in	   the	   land	   war,	   while	   Iran	  pushed	   on.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Iranian	   regime	  was	   looked	   upon	   as	   unpredictable,	   hostile	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  Report	  12.4.1985	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/17097.	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and	   a	   possible	   military	   danger	   to	   the	   neighbouring	   states,	   and	   also	   a	   danger	   to	   the	  region	  and	  the	  world	   in	  general	  when	  it	  came	  to	  values,	   ideologies	  and	  religion.	  These	  factors	   may	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   hesitation	   from	   the	   Security	   Council	   and	   the	  Secretary	  General	  to	  condemn	  Iraq	  as	  the	  aggressor	  and	  to	  blame	  Iraq	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  Iraq	  was	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  peace	  talks	  and	  to	  end	  the	  war,	   contrary	   to	   Iran.	   Even	   though	   the	   Secretary-­‐General’s	   statement	   on	   the	   use	   of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	   vague,	   he	   still	   addressed	   the	   topic	   specifically	   and	   highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  it.	  He	  also	  underlined	  that	  he	  was	  committed	  to	  work	  specifically	  with	  it.	  The	  two	  parties	  were	  far	  away	  from	  each	  other	  at	  that	  point,	  so	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  was	  more	  or	  less	  forced	  to	  try	  a	  new	  approach.	  He	  declared	  that	  he	  would	  try	  to	  gather	  the	   two	   belligerents	   to	   take	   part	   in	   talks	   to	   discuss	   and	   re-­‐examine	   all	   aspects	   of	   the	  conflict.	  The	  report	  did	  not	  bring	  new	  issues	  to	  the	  table,	  nor	  did	  it	  solve	  any	  issues,	  and	  the	  conflict	  was	  as	  locked	  as	  before.	  A	  comprehensive	  peace	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  achieve	  at	  the	  present	  point,	  so	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  approach	  was	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed,	  or	  at	  least	  limit	  the	  warfare.	  	  
	  Chemical	  weapons	  victims	  in	  European	  hospitals	  	  Chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  confirmed	  used	  in	  the	  UN-­‐mission	  sent	  to	  Iran	  in	  1984,	  but	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  continued	  to	  look	  into	  whether	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	  or	   not.	   After	   the	   repeated	   letters	   from	   the	   Iranian	   representative	   to	   the	   UN	   with	  allegations	   of	   renewed	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   by	   the	   Iraqi	   army	   in	   March,	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  sent	  a	  medical	  specialist	  mission	  to	  hospitals	  in	  Europe	  where	  victims	  of	  the	  attacks	  were	  hospitalized.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  was	  “to	  obtain	  an	  authoritative	  and	  independent	   opinion	   on	   the	   information	   coming	   from	   the	   hospital	   centres	  concerned.” 149 	  The	   specialist	   whom	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   sent	   was	   Dr.	   Manuel	  Domínguez,	   who	   was	   dispatched	   to	   Iran	   the	   previous	   year.	   He	   visited	   hospitals	   in	  Belgium,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  1-­‐5	  April	  1985.	  	  The	   report	  was	   submitted	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  8	  April.	  Dr.	  Domínguez	  had	  examined	  altogether	  17	  patients,	   and	   they	  all	   had	   the	   same	  symptoms	  of	   eye	   injuries,	  blackening	  of	  the	  skin	  in	  various	  degrees,	  detachment	  of	  skin	  and	  lung	  injuries.	  All	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  Letter	  17.4.1985	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  UNSC	  document	  S/17127	  and	  add.1	  
	   50	  
symptoms	  were	  the	  same	  as	  the	  ones	  observed	  by	  the	  mission	  in	  Iran	  in	  1984,	  and	  Dr.	  Domínguez	   concluded	   in	   his	   report	   with	   that	   chemical	   weapons,	   more	   specifically	  Yperite,	  a	  type	  of	  mustard	  gas,	  perhaps	  in	  combination	  with	  hydrocyanic	  gas,	  were	  used	  in	  March	  1985.	  The	  attacks	  were	  in	  forms	  of	  air	  dropped	  bombs.150	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   continued	   to	   look	   into	   the	   issue,	   but,	   as	   Khorassani	  pointed	  out	   in	  several	  of	  his	   letters	  sent	  during	   the	  spring	  of	  1985,	  no	  specific	  actions	  were	   taken	   to	   stop	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons.	   General	   condemnations	   and	   UN	  missions	   did	   obviously	   not	   prevent	   Iraq	   from	   conducting	   new	   attacks	   with	   chemical	  weapons:	   Khorassani	   reported	   of	   new	   poison	   gas	   attacks	   in	   April.	   	   Iraq	   had	   used	  mustard	  and	  nerve	  gases	  against	  Iranian	  forces	  on	  several	  occasions	  8	  and	  9	  April,	  and	  200	  people	  were	  injured,	  while	  15	  died.151	  	  The	  Security	  Council’s	  response	  to	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  	  The	  2576th	  meeting	  in	  the	  Security	  Council	  was	  held	  behind	  closed	  doors	  25	  April	  1985	  in	   New	   York,	   and	   a	   statement	  was	   published	   after	   the	  meeting.	   The	   president	   of	   the	  Security	  Council,	  Javier	  Arias	  Stella,	  declared	  that	  the	  Council	  was	  appalled	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  proved	  used	  against	   Iranian	   soldiers	   in	  March	  and	  condemned	   the	  renewed	  use	  of	   it.	  The	  Council	   referred	   to	   the	  previous	   statement	  on	   the	   issue,	  which	  was	  conveyed	  30	  March	  1984,	  and	  recalled	  that	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  were	  subjects	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  of	  1925.	  The	  President	  and	  the	  council	  also	  condemned	  the	  violations	  of	  humanitarian	  law	  and	  encouraged	  negotiations	  to	  restore	  peace.	  They	  also	  expressed	  their	  support	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  war	  where	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  could	  participate	  as	  a	  step	  to	  end	  the	  conflict.152	  	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   state	   that	   additional	   information	   had	   been	   added	   in	   this	  statement	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  one	  from	  March	  1984.	  In	  this	  statement	  the	  Council	  did	  not	  only	  condemn	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  as	  it	  did	  in	  the	  one	  from	  1984,	  but	  they	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  against	  Iranian	  soldiers.	  The	  statement	  did	  not	  condemn	   Iraq,	   but	   it	   was	   a	   step	   forward	   that	   the	   victims	   were	   identified.	   Iran	   still	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thought	  it	  too	  vague,	  and	  it	  was	  certainly	  not	  enough	  to	  hinder	  Iraq	  from	  using	  chemical	  weapons	  again.	  	  The	  issue	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  also	  concerned	  other	  organizations.	  The	  European	  Community’s	   10	   member	   states	   also	   condemned	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   in	   a	  declaration	   sent	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   dated	   6	   May	   1985.153	  This	   was	   the	   first	  statement	  in	  which	  the	  European	  Community	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  and	  it	  shows	  an	  increasing	  interest	   in	  the	  war	  from	  the	  international	  society.	   It	  should	  be	  noted	   though,	   that	   the	  European	  Community	  did	  not	  do	  anything	  either	   to	  prevent	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  Iran	   reported	   of	   new	  poison	   gas	   attacks	   in	  May	   1985.	   Khorassani	   claimed	   that	  artillery	  shells	  had	  delivered	  mustard	  gas	  on	  7	  and	  8	  May,	  and	  he	  urged	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  send	  a	  team	  from	  the	  UN	  to	  examine	  the	  sites	  in	  Fakkeh,	  on	  the	  border	  in	  the	  south,	  and	  Sardasht,	  in	  the	  north	  of	  Iran.154	  Khorassani	  sent	  a	  new	  letter	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  July	  where	  he	   claimed	   that	   chemical	   canon-­‐balls	  had	  been	   shelled	  on	   the	  northeast	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  city	  Basrah,	  where	  Iranian	  soldiers	  were	  positioned.155	  	  	  	  The	  War	  of	  the	  Cities	  	  Back	   in	   June	   1984,	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	   had	   signed	   an	   UN-­‐initiated	   agreement,	   where	   they	  agreed	  not	  to	  attack	  civilian	  targets.	  However,	  the	  agreement	  did	  not	  last	  for	  long.	  	  Iraq	  bombed	  a	  factory	  in	  Ahvaz	  5	  March	  1985,	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  Iranian	  province	  Khuzestan	  in	  Western	  Iran,	  and	  an	  unfinished	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  in	  Bushahr,	  a	  city	  on	  the	  Iranian	  coast.	  Tehran	  argued	  that	  Baghdad	  had	  violated	  the	  agreement	  by	  doing	  this,	  and	  Iran	  retaliated	  by	  bombing	  Basrah.	  As	  a	  counter	  response,	  Iraq	  bombed	  a	  number	  of	  Iranian	  cities	  and	  towns,	  including	  Isfahan,	  Iran’s	  third	  largest	  city.	  Iraq	  used	  its	  modern	  air	  force	  to	  bomb	  cities,	  and	  were	  quite	  successful	   from	  an	  Iraqi	  point	  of	  view.	  Iran	  on	  the	   other	   hand	   did	   not	   have	   the	   same	   strength	   in	   the	   air	   and	   used	  missiles	   to	   attack	  cities	  instead.	  The	  Soviet	  missiles	  that	  Iran	  used	  were	  not	  accurate,	  so	  even	  though	  Iran	  aimed	  at	  central	  parts	  of	  Baghdad	  and	  Kirkuk	   in	  the	  next	  round	  of	  bombings,	   they	  did	  not	  strike	  important	  targets,	  but	  mainly	  abandoned	  areas	  of	  the	  suburbs	  to	  the	  cities.156	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The	   two	  parties	  agreed	  on	  a	   temporary	  ceasefire	  6	  April,	  but	  what	   is	  known	  as	  
the	  War	  of	  the	  Cities	   resumed	  again	  after	  a	   car	  bomb	  exploded	   in	  Kuwait	  25	  May.	  The	  bomb	  was	  aimed	  at	  the	  Kuwaiti	  leader,	  Shaikh	  Sabah	  al	  Sabah,	  and	  Iraq	  claimed	  that	  the	  suicide	  bomber	  behind	  it	  had	  close	  links	  to	  the	  Iranian	  regime,	  so	  Iraq	  carried	  out	  new	  air	   raids	   on	   Tehran.	   The	   bomb	   also	  made	  Kuwait	   tilt	  more	   towards	   Iraq.	   Kuwait	   had	  previously	  been	  officially	  neutral	  in	  the	  war.157	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1985	  Iraq	  bombed	  Tehran	  43	  times,	  while	  Iran	  bombed	  Baghdad	  12	   times.158	  That	   shows	   how	   effective	   and	   strong	   the	   Iraqi	   air	   force	  was,	   but	   despite	  Saddam’s	  hope	  that	  it	  would	  turn	  the	  population	  against	  Khomeini,	  it	  did	  the	  opposite:	  The	  population	  of	  Iran	  looked	  upon	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  Iraq	  as	  violators	  of	  humanity,	  and	   compared	   him	   to	   the	   shah:	   	   Khomeini	   was	   the	   leader	   in	   the	   battle	   against	  oppression.159	  	  	  The	  war	  in	  summer	  and	  autumn	  1985	  	  The	   land	  war	   slowed	  down	   in	   the	   summer	  of	  1985,	   and	   there	  are	  no	   reports	  of	  more	  attacks	   of	   chemical	  weapons	   until	   1986	  when	   Iran	   launched	   new	   offensives.	   The	  war	  escalated	   in	   other	   areas,	   though,	   and	   that	   can	   be	   one	   of	   the	   explanations	   of	   why	   the	  Security	  Council	  or	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   ignored	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons:	   It	  had	  become	   a	  minor	   issue	   in	   comparison	   to	   other	   issues	   in	   the	  war,	   especially	   the	   tanker	  war.	  	   The	  summer	  and	  autumn	  of	  1985	  did	  not	  involve	  any	  large	  offensives	  from	  either	  part,	  but	  fighting	  took	  place	  on	  the	  southern	  and	  the	  central	  front.	  Iran	  managed	  to	  take	  some	   land	  during	   the	  summer	  of	  1985,	  but	  not	  of	  any	  significant	  value.160	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  Iran	  continued	  to	  dominate	  the	  marshlands	  in	  the	  south,	  especially	  the	  area	  around	  the	  Hawizeh	  marshes.	  Iraq	  on	  their	  side	  remained	  defensive.	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Third-­Party	  States	  Attention:	  The	  Tanker	  War	  	  	  	  	  When	   the	   fighting	  more	  or	   less	   settled	   into	  a	  new	  stalemate	  after	  Operation	  Badr,	   the	  Tanker	  war	   in	  the	  Gulf	  escalated.	  This	   issue	  got	  much	  more	  attention	  from	  third-­‐party	  states	  than	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  According	   to	   Iraq,	   Saddam’s	   forces	   hit	   30	   oil	   tankers	   on	   their	   way	   to	   and	   from	  Iranian	  oil	  stations,	  while	  Iran	  hit	  seven	  ships	  carrying	  Iraqi	  oil	  in	  the	  first	  three	  months	  of	  1985.	  The	  Iraqi	   tactics	  to	   injure	   Iranian	  oil	  export	  were	  successful	   in	   the	  beginning.	  Some	  ships	  refused	  to	  sail	  too	  far	  up	  the	  Gulf	  to	  buy	  and	  tank	  Iranian	  oil,	  so	  Iran	  started	  to	  ship	  oil	  themselves:	  Iranian	  tankers	  sailed	  from	  Kharg	  Island,	  which	  is	  an	  offshore	  oil	  terminal	   situated	   225	   km	   south	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   coastline,	   to	   Sirri	   Island,	   an	   oil	   terminal	  further	  south	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  Sirri	  island	  was	  harder	  to	  reach	  for	  Iraqi	  aircrafts	  and	  missiles,	  and	  therefore	  safer	  for	  oil	  tankers.161	  The	  Iranian	  strategy	  worked,	  and	  Iraq	  had	  to	  look	  in	   other	   directions	   to	   hurt	   the	   Iranian	   oil	   export.	   Much	   thanked	   to	   U.S.	   navigation	  systems	   and	   French	   planes	   and	   assistance	   with	   tactics,	   Iraq	   started	   to	   attack	   Kharg	  Island	  itself	  systematically	   in	  the	  mid	  of	  august.	  The	  island	  was	  Iran’s	   largest	  crude	  oil	  terminal	  at	  sea,	  and	  almost	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  Iran’s	  oil	  had	  to	  be	  exported	  from	  the	  island	  during	   the	   war.	   Four	   major	   scale	   attacks	   were	   carried	   out	   in	   August	   and	   early	  September	   and	  hit	   central	   parts	   of	   the	   oil	   installation,	  while	  more	   attacks	   followed	   in	  October	   and	   November.	   Still,	   statistics	   show	   that	   Iran’s	   oil	   production	   was	   not	   as	  severely	  hurt	  over	  time	  as	  Iraq	  hoped	  for.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  production	  rose	  in	  1985	  compared	  to	  1984,	  which	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  many	  loading	  points	  Kharg	  Island	  had.	  Even	  though	  one	  loading	  point	  was	  damaged	  it	  was	  relatively	  easy	  to	  repair,	  and	  in	  the	  meantime	  Iran	  could	  use	  other	  points.	  	  As	   a	   response	   to	   the	   attacks	   on	   Kharg	   Island,	   Khomeini	   once	   again	   threatened	   to	  close	   the	   Straight	   of	   Hormuz.	   The	   threats	   were	   never	   put	   to	   life,	   but	   Iran	   physically	  controlled	   more	   and	   more	   vessels	   sailing	   in	   the	   Gulf,	   to	   see	   if	   they	   carried	   war	  equipment	  to	  Iraq.162	  	  Iran	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  strike	  back	  in	  a	  similar	  scale,	  and	  mainly	  controlled	  and	  harassed	  ships	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Cordesman	  and	  Wagner,	  The	  Lessons	  of	  Modern	  War,	  p.	  209.	  162	  Ibid.,	  p.	  213.	  	  
	   54	  
	  Map	  5:	  Clip	  of	  the	  Persian	  Gulf.	  Source:	  Google	  Maps.	  	   Iran	   had	   also	   suffered	   heavy	   losses	   in	   1984	   and	   1985,	   but	   Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  and	  his	  advisors	  in	  Tehran	  still	  believed	  in	  Iranian	  victory	  despite	  the	  losses	  and	  despite	  an	   increasingly	   offensive	   Iraq.	   They	   used	   the	   autumn	   of	   1985	   to	   build	   up	   their	   army	  further.	   In	  addition	   to	  strategic	  planning	  and	  recruitment	  of	  new	  soldiers,	   Iran	  bought	  chemical	   weapons	   defence	   systems.	   There	   are	   also	   indications	   from	   late	   1985	   that	  showed	  signs	  of	  Syrian	  help	  to	  Iran	  to	  develop	  its	  own	  chemical	  weapons.163	  	  Iran	  continued	  to	  control	  ships	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  which	  provoked	  third	  party	  states,	  but	  it	   was	   events	   in	   the	   Gulf	   States	   that	   contributed	   to	   a	   further	   hostility	   towards	   Iran.	  Several	  car	  bombings	  took	  place	  in	  Kuwait	  in	  December.	  Several	  of	  them	  were	  directed	  at	   the	   American	   Embassy,	   but	   also	   other	   targets	   in	   Kuwait.	   The	   group	   behind	   it	   was	  supported	  by	   the	   Iranian	   regime,	  which	   led	   to	   a	   deepened	  hostility	   between	   Iran	   and	  Kuwait	   and	   the	  US.	   It	   is	   believed	   the	   terrorists	   thought	   the	  bombings	  would	  pressure	  Kuwait	  to	  stop	  the	  aid	  to	  Iraq.164	  It	  did	  not.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  led	  to	  increased	  support	  for	  Iraq,	  and	  a	  further	  hostility	  towards	  Iran.	  Incidents	  like	  these	  made	  Gulf	  States	  more	  convinced	  that	  the	  new	  regime	  in	  Iran	  was	  unreliable,	  and	  a	  victory	  of	  the	  war	  to	  Iran	  would	  be	   fatal	   for	   the	  entire	   region.	  Mistaken	   Iranian	  politics	   like	   the	   idea	  behind	   the	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events	   in	  Kuwait	   can	   thus	  be	   seen	  as	  one	  of	   the	   reasons	  why	  other	  Gulf	   States	   closed	  their	  eyes	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  	  Spring	  1986:	  The	  battles	  of	  Faw	  	  The	  Iranian	  seizure	  of	  the	  northern	  island	  of	  the	  Majnoon	  Islands	  had	  been	  a	  hard	  blow	  for	   Iraq,	   and	   it	   was	   important	   for	   them	   to	   retake	   the	   islands,	   which	   had	   been	   under	  Iranian	  control	  since	  February	  1984.	  The	   islands	  were	   important	  to	  retake,	  because	  of	  their	   economic	   value	   as	   well	   as	   strategic	   value.	   Iraq	   attacked	   Iranian	   positions	   6-­‐8	  January	   1986,	   and	   re-­‐captured	   the	   southern	   part	   of	   the	   island.	   The	   northern	   part,	  however,	   remained	   in	   Iranian	  hands,	   and	   Iraq	  did	  not	  make	   any	   attempts	   to	   retake	   it	  either.165	  However,	  Iran	  still	  had	  the	  initiative	  in	  the	  land	  war,	  despite	  the	  setback	  at	  the	  Majnoon	  Islands.	  	  The	  next	   Iranian	  offensive	   started	  9	   February,	   and	  was	  named	  Wal	   Fajr	   8.	   The	  goal	  was	  to	  take	  Faw,	  a	  peninsula	  on	  the	  west	  bank	  of	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab,	  in	  southeastern	  Iraq.	   By	   taking	   Faw,	   Iran	   could	   block	   Iraq’s	   access	   to	   the	   Gulf,	   and	   disrupt	   Iraqi	   oil	  production.	  Once	  the	  peninsula	  was	  taken	  Iran	  hoped	  to	  be	  able	  to	  reach	  Basra,	  and	  to	  disrupt	   Iraq’s	   communication	   lines	   to	   Kuwait.	   In	   addition,	   southern	   Iraq	   had	   a	  substantial	  population	  of	  Shia	  Muslims	  ,	  and	  Khomeini	  sought	  to	  liberate	  them	  from	  “the	  criminal	   rule	   of	   Saddam	  Hussein	   and	   the	   Baath	   party”,	   and	   of	   course	   to	   gain	   support	  from	  them.166	  Iraq	  was	  unprepared	  for	  an	  attack	  on	  Faw,	  and	  the	  peninsula	  was	  taken	  by	  Iran	  after	  a	  week.	  The	  Iranian	  seizure	  of	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  areas	  in	  Iraq	  was	  a	  shock	  to	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  his	  staff	  in	  Baghdad,	  and	  he	  had	  to	  strike	  back	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  However,	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  counterattack	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month	  due	  to	  bad	   organising	   and	   difficult	  weather.	   This	   gave	   Iran	   time	   to	   dig	   in,	   and	   to	   prepare	   to	  defend	  their	  newly	  gained	  positions,	  which	  made	  the	  Iraqi	  counterattack	  difficult	  when	  it	  came.	  	  Iraq	  used	  firepower,	  armour	  and	  air	  force	  in	  the	  counterattacks,	  and	  the	  attacks	  were	  so	  comprehensive	  that	  Iraq	  had	  to	  purchase	  emergency	  ammunition	  from	  abroad.	  Iraq	  used	  all	  available	  means	  to	  retake	  Faw.	  From	  the	  9	  February	  to	  31	  March	  Iraq	  used	  Tabun	  and	  mustard	  gas	  fired	  from	  artillery	  and	  bombs	  to	  support	  the	  air	  raids.	  However,	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the	   landscape	   on	   Faw	   also	   contributed	   to	   limited	   effects:	   The	   chemical	   agents	   were	  neutralised	   in	   the	   marshy	   landscape	   as	   water	   absorbed	   the	   effects.	   There	   were	   also	  unfavourable	  weather	   conditions	   in	   the	   area	   at	   the	   time.	   700	  were	  killed	  or	   seriously	  injured	  by	  chemical	  weapons	  during	  the	  fighting	  at	  Faw.	  Many	  of	  them	  were	  Basij	  troops,	  Khomeini’s	   people’s	   militia,	   who	   did	   not	   have	   sufficient	   training	   in	   using	   chemical	  weapons	  defence	  gear.	  700	  were	  not	  a	  big	  number	  compared	  to	  the	  overall	  casualties	  in	  the	   battle,	   but	   the	   use	   of	   gas	   paralysed	   the	   Iranian	   forces	   and	   prevented	   them	   from	  counterattacking.167	  	  	  Did	  Iran	  use	  chemical	  weapons	  as	  well?	  	  In	  February	  1986,	  Iraq	  also	  blamed	  Iran	  for	  using	  poison	  gas	  against	  Iraqi	  forces.	  	  The	  representative	  to	  the	  UN	  from	  Iraq,	  Ismat	  Kittani,	  conveyed	  a	  statement	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	   from	   Iraq’s	  Minister	  of	  Culture	  and	   Information	  on	  13	  February	  1986,	  where	  he	  claimed	  that	  Iran	  had	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  against	  Iraqi	  forces	  on	  12	  February	  and	  13	  February,	  i.e.	  during	  the	  Iranian	  attack	  of	  Faw.168	  No	  place	  or	  any	  other	  details	  were	  submitted	  in	  the	  letter	  or	  given	  in	  the	  statement,	  but	  he	  declared	  that	  the	  act	  would	  not	  go	  unpunished.	  The	  same	  threat	  was	  repeated	  in	  a	  letter	  from	  Kittani	  to	  the	   Secretary-­‐General	   the	   same	   day,	   where	   he	   also	   claimed	   that	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons	   was	   a	   scheme	   from	   Iranian	   authorities	   to	   distract	   the	   UN	   from	   the	   real	  problem,	  namely	   the	   Iranian	  aggression	  on	   Iraqi	   territory	  and	   the	   threat	   to	  peace	  and	  stability.169	  	  Some	  comments	  have	  to	  be	  made	  on	  why	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  Iran	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  against	   Iraq.	   It	   is	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   Iran	   had	   chemical	   weapons,	   and	   at	   least	   not	  developed	  enough	   to	  use	   them	   in	  battle	  at	   this	   time.	   In	  addition,	  Khomeini	  personally	  disapproved	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  because	  he	  regarded	  them	  as	  un-­‐Islamic.170	  	  It	  was	  never	  proven	  that	  Iran	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  against	  Iraqi	  forces,	  as	  Iraq	  declined	   the	   Secretary-­‐General’s	   request	   to	   investigate	   Iraq’s	   allegations.	   Iraq	   replied	  that	  the	  issue	  had	  been	  reported	  and	  was	  addressed	  in	  resolution	  582	  (1986),	  and	  it	  was	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  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/17824.	  	  169	  Letter	  13.2.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/17826.	  	  170 	  Institute	   for	   Compilation	   and	   Publication	   of	   Imam	   Khomeini	   Works,	   ”Imam	   Khomeini	   Strongly	  Opposed	  Developing	  Nukes.”	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therefore	  not	  necessary	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  it	  any	  further.	  The	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  ending	  the	  war	  instead	  of	  dealing	  with	  “secondary	  aspects”.171	  	  Iran	  on	   their	  side	  denied	  any	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  and	  claimed	  that	   it	  was	  the	   Iraqi	   chemical	  weapons	   that	   had	   gone	  wrong	   and	   affected	   both	   Iranian	   and	   Iraqi	  troops.172	  	  The	  Iranian	  claim	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  correct	  version	  of	  what	  happened.	  It	  was	  not	  uncommon	  that	  attacks	  with	  chemical	  weapons	  went	  wrong,	  and	  Iraq	  had	  not	  developed	  proper	   systems	   to	   target	   the	   effects	   precisely.	   Chemical	   weapons	   are,	   as	   previously	  mentioned,	   very	   sensitive	   to	  weather	   conditions	   and	   to	   geography	   in	   the	   surrounding	  areas.	  The	  Iraqis	  might	  have	  deployed	  chemical	  weapons	  too	  close	  to	  their	  own	  troops,	  and	  a	  sudden	  change	  of	  wind	  direction	  can	  have	  blown	  the	  gas	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  Iraqi	  soldiers	  instead	  of	  the	  Iranians.	  The	  fact	  that	  Iraq	  did	  not	  provide	  any	  details	  about	  the	  attack,	  and	  that	  they	  declined	  the	  offer	  to	  have	  it	  investigated	  by	  a	  neutral	  group	  adds	  up	  suspicion	  that	  the	  allegations	  were	  false.	  	  	  	  What	   is	   important	   is	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   offered	   to	   send	   a	   mission	   to	  investigate	   the	  allegations	   immediately.	   It	   shows	   that	  allegations	  of	   chemical	  weapons	  were	   taken	   seriously	   at	   once,	   and	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   responded	   at	   once	   as	  opposed	   to	   the	   first	   attacks	   in	  1983.	   It	   also	   shows	   that	  both	   countries	  were	  given	   the	  same	  opportunity	  to	  get	  the	  allegations	  confirmed.	  	  	  The	  relations	  between	  regional	  states	  and	  the	  belligerents	  in	  1986	  	  Iran	  launched	  Wal	  Fajr	  IV	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  area	  of	  Northern	  Iraq	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  Iraq	  tried	  to	  retake	  Faw.	  The	  Iranians	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  conquer	  any	  significant	  areas,	  but	  the	   offensive	   tied	   down	   Iraqi	   troops,	   so	   they	   could	   not	   be	   used	   in	   the	  more	   strategic	  battles	  in	  the	  south.173	  The	  Iraqi	  attempt	  to	  retake	  the	  Faw	  peninsula	  turned	  into	  a	  long,	  bloody	  and	  exhausting	  battle	   for	  both	  sides.	   Iran	  controlled	  about	  200	  square	  km,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  fighting	  had	  turned	  into	  a	  stalemate	  by	  April,	  and	  the	  situation	  would	  remain	  so	  until	  early	  1988.	  	  Both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  somehow	  seemed	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  status	  on	  Faw,	  and	  moved	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  main	  front	  east	  of	  Basra	  instead.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  Report	  of	  the	  mission	  dispatched	  by	  the	  Scretary-­‐General	  to	  investigate	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons:	  	  Note	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  12.3.1986.	  	  UNSC	  document	  S/17911.	  	  172	  Letter	  18.2.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/17843.	  173	  Hiro,	  The	  Longest	  War,	  p.	  168-­‐170.	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The	  Faw	  offensive	   in	  February	  1986	  made	   the	  neighbouring	  states	  nervous.	  An	  Iranian	   victory	   in	   the	   war	   had	   suddenly	   gone	   from	   possible	   to	   likely,	   as	   Iran	   was	  successful	   in	   the	   battlefield	   and	   pushed	   Saddam’s	   forces	   further	   into	   Iraqi	   territory.	  Other	  countries	   in	   the	  Middle	  East,	  e.g.	  Kuwait,	  had	   tried	   to	  stay	  out	  of	   the	  conflict,	   at	  least	  officially,	  as	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  had	  been	  important	  trade	  partners	  to	  other	  states	  in	  the	  area,	  but	  the	   latest	   Iranian	  offensive	  and	  the	  tanker	  war	  made	  the	  Gulf	  States	  turn	  against	  Iran	  officially.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  aggressor	  role	  had	  changed	  from	  Iraq	  to	  Iran.	  Iran	  had	  since	  1982	  turned	   the	   tide	   and	  was	   in	   1986	   not	   only	   the	   offensive	   part	   in	   the	  war,	   but	   also	   the	  successful	   one.	   Other	   Gulf	   States	   viewed	   Saddam	   Hussein	   as	   a	   much	   more	   reliable	  neighbour	  than	  Khomeini	  in	  Iran.	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  rule	  was	  Sunni	  and	  shared	  many	  of	  the	  same	  values	  as	  other	  Arab	   leaders.	  The	   Iranian	  rule	  was	  not	  only	  a	   threat	   to	  Arab	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  military	  power,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  ideology.	  Since	  he	  came	  to	  power,	  Khomeini	   had	   declared	   that	   he	  wished	   to	   spread	   the	   Iranian	   revolution,	   and	   Arabian	  leaders	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  positions.	  	  Second,	   Khomeini	   and	   other	   Iranian	   leaders	   threatened	   to	   expand	   the	   war	   to	  other	  Gulf	  States,	  because	  of	  their	  indirect	  support	  of	  Iraq.	  Even	  though	  most	  countries	  had	   declared	   neutrality	   in	   the	   war,	   many	   of	   them	   had	   supported	   Iraq	   with	   war	  equipment,	  loans	  or	  been	  important	  trade	  partners.	  The	  direct	  threat	  from	  Khomeini	  did	  not	   prevent	   the	   support	   of	   Iraq;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   it	   led	   to	   closer	   cooperation	   with	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  Iraq,	  and	  a	  further	  alienation	  of	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  and	  Iran.	  	  	  Security	  Council	  meetings	  in	  February	  1986	  	  The	   Security	   Council	  met	   in	   a	   series	   of	  meetings	   in	   February	   1986	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  recent	   events,	   and	   representatives	   from	  Bahrain,	   Jordan,	   Kuwait,	   Oman,	   Saudi	  Arabia,	  Tunisia	   and	   Yemen	   had	   requested	   to	   be	   a	   part	   of	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   issue.174	  In	  addition,	   the	   representative	   from	   the	   United	   Arab	   Emirates	   was	   a	   member	   of	   the	  Security	   Council.	   The	   Deputy	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   of	   Iraq,	  Tariq	  Aziz,	  was	  also	  allowed	  to	  take	  part	   in	  the	  discussion	  after	  request,	   in	  addition	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  The	   Security	   Council	   in	   1986	   consisted	   of	   the	   five	   permanent	   members	   and	   Australia,	   Bulgaria,	  Denmark,	  Ghana,	  Madagascar,	  Thailand,	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  and	  Venezuela.	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the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Arab	  States,	  which	  Iraq	  was	  a	  member	  of.175	  The	  first	  meeting	  was	  held	  18	  February	  at	  the	  Headquarters	  in	  New	  York,	  and	  the	  support	  of	  Iraq	  was	  expressed	  explicitly	  in	  the	  discussions	  by	  several	  of	  the	  actors.	  Iran	  still	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  meeting	  with	  the	  Security	  Council.	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   of	   the	   League	   of	   Arab	   Nations	   held	   a	   speech	   before	   the	  Security	  Council,	  and	  it	  was	  obvious	  that	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  a	  subordinate	  topic	  to	  the	  Arab	  nations	  he	  represented.	  His	  major	  concern	  was	  that	  the	  war	  threatened	  to	  spread	  to	  the	  entire	  Middle	  East,	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  affect	  the	  entire	  global	  economy.	  Iran	  was	  the	  aggressor	  in	  the	  war,	  according	  to	  him,	  and	  the	  one	  to	  blame	  for	  creating	  instability	   in	   the	   region.	   Iraq,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   had	   responded	   positively	   to	   all	  mediation	  efforts	  and	  peace	  initiatives,	  while	  Iran	  had	  rejected	  them,	  and	  the	  League	  of	  Arab	  States	  therefore	  declared	  full	  solidarity	  with	  its	  member	  state	  Iraq.	  Still,	  the	  League	  believed	   in	   a	   peace	   process	   based	   on	   international	   law.	   The	   Secretary-­‐General	   of	   the	  League	  of	  Arab	  States	  called	   for	   the	  big	  powers	  of	   the	  world	   to	   take	  “a	  practical	  stand	  enabling	  all	  necessary	  conditions	  to	  be	  met	  for	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conflict.”176	  	  The	  big	  powers	  had	   so	   far	   not	   given	   the	   conflict	   enough	   attention	   or	   done	   enough	   to	   prevent	   an	  escalation	  of	  the	  conflict.	  He	  even	  hinted	  to	  that	  some	  of	  the	  influential	  powers	  did	  not	  object	  to	  the	  continuation	  of	   the	  conflict.	  He	  and	  the	  Arab	  states	  expected	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  implement	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter,	  especially	  Articles	  36	  and	  37	  of	  chapter	  VI	  and	  chapter	  VII,	  i.e.	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  should	  take	  means	  to	  settle	  the	  dispute,	  if	  necessary	  by	  action.177	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Arab	  Nations	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  The	  League	  supported	  Iraq	  openly,	  and	   it	   is	  quite	  natural	   that	   they	  did	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  crimes	  that	  Iraq	  committed	  in	  the	  war,	  but	  it	  should	  be	  added	  that	  he	  mentioned	  several	  times	  that	  Iran	  breached	  international	  law	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  The	  League’s	   overall	   agenda	  was	   peace,	   and	   it	   stuck	   to	   the	   same	   strategy	   as	   the	   Security	  Council	   and	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   had	   had	   during	   the	   first	   year	   of	   the	   war,	   namely	  comprehensive	  peace	   instead	  of	  a	  gradual	   reduction	  of	  hostilities.	  This	  had	  previously	  proved	   impossible	   as	   Iran	   demanded	   that	   Iraq	   should	   pay	   retributions	   of	   the	  war,	   in	  addition	  to	  be	  condemned	  for	  its	  violation	  of	  international	  law,	  i.e.	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  the	  2663rd	  meeting	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  18.2.1986.	  UNSC	  document	  S/PV.2663.	  176	  Idem.	  177	  UN,	  ”Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.”	  	  
	   60	  
The	  Deputy	  Minister	  and	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Iraq,	  Tariq	  Aziz,	  who	  also	  spoke	  before	  the	  Council,	  criticised	  it	  for	  focusing	  too	  much	  on	  such	  subordinate	  aspects	  of	   the	   war,	   and	   that	   the	   Council	   had	   done	   so	   since	   1983,	   i.e.	   the	   first	   year	   chemical	  weapons	  were	  used.	  He	  claimed	  that	   Iran	  had	  used	   lies	  and	  propaganda	  to	  occupy	  the	  Council	  with	  matters,	   instead	   of	   focusing	   on	   ending	   the	  war.178	  The	  majority	   of	   Iran’s	  complaints	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  regarded	  chemical	  weapons,	  so	  it	  is	  quite	  obvious,	  though	  not	  said	  explicitly,	  that	  Aziz	  had	  the	  aspect	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  mind.	  	  The	   representatives	   to	   the	   UN	   from	   Jordan,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   Kuwait,	   Tunisia	   and	  Oman	  held	  speeches	  on	  the	  item	  the	  following	  days,	  and	  they	  all	  agreed	  that	  the	  latest	  Iranian	   offensive	   was	   a	   breach	   on	   international	   law	   as	   they	   occupied	   another	   state’s	  territory.	  They	  also	  highlighted	  that	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  conflict	  endangered	  peace	  and	  stability	   in	   the	   entire	   region.	   They	   all	   condemned	   Iran	   for	   the	   aggression,	   and	  underlined	  that	   Iraq	  had	  welcomed	  previous	  resolutions	  and	  been	  willing	   to	  negotiate	  peace.	  Iran	  had	  rejected	  all	  previous	  resolutions	  and	  negotiating	  efforts.179	  	  	  It	  was	   clear	   at	   this	   point	   that	  most	   of	   the	   other	   states	   in	   the	   region	   abandoned	   their	  official	  stand	  as	  neutral	  states,	  and	  Iran’s	  isolation	  became	  clearer.	  	  Representatives	  to	  the	  UN	  from	  Egypt,	  Libya	  and	  Morocco	  had	  also	  been	  invited	  by	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Council	  to	  speak	  their	  views.	  Both	  the	  representative	  of	  Morocco	  and	   Egypt	   spoke	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   UN	   initiated	   peace,	   which	   they	   underlined	   that	   Iraq	  already	  had	  welcomed.	  Bahrain	   and	   a	   representative	   of	   the	   PLO	   (Palestine	   Liberation	  Organization)	   also	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   peace,	   but	   did	   not	   credit	   Iraq	   for	   its	  willingness	  to	  negotiate.180	  	  Libya,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  was	   one	   of	   the	   few	   official	   supporters	   of	   Iran	   in	   the	  conflict.	  Libya	  shared	  Iran’s	  contempt	  for	  USA,	  and	  Iran	  was	  therefore	  an	  obvious	  ally	  of	  Libya.	  The	  representative	  did	  not	  address	   the	   issue	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  even	  though	  this	  was	   one	   of	   the	  major	   preoccupations	   for	   Iran,	   but	   attacked	   the	   Council	   for	   being	  useless	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  role	  as	  a	  peacekeeper.	  According	  to	  the	  Libyan	  representative,	  The	  US	  paralysed	  the	  Council,	   in	  addition	  to	  acting	   like	  the	  world’s	  police	   force,	  which	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made	   the	   entire	   Security	  Council	   and	   the	  UN	  undemocratic.181	  Iran	  had	   in	  many	  of	   its	  letters	  accused	  the	  Council	  for	  not	  carrying	  out	  its	  duties	  according	  to	  the	  Charter,	  and	  the	  Libyan	  representative	  shared	  this	  view.182	  	  These	  meetings	   in	  February	  do	  not	  only	  show	  that	   Iran	  had	  almost	  all	   states	   in	  the	   region	   against	   them,	   but	   they	   also	   show	   what	   issues	   were	   important.	   Chemical	  weapons	  did	  not	  harm	  anyone	  except	   Iran,	  and	   it	  was	   therefore	  not	  on	  other	   regional	  states’	  agenda	  than	  Iran’s.	  Attacks	  on	  ships	  in	  the	  Gulf	  were	  a	  major	  problem	  for	  other	  states,	  especially	  the	  Gulf	  States.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  tanker	  war	  endanger	  peace	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  but	  it	  also	  threatened	  other	  states’	  economies.	  	  	  
The	  Focus	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Secretary-­General	  in	  1986	  	  	  The	   Security	   Council	   had	   not	   adopted	   any	   resolutions	   on	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war	   since	  resolution	  552	  (1984)	   in	  1984,	  but	   the	  escalation	  of	   the	  warfare	   in	  1985	  and	   the	   first	  months	  of	  1986	  made	  a	  new	  one	  urgent.	  Almost	  two	  years	  had	  gone	  by,	  but	  the	  previous	  resolution	  had	  not	  been	  adopted	  unanimously,	  which	  showed	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  was	  divided	  in	  how	  they	  should	  approach	  and	  solve	  the	  conflict.	  A	  united	  Council	  would	  be	  a	  basic	  necessity	   to	  solve	   the	  conflict.	  The	  resolution	  showed	   the	  complexity	  of	   the	  war,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  difficult	  it	  was	  to	  solve	  it,	  even	  for	  third	  party	  states.	  The	  resolution	  had	  been	  an	  utter	  failure,	  and	  Iran	  had	  refused	  to	  negotiate.	  	  	  The	  meeting	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  February	  1986	  	  	  The	  Security	  Council	  member	  states	  needed	  time	  to	  work	  on	  a	  new	  resolution	  they	  could	  agree	  on.	  The	  Security	  Council	  meeting	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  voting	  on	  the	  new	  resolution	  took	  place	  24	  February	  1986.	  Representatives	  from	  Thailand,	  The	  United	  Kingdom,	  The	  Soviet	  Union,	  USA,	  China,	  Denmark,	  Australia,	  Madagascar	  and	  France	  spoke	  on	  the	  issue,	  and	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   verbatim	   record	   that	   states	   outside	   the	   region	   had	   a	   wider	  perspective	  on	  the	  conflict	  than	  the	  Arab	  states.	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Thailand,	  which	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement	  and	  not	  a	  close	  ally	   of	   any	   of	   the	   superpowers	   either,	   spoke	   in	   clear	   text	   about	   the	   conflict.	   Thailand	  reminded	  the	  Security	  Council	  of	  Iran’s	  declination	  to	  be	  present	  in	  the	  meetings	  and	  to	  speak	   its	   case.	   The	   Council	   had	   therefore	   only	   heard	   one	   side	   of	   the	   story.	   The	  representative	   from	   Thailand	   also	   said	   that	   the	   war	   was	   “initiated	   by	   one	   side,	  continued	  by	   the	  other”,	  which	   indirectly	  meant	   that	   Iraq	  began	   the	  war.	  As	   the	  Arab	  states	   except	   Libya	   had	   spoken	   for	   earlier,	   also	  Thailand	   urged	   for	   peace	   in	   the	   long-­‐lasting	   conflict.	   The	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons	  was	   an	   aspect	   that	   Thailand	   paid	   great	  importance	   to	   as	   it	   breached	   the	   Geneva	   Protocol	   and	   was	   an	   inhumane	   weapon.	  Thailand	   feared	   that	   the	  prolongation	  of	   the	   conflict	  would	   lead	   to	  escalated	  use	  of	   it.	  Thailand	   asked	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   to	   pay	   specific	   attention	   to	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons,	   which	   was	   allegedly	   used	   by	   both	   Iran	   and	   Iraq.	   The	   aspect	   of	   chemical	  weapons	   was	   included	   in	   the	   Secretary-­‐Generals	   eight-­‐point	   plan	   for	   peace,	   and	  Thailand	  therefore	  urged	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  to	  respect	  this	  point.183	  	  	  The	   British	   representative	   elaborated	   on	   his	   colleague	   from	   Thailand’s	  arguments,	  and	  specified	  that	  the	  illegal	  weapon	  had	  been	  used	  against	  Iranian	  troops,	  and	  thereby	  indirectly	  making	  Iraq	  responsible	  for	  the	  crime.	  That	  matter	  could	  not	  be	  set	  aside	  or	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  minor	  obstacle	   to	   the	  peace	  process,	  according	  to	   the	  Brit.	  Peace	  was	  the	  ultimate	  goal,	  which	  should	  be	  worked	  for	  in	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  plan	  arranged	  by	  the	  UN,	  and	  it	  had	  to	  be	  acceptable	  for	  both	  sides.184	  	  The	  US	  had	  condemned	  the	  use	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  repeated	  the	  condemnation	  at	  the	  Security	  Council	  meeting.	  The	  American	  representative	  expressed	  his	  concern	  over	  the	  use	  in	  a	  time	  when	  the	  world	  had	  abstained	  from	  using	  it	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  use	  now	  did	  not	  only	  breach	  international	  law,	  but	  it	  also	  ruined	  years	  of	  international	  cooperation.185	  China	  shared	   the	  same	  view	  as	  The	  UK,	  and	  highlighted	   that	   the	   terms	  for	  peace	  had	  to	  be	  acceptable	  and	  reasonable	   for	  both	  parties.	  They	  also	  opposed	  the	  use	  of	  bacterial	  and	  chemical	  weapons.186	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Australia	   also	   proclaimed	   their	   concerns,	   which	   particularly	   were	   the	   use	   of	  chemical	  weapons.	   Denmark,	  Madagascar	   and	   France	   encouraged	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	  new	  resolution,	  but	  did	  not	  utter	  any	  particular	  stand	  on	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.187	  	  	  Neither	   did	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   which	   had	   been	   one	   of	   the	   countries	   that	   helped	   Iraq	  develop	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  The	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   concerned	   some	   states	   more	   than	   others.	   Arab	  states,	  which	  officially	  supported	  Iraq	  or	  which	  preferred	  Iraq	  to	  Iran,	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  aspect	  of	  poison	  gas	  at	  all,	  or	  they	  criticised	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  for	  focusing	  too	  much	  on	  it.	  Western	  states,	  many	  of	  them	  members	  of	  the	  NATO,	  Non-­‐Aligned	  countries	  outside	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  neutral	  states	  to	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	  Cold	  war,	  saw	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  issues	  in	  the	  war.	  	  The	  war	  could	  not	  be	  settled	  without	  addressing	  the	  problem.	  It	  is	  probable	  that	  these	  countries	  did	  not	   see	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  as	  an	   isolated	  conflict,	  but	  as	  a	  war	   in	  a	  world	  where	  it	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  influence	  other	  conflicts	  in	  negative	  ways.	  However,	  no	  matter	  how	  grave	  they	  viewed	  the	  use,	   they	  did	  not	  go	  beyond	  condemnation	  of	   it,	  but	  so	  far,	  condemnation	  and	  declared	  concern	  about	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  not	  prevented	  Iraq	  from	  using	  chemical	  weapons	  earlier	  in	  the	  war.	  	  	  Resolution	  582	  (1986)	  	  	  Resolution	  582	  was	  voted	  for	  24	  February	  1986.	  The	  Security	  Council	  recalled	  decisions	  taken	  during	  the	  (at	  that	  time)	  six-­‐year	   long	  conflict,	  and	  that	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  were	  parties	   to	   the	  charter,	  which	  obliged	  states	   to	  settle	   conflicts	  peacefully.	  The	  aspect	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  dealt	  with	  carefully,	  but	  taken	  seriously	  in	  the	  resolution.	  	  In	  resolution	  585	  (1986)	  the	  Security	  Council	  noted	  that	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  were	  parties	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol,	  which	  prohibited	  the	  use	  of	  asphyxiating,	  poisonous	  and	  other	   gases,	   and	   bacteriological	   methods	   in	   warfare. 188 	  Furthermore,	   the	   Security	  Council	  deplored	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  conflict,	   the	  breach	  of	  humanitarian	  law,	  attacks	  on	  neutral	  shipping	  and	  aircrafts,	  but	  particularly	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  Finally	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the	  Security	  Council	  urged	  the	  conflicting	  parties	  to	  settle	  their	  disputes	  peacefully	  and	  to	  end	  the	  war.	  The	  Security	  Council	  adopted	  resolution	  582	  unanimously.189	  	  	  Iraq	  and	  Iran’s	  responses	  to	  resolution	  582	  (1986)	  	  Iraq	   was	   positive	   to	   the	   resolution,	   which	   Iraq	   saw	   as	   a	   basic	   framework	   for	   peace	  negotiations.	  However,	  Iraq	  was	  only	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  if	  Iran	  accepted	  the	  resolution	  unconditionally190	  	  Iran,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  a	  different	  stand	  to	  it.	  Iran	  appreciated	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	   Secretary-­‐General,	   and	   said	   the	   resolution	   was	   a	   positive	   step	   on	   the	   point	   of	  condemning	   Iraq	   as	   the	   aggressor	   of	   the	   war.	   However,	   Iran	   could	   not	   accept	   the	  resolution,	   because	   it	   was	   unbalanced	   and	   inadequate,	   and	   reflected	   the	   unequivocal	  and	   vague	   position	   the	   Security	   Council	   had	   towards	   the	   war.191	  Iran	   repeated	   its	  previous	  demands,	  which	  were	  necessary	  to	  address	  if	  Iran	  should	  accept	  a	  resolution.	  First	   of	   all,	   Iraq	  had	   to	  be	   condemned	   for	   initiating	   the	  war	  by	   invading	   Iran.	   Second,	  Iraq	   had	   to	   be	   condemned	   for	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons.	   Third,	   Iraq	   had	   to	   be	  condemned	  for	  crimes	  and	  threats	  against	  aviation,	  as	  well	  as	  participation	  in	  hijacking.	  The	  Council	  also	  had	   to	   take	  decisive	  position	  against	   Iraq	  because	  of	   their	  attacks	  on	  neutral	  vessels	  and	  civilian	  centres.192	  	  Iran	   also	   criticised	   the	   Council	   for	   not	   taking	   action	   against	   chemical	  weapons.	  The	  Council	  had	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  against	  Iranian	  forces	  in	  the	  statement	  of	  25	  April	  1985,	  and	  Iran	  expected	  that	  Iraq	  should	  be	  condemned	  by	  name	  in	   a	   resolution.	   According	   to	   Iran,	   the	   Council	   took	   a	   milder	   position	   to	   the	   use	   of	  chemical	   weapons	   in	   resolution	   582	   (1986),	   which	   was	   a	   major	   setback.	   Iran	   also	  criticised	  “certain	  permanent	  members”	   for	  being	  one-­‐sided	  and	  partial	   in	  the	  conflict.	  That	  prevented	  the	  resolution	  from	  being	  fair,	  and	  it	  prevented	  the	  Council	  from	  finding	  a	  solution.	  The	  continuation	  of	  the	  war	  was	  thus	  the	  Council’s	  responsibility.193	  “Certain	  permanent	  members”	  was	  the	  US.	  The	  US	  had	  been	  Khomeini’s	  prime	  enemy	  since	  the	  Islamic	   revolution	   and	   the	   hostage	   crisis.	   Khomeini	   had	   also	   criticised	   international	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  Letter	  5.3.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iraq	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  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	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  Letter	  25.2.1986	  from	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communism	  for	  being	  just	  as	  bad	  as	  the	  US	  and	  for	  the	  Soviets	  relations	  to	  Iraq,	  so	  the	  reference	  might	  have	  been	  directed	  at	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  well.194	  	  Despite	   the	   lukewarm	   reception	   of	   resolution	   582	   (1986)	   by	   Iran,	   it	   received	  positive	  response	  from	  other	  UN	  member	  states	  in	  the	  following	  weeks.	  The	  European	  Community,	  for	  example,	  urged	  the	  two	  fighting	  parties	  to	  accept	  resolution	  582	  (1985)	  to	  settle	  the	  conflict.195	  	  	  Continued	  Efforts	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  writes	  in	  his	  memoirs	  that	  he	  felt	  that	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  worked	  against	  him.	  They	  supported	  resolutions,	  but	  did	  not	  take	  any	   actions	   to	   prevent	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   conflict.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   he	   felt	   that	   the	  permanent	  members	   took	   actions,	  which	   escalated	   and	  prolonged	   the	   conflict.	   France	  for	  instance,	  started	  selling	  war	  systems	  to	  Iran.196	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  France	  had	  sold	  warplanes	  to	  Iraq.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  still	  continued	  his	  work,	  and	  sent	  a	  mission	  to	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  to	  investigate	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  again.	  	  The	  mission	  was	  sent	  on	  26	  February	  to	  3	  March	  1986	  to	  Iran,	  and	  consisted	  of	  three	   specialists,	   while	   a	   fourth	   joined	   in	   on	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   findings	   in	  Switzerland.	  All	  were	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  missions.	  	  The	   number	   of	   casualties	   alarmed	   the	   specialists,	   especially	   since	   the	   UN	   had	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  It	  was	  also	  clear	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	   on	   a	   more	   intense	   scale	   than	   before.197	  The	   task	   was	   to	   investigate	   whether	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	  or	  not,	  and	  if	  they	  were,	  to	  what	  extent,	  what	  type,	  and	  in	  what	  circumstances.	  The	  mission	  only	  carried	  out	  investigations	  in	  Iran,	  as	  Iraq	  had	  previously	   declined	   the	   request	   to	   conduct	   examinations	   on	   Iraqi	   territory.	   The	  investigations	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  forms	  of	  interviews	  with	  Iranian	  Government	  officials,	  visits	   to	   the	   Abadan	   area	   where	   samples	   were	   collected,	   clinical	   examinations	   and	  interviews	  of	  victims,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  interview	  with	  an	  Iraqi	  pilot	  who	  had	  been	  captured	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  7.8.1986	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  representative	  of	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  UK	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  UNSC	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and	   other	   Iraqi	   prisoners	   of	   war.198	  The	   report	   dealt	   with	   medical	   aspects,	   chemical	  aspects,	  munitions	  aspects	  and	  testimony	  of	  Iraqi	  personnel.	  The	  conclusion	  was	  clear:	  Chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	  in	  the	  form	  of	  aerial	  bombs	  against	  Iranian	  positions	  by	  Iraqi	  forces.	  The	  Iraqi	  pilot	  who	  was	  interviewed	  confirmed	  this.	  The	  chemical	  agent	  used	  was	  mainly	  mustard	  gas	  (yperite),	  but	  traces	  of	  nerve	  gases	  were	  also	  found.	  The	  extent	  of	  it	  could	  not	  be	  determined,	  but	  the	  specialists	  saw	  700	  casualties	  in	  Ahwaz	  and	  Tehran,	  which	  indicated	  that	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  increased	  since	  1984.199	  	  The	  interviews	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  prisoners	  of	  war	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  pilot	  were	  the	  first	  time	   Iraqi	   personnel	   admitted	   that	   they	   had	   used	   chemical	  weapons.	   The	   report	  was	  also	   the	   first	   official	   UN	   document	   where	   it	   was	   specifically	   stated	   that	   chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	  against	  Iranians	  by	  Iraqi	  forces.	  	  The	   mission’s	   report	   was	   a	   shift	   from	   what	   had	   previously	   been	   written	   and	  published	  by	  UN	  officials	  as	  the	  violator	  was	  identified.	  However,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  did	  not	  repeat	  that	  it	  was	  Iraqi	  forces	  that	  had	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  his	  note,	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  chapter	  below.	  The	  need	  for	  a	  clear	  and	  direct	  condemnation	  is	  also	  something	  Iran	  requested	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  18	  March.200	  	  	  The	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  response	  to	  the	  latest	  report	  	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   instructed	   new	   investigations	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   after	   repeated	  requests	  from	  Iran	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  three	  first	  months	  of	  1986,	  after	  Iraq	  had	  resumed	  its	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  In	  his	  note,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  summed	  up	  the	  efforts	  made	  by	  himself	  and	  the	  Security	  Council,	  in	  addition	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  mission	  he	  dispatched,	  as	  well	  as	  commenting	  on	  it.	  	  At	   this	   point,	   12	   March,	   only	   Iraq	   had	   responded	   positively	   to	   resolution	   582	  (1986),	  and	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  stressed	  that	  in	  the	  meanwhile	  he	  was	  determined	  to	  pursue	  every	  way	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  end	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  which	  could	  minimize	  the	  suffering.	  The	  report	  had	  concluded	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  once	  again	  been	  used,	  and	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   repeated	   that	   he	   condemned	   the	   use	   of	   it	   wherever	   and	  whenever	  it	  occurred.	  He	  also	  specified	  that	  this	  time	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	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“in	  violation	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  of	  1925	  against	  Iranian	  forces”.201	  By	  saying	  this,	  he	  addressed	  the	  victims,	  which	  was	   important	  both	   for	   Iran,	  but	  one	  can	  also	  say	   that	   it	  was	  important	  for	  the	  war	  in	  general	  as	  it	  indirectly	  identified	  Iraq	  as	  the	  one	  behind	  the	  violation.	  Iran	  had	  in	  several	  letters	  complained	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  make	  Iraq	  responsible	  for	  it,	  had	  led	  to	  renewed	  attacks	  by	  Iraq,	  as	  their	  actions	  did	  not	  have	  any	  consequences.	  Finally,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  encouraged	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  to	  end	  the	  war	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  peace	  in	  the	  area.202	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Security	  Council’s	  response	  to	  the	  latest	  report	  
	  The	  Security	  Council	  discussed	   the	   report	  of	   the	  mission	  dispatched	  by	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   to	   investigate	  allegations	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   the	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  chemical	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  published,	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  president	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  after	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   Councils	   concerns	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  mission,	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  that	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  had	  been	  used	  by	  Iraqi	  forces	  against	  Iranian	  forces	  in	  the	  recent	  Iranian	  offensives.	  He	  condemned	  the	  use	  and	  urged	  the	  two	  conflicting	  parties	  to	  settle	  their	  disputes	  and	  comply	  to	  Resolution	  582	  (1986),	  so	  peace	  could	   be	   restored.203	  This	   was	   the	   first	   time	   Iraq	  was	   named	   as	   the	   user	   of	   chemical	  weapons	  by	  the	  Security	  Council,	  which	  at	  an	  international	  level	  was	  important	  because	  it	  made	  Iraq	  responsible	  for	  breaking	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol.	  However,	  a	  statement	  by	  the	  Security	  Council	  was	  not	  as	   strong	  as	  a	   resolution,	  nor	  was	   it	  binding.	  Still,	   this	  was	  a	  triumph	   to	   Iran	   as	   they	   had	   called	   for	   an	   identification	   of	   Iraq	   as	   user	   of	   chemical	  weapons	  since	  1983.	  	  	  Iran’s	  relations	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  1986	  	  The	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  did	  not	  stop	  despite	  the	  new	  efforts	  and	  the	  condemnation.	  Iran	  once	   again	   called	   for	   a	   decisive	   action	   from	   the	   Security	  Council,	   and	  Khorassani	  	  said:	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[…]	  it	  should	  have	  gone	  beyond	  mere	  condemnation	  and,	  following	  so	  oft-­repeated	  
cases	   of	   the	   deployment	   of	   chemical	  weapons	   by	   Iraq,	   it	   should	   have	   acted	  more	  
decisively	  and	  punitively	   vis-­à-­vis	   the	  unequivocal	   report	  of	   the	  Secretary-­General	  
on	  the	  Iraqi	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  against	  Iranian	  troops.204	  	  	  	  Iran	  was	  in	  general	  not	  satisfied	  with	  only	  a	  condemnation	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  The	  Ministry	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs	   of	   Iran	   called	   for	   a	   resolution	  by	   the	   Security	   Council,	  which	   identified	   and	   condemned	   Iraq	   as	   the	   aggressor	   and	   violator	   of	   the	   Geneva	  Protocol	   of	   1925	   in	   response	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General’s	   statement.	   Khorassani	  was	   of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  UN	  in	  general	  did	  not	  act	  according	  to	  its	  responsibilities,	  but	  he	  warned	  the	  Council	  and	  states	  of	  taking	  sides	  in	  the	  war.	  The	  US	  was	  addressed	  specifically	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  the	  conflict.205	  	  Iraq	  launched	  another	  attack	  against	  Iran	  in	  May.	  Iraq	  surprised	  Iran	  and	  took	  the	  Iranian	  border	   city	  Mehran,	  which	  was	   an	   important	   city	   strategically,	   because	   it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  routes	  for	  Iranian	  attacks	  into	  Iraq.	  It	  also	  boosted	  Iraqi	  moral.	  206	  Iraq	  did	   not	   manage	   to	   take	   the	   mountains	   surrounding	   Mehran,	   which	   gave	   Iran	   an	  opportunity	  to	  strike	  back.	  Iran	  did,	  and	  Iraq	  had	  to	  admit	  their	  defeat	  by	  early	  July.207	  	  	  	  The	  Security	  Council’s	  work	  in	  autumn	  1986	  	  The	  President	  of	   the	  Security	  Council	   sent	  a	   letter	   to	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  29	  August	  1986,	  where	  he	  spoke	  on	  behalf	  of	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  The	  Security	  Council	  were	  alarmed	  by	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  threats	  against	  neighbouring	   countries,	   and	   the	   attacks	   on	  merchant	   shipping	   and	  on	   civilian	   targets.	  The	   council	   encouraged	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   to	   continue	   his	   peace	   mediation,	   and	  pointed	  especially	  out	  that	  extra	  effort	  should	  be	  put	  in	  the	  area	  of	  preventing	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	   and	   attacks	   on	   civilian	   areas.208	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   had	   already	  sent	   missions	   to	   investigate	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons,	   and	   his	   possibilities	   to	   do	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  p.227-­‐228.	  207	  Johnson,	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  War,	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something	  past	  that	  were	  limited.	  The	  Security	  Council	  had	  more	  options	  to	  prevent	  any	  further	  use	  of	  gas,	  but	  the	  Council	  indirectly	  disclaimed	  its	  liability.	  Even	  though	  the	  war	  was	  discussed	  and	  given	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  on	  international	  level,	   it	   still	   continued.	   The	   Tanker	   war	   showed	   the	   differences	   in	   military	   strength	  between	   the	   two	  parties,	   and	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   Iraq	  was	   superior	  when	   it	   came	   to	   air	  power.209	  Iran’s	  chance	  to	  win	  the	  war	  was	  therefore	  dependent	  on	  the	  land	  war.	  	  	  The	  land	  war	  in	  autumn	  1986	  	  Karbala	   2	  was	   launched	   in	   northern	   Iraq	   31	   August,	   and	   Iran	  managed	   to	   take	   some	  territory	  together	  with	  Kurdish	  fighters.210	  Karabla	  3	  followed	  the	  next	  day,	  1	  September.	  	  	  	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  take	  Iraqi	  oil	  platforms	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  but	  the	  attack	  failed	  and	  Iran	  stepped	  up	  its	  controls	  of	  vessels	  in	  the	  Gulf	  instead.	  	  	  	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  continued	  to	  warn	  that	  the	  final	  battle	  to	  end	  the	  war	  would	  soon	   take	   place,	   but	   the	   land	   fighting	   ceased	   in	   the	   autumn	   of	   1986.	   Only	   small	   land	  operations	  were	  carried	  out,	  and	  the	  fighting	  was	  exhausting	  for	  both	  sides.	  	  Instead,	  the	  War	  of	  the	  Cities,	  and	  the	  Tanker	  war	  continued	  and	  escalated	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  1986.	  	  Iraq	  continued	  the	  air	  attacks	  on	  border	  towns,	  military	  targets	  and	  on	  oil	  installations.	  Tehran	  was	  also	  attacked,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  loading	  points	  at	  Larak	  Island	  and	  Kharg	  Island	  that	  were	  the	  main	  targets.211	  The	  attacks	  were	  quite	  successful	  from	  an	   Iraqi	   point	   of	   view,	   and	   it	   showed	   that	   the	   Iranian	   defence	   systems	   were	   either	  destroyed,	  out	  of	  date	  or	  simply	  not	  efficient	  enough.	  The	  attacks	  also	  raised	  the	  Iranian	  allegations	  that	  Iraq	  used	  Saudi-­‐Arabia	  as	  a	  pit	  stop,	  since	  Larak	  is	  situated	  in	  the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz	  and	  too	  far	  off	  Iraq	  to	  fly	  back	  and	  forth	  without	  refuelling.	  	  Iran	  was	  subordinate	  when	  it	  came	  to	  air	  power	  and	  long-­‐distance	  missiles,	  but	  had	  to	  retaliate	  somehow.	  Iran	  therefore	  fired	  Scud	  missiles	  at	  Baghdad	  and	  Basra,	  and	  escalated	   its	   attacks	   on	   tankers	   in	   the	   Gulf.	   An	   average	   of	   one	   ship	   a	   week	  was	   lost,	  which	  upset	  the	  Gulf	  States	  even	  more.212	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Resolution	  588	  (1986)	  
	  The	  attention	  and	  effort	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1986	  died	  down	  during	  the	  summer	  when	  the	  fighting	  decreased.	  However,	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini’s	  warnings	  of	  a	  new,	   final	  offensive	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  new	  full-­‐scale	   fighting	  and	  escalation	  of	  the	  war	  were	  imminent.	  Iraq’s	  response	  to	  resolution	  582	  (1986)	  had	  been	  positive,	  as	  their	  responses	  had	  been	  since	  they	   lost	  the	   initiative	   in	  the	  war,	  but	  the	  answer	  from	  Iran	  had	  also	  been	  much	  more	  optimistic	  than	  previous	  responses.	  	  The	   Security	   Council	   had	   to	   seize	   the	   opportunity	   when	   there	   were	   hopes	   of	  negotiations,	   and	   met	   to	   discuss	   the	   issue	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   October.	   Other	   states,	  including	  Iraq,	  had	  requested	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  discussions	  of	  the	  issue.	  The	  discussion	  in	  advance	  of	  resolution	  582	  (1986)	  had	  focused	  on	  the	  tanker	  war.	  The	  discussions	  in	  October	  showed	  a	  turn	  of	  focus	  from	  the	  Tanker	  war	  to	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  stop	  the	  war.	  	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   made	   a	   statement	   before	   the	   discussion	   in	   the	   Council	  started,	  where	  he	  admitted	  that	  his	  eight-­‐point	  plan,	  which	  sought	  to	  end	  the	  war,	  had	  not	  been	  successful.	  The	  war	  now	  threatened	  to	  spread	  to	  the	  entire	  region	  and	  to	  draw	  in	  Powers	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  as	  well.	  The	  vital	  question	  was,	  therefore,	  what	  new	  efforts	  could	  be	  deployed	  to	  stop	  the	  war?213	  The	  key	  holder	  to	  this	  question	  was	  Iran,	   and	   he	   urged	   Iran	   to	   present	   its	   case	   to	   the	   Council,	   so	   negotiations	   could	   be	  initiated.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  would	  continue	  his	  peace	  efforts.214	  	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   of	   the	   League	   of	   Arab	   States,	   Chedli	   Klibi,	   was	   the	   first	  speaker,	  and	  he	  urged	  the	  Council	  to	  agree	  on	  effective	  actions,	  which	  would	  end	  the	  war,	  and	   referred	   to	   chapter	   VI	   of	   the	   UN	   charter.	   He	   had	   spoken	   warmly	   of	   Iraq	   in	   the	  discussion	  in	  February,	  but	  focused	  on	  a	  peace	  that	  would	  be	  agreeable	  to	  both	  parties	  in	  the	  discussions	  in	  October.215	  	  The	   representative	   of	   Iraq,	   Tariq	   Aziz,	   and	   the	   representative	   of	   Egypt	   agreed	  with	  Klibi	  and	  urged	  the	  Council	  to	  take	  measures	  so	  peace	  could	  be	  established.216	  Representatives	  from	  Senegal,	  Oman,	  PLO	  (Palestinian	  Liberation	  Organization),	  Argentina,	   Jordan	  and	  Rwanda	  also	  called	  for	  peace.217	  Neither	  of	  them	  were	  members	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of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  but	  requested	  to	  speak	  because	  the	  war	  endangered	  peace	  in	  the	  region	  and	  the	  world	  in	  general.	  	  Representatives	   from	   Thailand,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   Kuwait,	   Bulgaria,	   Mexico,	   Chad,	  Bangladesh,	  Cuba,	  and	  GDR	  (German	  Democratic	  Republic)	  also	  called	   for	   the	  Security	  Council	   to	   take	  responsibility	   in	  a	  meeting	   three	  days	   later.218	  None	  of	   these	  countries	  were	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  either,	  but	  the	  number	  and	  spectre	  of	  countries	  show	  that	  the	  international	  community	  was	  united	  in	  their	  stand	  towards	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war,	   and	   it	   shows	   how	   important	   it	   was	   to	   achieve	   peace,	   not	   only	   for	   states	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  Gulf	  region,	  but	  for	  the	  whole	  world.	  The	  war	  threatened	  to	  spread	  to	  the	  entire	  region,	  and	  the	  Tanker	  War	  made	  the	  export	  of	  oil	  from	  the	  region	  unstable.	  The	  war	  had	  also	  lasted	  for	  six	  years,	  but	  led	  nowhere.	  	  Other	   countries,	   which	   were	   not	   members	   of	   the	   Security	   Council,	   but	   which	  spoke	   in	   the	   discussions,	   were	   Tunisia,	   Guyana,	   Yugoslavia,	   United	   Arab	   Emirates,	  Yemen,	  Uruguay,	  Morocco,	  Peru,	  and	  Mauretania.219	  Denmark	   and	   Australia,	   which	   both	   were	   members	   of	   the	   Security	   Council	   in	  1986,	   agreed	   to	   the	   overall	   wish	   to	   stop	   the	   war,	   but	   also	   specified	   that	   the	   use	   of	  chemical	   weapons	   was	   unacceptable.	   The	   Australian	   representative	   also	   urged	   the	  members	  of	  the	  UN	  not	  to	  sell	  arms	  to	  the	  belligerents	  –	  that	  was	  how	  the	  war	  was	  able	  to	   continue	   and	   escalate.	   The	   Danish	   representative	   stressed	   that	   the	   disrespect	   of	  international	  laws	  was	  a	  frightening	  development,	  which	  the	  Council	  had	  an	  obligation	  to	  respond	  to.220	  Denmark	  had	  previously	  not	  made	  any	  official	  comments	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  concerns	  were	  growing,	  as	  they	  now	  took	  a	  firm	  stand	  towards	  it.	  	  	  Only	   the	  UK	  of	   the	  permanent	  members	   in	   the	   Security	  Council	   commented	  on	  the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons.	   The	   British	   representative	   repeated	   the	   UK’s	  condemnation	   of	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons,	   and	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	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upholding	   international	   law.	   It	   should	   be	   added,	   that	   the	   British	   representative	   also	  addressed	  other	  grave	  aspects	  of	  the	  war	  as	  well,	  namely	  the	  attacks	  on	  civilians.221	  	  The	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  then	  voted	  on	  resolution	  588	  (1986).	  This	  resolution	  was	  not	  new	  in	  any	  ways,	  and	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  particular	  or	  any	  other	  aspect	  of	  the	  conflict,	  but	  called	  upon	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  to	  implement	  resolution	   582	   (1986).	   Its	   main	   message	   was	   that	   it	   called	   upon	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	   to	  implement	   resolution	   582	   (1986)	   from	   February.	   The	   resolution	   also	   requested	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  continue	  his	  peace	  efforts,	  and	  to	  keep	  the	  Council	  updated	  on	  his	  work.	   Resolution	   588	   (1986)	   was	   also	   adopted	   unanimously.222	  In	   other	   words,	   it	  brought	  no	  new	  aspects	  to	  the	  table.	  One	  might	  ask	  why	  the	  Security	  Council	  resorted	  to	  repeat	  the	  previous	  one	  when	  they	   knew	   that	   changes	  had	   to	   be	  done.	   Iran	  had	  been	   very	   clear	   that	   resolution	  582	  (1986)	   failed	   to	   condemn	   Iraq	   as	   the	   aggressor,	   failed	   to	   condemn	   Iraq	   for	   its	   use	   of	  chemical	   weapons,	   and	   failed	   to	   condemn	   Iraq	   for	   attacking	   aviation.223	  These	   issues	  were	  crucial	  to	  Iran,	  and	  Iran	  had	  not	  given	  any	  signals	  that	  they	  would	  abandon	  their	  demands.	  On	  the	  bright	  side,	  resolution	  588	  (1986)	  showed	  that	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  was	  still	   an	   important	   and	   current	   issue	   for	   the	   Security	   Council,	   which	   was	   important	  especially	   in	   regard	   to	   Iran,	  who	   had	   previously	   accused	   the	   Council	   for	   ignoring	   the	  conflict.	  It	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  resolution	  582	  (1986)	  was	  what	  the	  Council	  could	  agree	   upon	   at	   the	   time,	   and	   that	   they	   hesitated	   to	   stress	   a	   new	   resolution	   that	   the	  member	  states	  could	  not	  even	  agree	  upon.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  was	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	   resolution	   either,	   and	   he	   understood	   that	   he	   would	   not	   get	   any	   help	   from	   the	  Council.224	  	  The	   responses	   from	   the	   two	   belligerents	  were	   as	   expected.	   Iraq	   reaffirmed	   its	  willingness	  to	  cooperate,	  and	  repeated	  its	  demands	  from	  its	  response	  to	  resolution	  582	  (1986),	   namely	   immediate	   ceasefire	   and	   withdrawal	   to	   internationally	   recognized	  borders.225	  Iran	  repeated	  that	  they	  could	  not	  accept	  a	  resolution,	  which	  did	  not	  condemn	  Iraq	   as	   the	   aggressor	   or	   that	   did	   not	   prevent	   chemical	  weapons	  use,	   attacks	   on	  naval	  vessels,	   attacks	   on	   civil	   aviation	   or	   breaches	   on	   humanitarian	   law.	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welcomed	  new	  peace	  efforts,	  and	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  eight-­‐point	  plan	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  it.226	  	  	  	  The	  Security	  Council	  had	  requested	  the	  Secretary	  General	   to	  continue	  his	  peace	  efforts,	   and	   report	   back	   to	   the	   Council,	   and	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   submitted	   another	  report	  after	  resolution	  588	  (1986)	  26	  November	  1986.	  In	   the	   report,	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   repeated	   the	   necessity	   of	   the	   conflicting	  parties	  to	  accept	  resolution	  582	  (1986),	  despite	  Iran’s	  crystal	  clear	  demands.	  The	  focus	  of	   the	   Secretary	   General’s	   report	   was	   mainly	   on	   the	   Tanker	   war.	   The	   events	   in	   the	  summer	   and	   autumn	   months	   of	   1986,	   where	   third	   party	   merchant	   ships	   were	  increasingly	  attacked	  alarmed	  the	  Secretary-­‐General,	  and	  his	  major	  concern	  was	  that	  the	  conflict	   would	   escalate	   to	   include	   neighbouring	   states	   in	   the	   warfare.	   His	   and	   the	  Security	   Council’s	   major	   goal	   had	   always	   been	   to	   end	   the	   conflict,	   and	   this	   was	   now	  more	   important	   than	   ever.	   However,	   he	   understood	   that	   there	   were	   too	   many	  underlying	   factors	   that	   had	   to	   be	   solved	   before	   peace	   could	   be	   achieved,	   and	   a	   basis	  therefore	  had	  to	  be	  created	  so	  that	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  could	  end	  the	  hostilities.227	  	  	  
New	  Revelations:	  The	  US’	  Double	  Game	  	  	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Scandal	  and	  the	  reflagging	  of	  Kuwaiti	  tankers	  	  In	   November	   1986,	   the	   Syrian	   magazine	   Al	   Shiraa	   revealed	   that	   the	   US	   had	   sold	  weapons	  to	  Iran	  on	  several	  occasions	  in	  1985	  and	  1986.	  Israel	  functioned	  as	  a	  transfer	  country.	   Also,	   a	   US	   Security	   Advisor	   had	   visited	   Iran.	   In	   return,	   Iran	   had	   helped	   free	  American	  hostages	  held	  by	  pro-­‐Iranian	  groups	  in	  Lebanon.	  228	  The	  sales	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Scandal	  and	  shocked	  the	  world,	  especially	  Iraq	  and	  other	  Gulf	  States.	  The	  US	  refused	  to	  recognize	  the	  new	  regime	  in	  Iran,	  so	  the	  news	  of	   the	  arm	  sales	  was	  embarrassing	   for	   the	   Reagan	   administration.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   credibility	   of	   President	  Reagan	  dropped	  among	  the	  US	  citizens,	  European	  countries	  and	  Arab	  countries.229	  The	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scandal	   can	   also	  partly	   explain	   the	   Security	  Council’s	   evasive	   attitude	   to	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	  war.	  	   The	  sales	  to	  Iran	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  US	  halted	  its	  sales	  and	  cooperation	  with	  Iraq,	  however.	  According	  to	  the	  Chargé	  d’	  Affairs	  of	  the	  Permanent	  Mission	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  UN,	  the	  American	  newspaper	  the	  Washington	  Post	  published	  an	  article	  that	  claimed	  that	  the	  US	  had	   given	   intelligence	   reports	   to	   Iraq	   since	   1984.	   The	   intelligence	   information	  had	  been	  used	   to	  plan	  poison	  gas	  attacks.	  The	  newspaper	  had	  also	   suggested	   that	   the	  director	  of	  CIA	  had	  even	  encouraged	  Iraq	  to	  use	  chemical	  weapons.230	  	  American	   government	   never	   denied	   the	  Washington	   Post’s	   allegations,	   and	   Iran	   used	  the	  allegations	  as	  propaganda	  for	  what	  it	  was	  worth.231	  	  	  	  Iraq	   was	   not	   happy,	   but	   events	   in	   the	   Gulf	   made	   the	   situation	   for	   Iraq	   better.	  Kuwait	   had	   tilted	   more	   an	   more	   towards	   Iraq,	   and	   gave	   its	   neighbour	   in	   the	   north	  financial	   loans,	   let	   Iraqi	  planes	   fly	   through	  Kuwaiti	   air	   space,	   let	   ships	  unload	  military	  equipment	   for	   Iraq	   in	   Kuwaiti	   ports,	   as	   well	   as	   sold	   oil	   for	   Iraq.	   As	   a	   response,	   Iran	  increased	   its	   attacks	   on	  Kuwaiti	   ships.	  Kuwait	   asked	   a	  number	  of	   third	  party	   sates	   to	  reflag	   its	   tankers,	   and	   both	   the	   US	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   offered	   to	   do	   so.232	  The	  Superpowers	  became	  more	  and	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  advantage	  was	  Iraq’s.	  The	  reflagging	  shows	  that	  the	  Superpowers	  were	  more	  and	  more	  willing	  to	  interfere	  in	  the	  war.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Iranian	  correspondence	  with	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  December	  1986	  	  The	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  22	  December,	  where	  he	  urged	  that	  resolution	  582	  (1986)	  and	  588	  (1986)	  should	  be	  implemented,	  and	  repeated	  the	  concerns	  over	  the	  conflict,	  but	  paid	  specifically	  attention	  to	  the	  attacks	  of	  civilian	  targets,	  attacks	  on	  merchant	  shipping,	  and	  on	  oil	   installations	  of	   littoral	  states.	  The	   Security	   Council	   also	   expressed	   concern	   over	   the	   continuation	   of	   violation	   of	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  and	  laws	  of	  armed	  conflict.233	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Iran	  launched	  a	  new	  offensive,	  Karbala	  IV,	  aimed	  at	  Basra	  23	  December.	  However,	  Iraq	  knew	   that	   the	  offensive	  would	   come,	   and	  was	  prepared.	   Iraq	   increased	   its	   forces	  and	  defences	   considerably	  after	   the	  Fao	  disaster,	   and	  halted	   the	   Iranian	  attack	  after	  a	  few	  days.	   Iran	  claimed	  in	  a	   letter	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  that	  Iraq	  had	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  against	  Iranian	  troops	  again	  on	  the	  eastern	  side	  of	  the	  Shatt	  al	  Arab.234	  	  Iran	  also	  reported	   that	  mustard	  gas	  had	  been	  used	  against	   Iranian	  positions	  on	  the	  western	  front	  31	  December,	  and	  400	  had	  been	  injured.235	  20	  died	  in	  the	  attack,	  and	  the	   Iranian	   representative	   to	   the	   UN	   requested	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   to	   send	   a	   new	  mission	   to	   Iran	   to	   visit	   the	   victims	   and	   the	   sites	   where	   chemical	   weapons	   had	   been	  used.236	  The	  request	  was	  repeated	  in	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Iran,	  Ali	  Akbar	  Velayati,	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  The	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  also	  warned	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	   if	   he	   failed	   to	   take	   serious	   and	   constructive	   steps	   in	  halting	   the	  Iraqi	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons,	   Iran	   would	   have	   to	   resort	   to	   preventive	   measures	  themselves	  as	  a	  legal	  way	  of	  defending	  themselves.237	  Iran	  had	  previously	  threatened	  to	  retaliate	  in	  kind	  with	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  The	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  thus	  moderated	  this	  threat,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  made	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  responsible	  for	  the	  counter	  measures	  Iran	  would	  take.	  No	  doubt,	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  one	  of	  the	  gravest	  aspects	  in	  the	  war	  to	  Iran.	  	  	  	  It	  was	  evident	  at	  this	  point	  that	  the	  deployment	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  become	  an	  integrated	  part	  of	  Iraq’s	  defence.	  The	  attacks	  with	  gas	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war	  had	  been	   sporadic	   and	   inconsistent,	   but	   the	   increased	   letters	   from	   the	   Iranian	  representatives	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  reports	  issued	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  show	  that	  the	  use	  had	  increased	  and	  the	  deployment	  had	  changed	  for	  the	  worse.	  Iraq	  had	  developed	  better	  delivery	  systems,	  become	  better	  at	  targeting	  and	  had	  learned	  how	  to	  predict	  wind	  patters	  during	  1985	  and	  1986.238	  	  	  Even	  though	  it	  was	  proven	  and	  established	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	  since	  1984,	   the	  war	  would	  experience	  an	   increased	  use	  of	   these	  weapons	   in	  1986,	  not	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only	  on	  military	  targets,	  but	  also	  on	  civilians	  as	  well.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  again	  that	  Iran	  used	  chemical	  warfare	  as	  propaganda	  as	  well,	  and	  even	  though	  it	  is	  established	  that	  Iraq	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  frequently,	   it	   is	  still	  uncertain	  if	  all	  of	  Iran’s	  reports	  were	  true.	  As	   discussed	   earlier,	   Iran	   used	   the	   attacks	   to	   create	   sympathy	   from	   other	   states.	  However,	   1986	  was	   also	   a	   year	  when	   the	   allegations	  on	   the	  use	  of	   chemical	  weapons	  were	  taken	  more	  seriously,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  increased	  concern	  about	  the	  use,	  the	  impact	  of	  it	   and	   the	   gravity	   of	   the	  war	   in	   general.	   However,	   the	   Security	   Council	   failed	   to	   take	  action	  yet	  again.	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5. The	  final	  stages	  of	  the	  war	  	  
	  
	  Spring	  1987:	  The	  Limitations	  of	  Iran	  Start	  to	  Show	  	  The	  war	  had	  entered	  its	  seventh	  year,	  and	  Iran	  sought	  a	  final	  offensive	  that	  would	  end	  the	  war.	  Khomeini	  declared	  that	  Iranian	  victory	  would	  come	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1987,	  more	  specifically	  before	  21	  March,	  the	  date	  of	  the	  Iranian	  New	  Year,	  Nowruz.239	  Iraq	  on	  their	  side	   continued	   their	   strategy	   of	   defence,	   a	   strategy	   that	   aimed	   at	   tiring	   the	   Iranian	  troops	  out,	  which	  in	  the	  end	  would	  lead	  to	  an	  Iraqi	  victory	  or	  at	  least	  force	  the	  Iranian	  leaders	   to	   settle	   for	   peace.	   Iraq	   had,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   been	  willing	   to	   negotiate	   a	  peace	  agreement	  since	   Iran	  seized	   the	   initiative,	  but	   Iran	  had	  refused	  to	  participate	   in	  any	  negotiations.	  	  Throughout	  the	  years,	  Khomeini	  had	  repeated	  that	  the	  war	  could	  not	  be	  settled	  and	  decided	   at	   a	   table	   –	   it	   should	   be	   ended	   on	   the	   battlefield.240	  This	   philosophy	  was	  maintained	  despite	   the	  enormous	   losses	   the	  war	  caused,	  and	  despite	   that	   the	  war	  had	  reached	  its	   limits	  at	  this	  time.	  There	  were	  internal,	  political	  struggles	  in	  Tehran,	  and	  it	  proved	  more	  and	  more	  difficult	  to	  recruit	  volunteers	  for	  the	  army.	  	  Cordesman	   and	  Wagner	   claim	   that	   the	  mobilization	   of	   new	   Iranian	   volunteers	  dropped	   by	   50	  %	   in	   one	   year,	   from	  80,000	   in	   1986	   to	   40,000	   in	   1987.241	  The	   lack	   of	  fresh	  personnel	  made	  the	  mismanagement	  in	  the	  army	  more	  apparent,	  and	  showed	  that	  Iran’s	  strategy	  of	  pouring	  more	  and	  more	  people	  into	  the	  battlefields,	  was	  a	  strategy	  that	  could	   not	  work	   forever.	   In	   addition	   and	  most	   importantly,	   the	   people	   of	   Iran	   did	   not	  support	   the	   war	   as	   whole-­‐heartedly	   as	   they	   had	   done	   when	   Iran	   was	   the	   one	   being	  attacked.242	  	  	  Iraq	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  despite	  being	  on	  the	  defensive	  since	  1981,	  had	  managed	  to	   build	   up	   its	   army.	   During	   the	   years	   that	   had	   passed	   in	   the	   war,	   the	   Iraqi	   tactics	  improved,	  their	  forces	  were	  better	  trained,	  their	  equipment	  more	  modern	  and	  efficient,	  and	   Iraq	   benefitted	   from	   its	   diplomatic	   work:	   third-­‐party	   states	   provided	   Iraq	   with	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weapons,	   intelligence,	   technology	  and	  economic	  aid.243	  All	   these	   factors	  began	  to	  show	  in	  spring	  1987,	  but	  became	  evident	  in	  the	  autumn.	  	  	  	  Iran	   continued	   to	   attack	   Iraq	   in	   the	   winter	   of	   1987.	   Karbala	   V	   was	   a	   major	  offensive,	  which	  took	  place	  in	  the	  southern	  Iraq	  and	  began	  7	  January.	  120.000-­‐140.000	  Iranian	  troops,	  many	  of	  them	  Basij,	  and	  200.000	  Iraqi	  troops	  took	  part	  in	  the	  battle.244	  Again,	  the	  Iranians	  aimed	  to	  cut	  Basra	  and	  Faw	  off	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Iraq,	  but	  again	  they	  met	  a	  strong	  Iraqi	  defence.	  Iraq	  had	  built	  200	  square	  kilometres	  of	  water	  barriers,	  which	  the	  Iranians	  had	  to	  cross,	  and	  Iraq	  used	  artillery,	  air	  strikes	  and	  poison	  gas	  to	  halt	  the	  attack,	  until	  they	  managed	  to	  organize	  a	  counter	  attack.245	  	  	  The	  first	  Iraqi	  counter	  attacks	  were,	  however,	  unsuccessful,	  perhaps	  because	  Iran	  took	  Iraq	  off-­‐guard	  even	  though	  the	  Iraqis	  knew	  that	  Karbala	  5	  was	  in	  the	  planning.	  Iran	  took	  strategic	  positions	  at	  the	  border,	  and	  managed	  to	  reach	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Basra.	  At	  its	  closest,	  Iranian	  soldiers	  were	  just	  15	  km	  east	  of	  the	  city.	  After	  the	  initial	  confusion,	  Iraq	  hit	   back,	   and	   the	   Iranians	   did	   not	  manage	   to	   capture	  Basra	   this	   time	   either.	   A	  month	  after	  it	  had	  started	  it	  turned	  into	  a	  siege,	  and	  the	  Iranian	  leadership	  declared	  the	  battle	  as	  over	  in	  the	  end	  of	  February.	  The	  battle	  was	  bloody	  for	  both	  sides,	  and	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  10,000	  Iraqis	  and	  40,000	  Iranians	  lost	  their	  lives	  in	  Karbala	  5.246	  	  The	   Iranian	  Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Ali	   Akbar	   Velayati,	   reported	   of	   several	  incidents	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   attacks	   in	   the	   war	   zone,	   but	   also	   the	   Iranian	   cities	   of	  Khorramabad	   and	   Bakhtaran	   were	   attacked	   13	   January.	   According	   to	   Velayati,	   170	  civilians	  were	   killed,	  while	   another	   830	  were	   injured	   in	   the	   two	   cities.247	  The	   Iranian	  representative	   to	   the	   UN,	   Said	   Rajaie-­‐Khorassani,	   also	   reported	   of	   repeated	   use	   of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  January	  on	  the	  Karbala	  V	  front.248	  The	  scale	  of	  the	  attacks	  was	  not	  reported,	  which	  indicates	  that	  they	  were	  not	  big.	  Still,	  once	  again	  one	  sees	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	  as	  an	  integrated	  part	  of	  Iraq’s	  defence.	  	  By	   this	   time,	   Iran	  had	   improved	   its	   chemical	   defence	   gear	   significantly.	   Iranian	  troops	   carried	   gas	   masks,	   protective	   clothing,	   decontamination	   kits	   and	   antidotes	   to	  nerve	  gases.249	  How	  many	  of	  the	  Iranian	  troops	  who	  had	  this	  gear	  is	  uncertain,	  however.	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It	  is	  also	  unknown	  how	  efficient	  it	  was,	  as	  poison	  gas	  attacks	  quickly,	  and	  often	  caused	  panic	  among	  the	  Iranian	  troops	  so	  they	  failed	  to	  use	  their	  gear	  properly.	  It	  is	  still	  likely	  to	   believe	   that	   the	   gear	   prevented	   casualties.	   The	   letters	   from	   Iran	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   also	   indicate	   that.	   During	   1986	   and	   1987	   Iran	   continued	   to	   report	   where	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  launched	  against	  them,	  yet	  often	  without	  numbers	  of	  casualties.	  In	   the	   letters	  where	  numbers	  of	  casualties	  were	  given,	   the	  numbers	  were	  quite	   low	  in	  comparison	  to	  previous	  allegations.250	  	  	  Land	  fighting	  in	  spring	  1987	  	  Karbala	  VI	  was	  also	  launched	  in	  the	  mid	  of	  January,	  but	  on	  the	  central	  front.	  The	  Iranians	  still	  sought	  to	  lead	  off	  attention	  and	  resources	  from	  the	  battle	  in	  the	  south,	  but	  Karbala	  6	  lacked	   the	   same	   intensity	   as	   the	   previous	   attacks	   in	   the	   north	   had	   had.	   A	   part	   of	   the	  reason	   for	   the	   lack	  of	   intensity	  was	   that	   the	  Kurdish	   rebellion	  had	  decreased.	  Turkey,	  the	   neighbouring	   country	   that	   also	   had	   a	   major	   Kurdish	   population,	   which	   was	  troublesome,	  had	  hit	  down	  on	  the	  Turkish	  Kurdish	  Worker’s	  Party,	  PKK,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  Patriotic	  Union	  of	  Kurdistan	  (PUK)	  and	  the	  Kurdistan	  Democratic	  Party	  (KDP),	  when	  they	   had	   attempted	   to	   base	   themselves	   in	   the	   border	   area.251	  The	   Iranians	   took	   some	  new	  ground,	  and	  two	  new	  offensives	  further	  south	  followed	  the	  two	  next	  weeks.	  	  Saddam	  Hussein	  ordered	  new	  air	  attacks	  on	  Iranian	  cities,	  and	  Tehran,	  Qom	  and	  Isfahan	  were	  hit.252	  	  A	  second	  phase	  of	  Karbala	  V	  was	   launched	   in	   the	  end	  of	  February,	  but	   failed	   in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  previous	  attack	  had	  done.	  The	  progress	  Iran	  had	  experienced	  in	  the	  initial	  years	  of	  the	  counter	  offensives	  was	  now	  slowed	  down	  and	  even	  put	  to	  a	  halt.	  The	  Iranian	   representative	   to	   the	  UN	  once	   again	   reported	  of	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons.	  He	  claimed	   Iraq	  had	  used	   them	  on	   several	   occasions	   between	   the	  25	   and	  29	   January.	  He	  asked	   for	   a	   new	   mission	   to	   be	   sent	   to	   Iran	   to	   investigate	   the	   new	   attacks.	   He	   also	  criticised	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  for	  not	  giving	  enough	  attention	  to	   the	   latest	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons.253	  Another	   letter	   was	   sent	   9	   February,	   which	  reported	   of	   chemical	   bombs	   dropped	   on	   the	   southern	   front,	   which	   indicates	   that	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chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	  continuously	  in	  the	  southern	  warzone	  during	  the	  Karbala	  5	  offensive.254	  	  
Third-­Party	  States’	  Focus	  in	  1987	  
	  
	  Third-­‐party	  states’	  concerns	  in	  1987	  	  The	   latest	   Iranian	   offensive	   reminded	   the	   international	   society	   once	   again	   of	   the	  brutality	  of	  war,	  and	  it	  attracted	  their	  attention.	  	  The	  European	  Community	   issued	  a	  new	  statement	   in	   the	  end	  of	   January,	  which	  was	   conveyed	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   from	   the	   Belgian	   representative,	   where	   the	  member	   countries	   urged	   both	   Iran	   and	   Iraq	   to	   adopt	   the	   two	   resolutions	   from	   1986.	  They	  also	  repeated	  their	  condemnation	  of	  chemical	  weapons.255	  	  The	   American	   representative	   transmitted	   a	   statement	   30	   January	   from	   the	  president	  of	  the	  US,	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  which	  showed	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  European	  focus	  on	  the	  war	  and	  the	  American	  focus.	  President	  Reagan	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  war	  threatened	  American	  interests,	  and	  it	  threatened	  the	  safety	  of	   its	   friends	  in	  the	  region.	  He	  condemned	  Iran	   for	  occupying	  Iraqi	   territory,	  and	  ensured	  that	   the	  US	  would	  keep	  the	  Hormuz	   Strait	   open,	   so	   oil	   could	  be	   exported	   from	   the	   region.	  He	   also	  underlined	  that	   the	  US	  was	  committed	   to	  support	   its	   friends	   in	   the	  Gulf	   region	   if	   their	   safety	  was	  threatened.256	  	  A	   letter	  of	   interest	   came	   from	  the	  representative	  of	   Iran	   to	   the	  UN,	  Khorassani,	  sent	   25	   February.	   In	   the	   letter,	   he	   claimed	   that	   Iran	   had	   captured	   an	   Iraqi	   second	  lieutenant.	   The	   lieutenant	   admitted	   that	   Iraq	   used	   chemical	  weapons	   launched	   by	   air	  bombs	  and	  guns	  on	  Iranian	  positions,	  but	  that	  there	  also	  had	  been	  occasions	  where	  Iraq	  had	  mistakenly	  bombed	  its	  own	  forces.257	  These	  sayings	  undermine	  the	  Iraqi	  claims	  that	  Iran	   had	   used	   chemical	   weapons	   as	   well,	   while	   the	   confession	   support	   the	   Iranian	  allegations	   that	   the	  poisoning	  of	   Iraqi	   forces	  were	  caused	  by	   their	  own	  weapons.	   Still,	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one	  should	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  statement	  came	  from	  a	  lieutenant	  in	  Iranian	  captivity.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  the	  UN	  mission	  in	  1986	  had	  interviewed	  a	  number	  of	  Iraqi	  soldiers	  and	  a	  pilot	  in	  Iranian	  captivity,	  and	  they	  said	  the	  same.	  	  President	   Ronald	   Reagan	   repeated	   his	   previous	   call	   a	   month	   earlier	   in	   a	  statement	  transmitted	  by	  the	  American	  UN	  representative	  27	  February.	  The	  president’s	  main	  focus	  in	  this	  statement	  was	  on	  the	  war	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  peace.	  He	   criticised	   the	   Iranian	   government	   for	   continuing	   the	   war	   through	   terror	   and	  harassment,	  also	  on	  their	  neighbours,	  and	  it	  would	  therefore	  be	  crucial	  to	  convince	  Iran	  to	   take	   part	   in	   peace	   negotiations.	   President	   Reagan	   declared	   that	   he	   would	   ask	   the	  American	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   George	   Shultz,	   to	   lead	   the	   international	   work	   towards	  this.258	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  US	  was	  an	  officially	  declared	  enemy	  of	   Iran	  by	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini,	  and	   it	  was	  specified	  in	  a	   letter	  the	  same	  day	  as	  the	  statement	  of	  President	  Reagan	  was	  published,	  that	   Iran	   preferred	   peace	   efforts	   by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General.259	  	   The	   Secretary-­‐General	  knew	  that	  only	  strong	  action	  by	  the	  Security	  Council	  could	  end	  the	  war.260	  Likewise,	  only	  measures	   from	   the	   Security	   Council	   could	   stop	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons.	   At	   this	  point,	   it	  was	  clear	   that	   the	  UN	  had	   failed	   to	   limit	   the	  war	  at	  any	  point.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  therefore	  decided	  to	  invite	  the	  UN	  ambassadors	  of	  the	  five	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Council	  to	  meet	  and	  discuss	  the	  war.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1987	  the	  five	  ambassadors	  met	   in	   a	   number	   of	   secret	   discussions,	   and	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   characterized	   the	  meetings	   as	   “constructive	   and	   harmonizing.”	   Still,	   nothing	   came	   from	   it,	   only	   that	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  was	  the	  best-­‐suited	  mediator.261	  	  	  	  The	  threat	  of	  external	  involvement	  in	  the	  warfare	  	  Iraq	  also	  escalated	  its	  attacks	  on	  Iranian	  oil	  installations	  in	  the	  Gulf	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1987.	  As	  a	   response,	   Iran	  escalated	   its	  assaults	  on	  ships	  sailing	   in	   the	  Gulf,	  which	  convinced	  thirds	  party	  states	  to	  increase	  their	  presence	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean.	  The	  US	  and	  the	  British	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navy	  expanded	  their	  fleets	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  the	  Gulf,	  while	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  sent	  a	  military	  frigate	  to	  protect	  its	  ships	  sailing	  to	  and	  from	  Iraq.262	  	  American	  intelligence	  discovered	  Iranian	  testing	  of	  Chinese	  Silkworm	  missiles	  in	  late	  February	  1987.	  The	  Silkworm	  missiles	  had	  a	  much	   longer	  range	   than	  the	  missiles	  Iran	   had	   previously	   used,	   in	   addition	   to	   be	   much	   more	   destructive,	   and	   this	  development	   alarmed	   both	   the	   Americans	   and	   other	   Gulf	   States.	   Kuwait	   felt	   more	  vulnerable	   than	   any,	   because	   Iran	  had	   already	   threatened	   to	   escalate	   their	   attacks	   on	  Kuwaiti	   ships.	   In	  addition,	  Kuwaiti	  Shiites	  had	  held	  demonstrations	  against	   the	   rulers,	  and	  a	  series	  of	  bombings	  had	  taken	  place,	  which	  could	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  Iranian	  regime.263	  As	  a	   result	  Kuwait	   sent	   requests	   to	   the	  US	  and	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	   and	  asked	   if	  Kuwaiti	  ships	   could	   sail	   under	   their	   flag.	   Kuwait	   thought	   that	   it	   would	   prevent	   Iran	   from	  attacking,	  because	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  intervention	  from	  the	  superpowers.	  Both	  the	  US	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  agreed	  to	  reflag	  Kuwaiti	  tankers.264	  	  Khomeini	  had	  been	   seriously	  mistaken	   in	  his	  way	  of	   thinking	  when	  he	   thought	  that	  the	  tactics	  of	  harassing	  ships	  would	  scare	  off	  foreign	  states,	  but	  Kuwait’s	  reasoning	  also	  proved	  wrong.	  Iran	  continued	  to	  harass	  vessels	  from	  Iraq,	  Kuwait	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  though	  only	  with	  light	  rockets	  and	  small-­‐arm	  fire,	  not	  Silkworm	  missiles.265	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  Iran	   continued	   its	   series	   of	   Karbala	   offensives.	   Karbala	   7	   near	   Haj	   Omran	   in	   Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  in	  early	  March,	  Karbala	  8	  in	  the	  Basra	  area	  in	  early	  April,	  and	  Karbala	  9	  and	  10	  in	  northern	  Iraq	  in	  the	  mid	  of	  April.	  The	  offensives	  in	  the	  south	  gained	  little,	  but	  the	  offensives	  in	  northern	  Iraq,	  which	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  cooperation	  with	  Kurdish	  groups,	  made	   Saddam	  Hussein	   aware	   that	   the	   northern	   front	  was	   the	  weakest	   point.	   Kurdish	  groups	  had	  also	  united	  against	  the	  rule	  in	  Baghdad,	  which	  made	  them	  more	  effective.266	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Iran	   reported	   about	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   in	   several	   letters	   to	   the	   UN	   during	   the	  Karbala	  8-­‐10	  offensives.	  Mustard	  gas	  was	  dropped	   from	  artillery	  shells	  and	  rockets	   in	  the	  Basrah	  area	  7-­‐9	  April,	  and	  claimed	  140	  victims.267	  	  In	  a	   letter	  transmitted	  by	  the	  Iranian	  UN	  representative,	   the	  Iranian	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Velayati,	   reported	   that	   the	  cities	  of	  Abadan,	  Khorramshahr	  and	  Mared	  had	   been	   attacked	   in	   the	   spring	   of	   1987	   too.	   100	   civilians	   had	   been	   injured,	   and	   the	  chemical	   agent	   used	   was	   new,	   according	   to	   Velayati.	   He	   demanded	   that	   the	   Security	  Council	   should	   take	   all	   necessary	   steps	   and	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   should	   send	   a	  new	  mission	  to	  Iran.268	  	  Two	  border	  villages	  were	  also	  attacked	  with	  poison	  gas	  in	  April,	  according	  to	  the	  Iranian	  representative.269	  	  	  Iraq	  also	  reported	  of	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  April	  in	  a	  letter	  sent	  15	  April.	  	  He	   claimed	   that	   Iranian	  bombs	  had	  poisoned	  376	   Iraqi	   combatants,	  while	  9	  had	  been	  killed	   on	   the	   southern	   front.270	  New	   allegations	   of	   Iranian	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	  followed	  the	  next	  day.	  Iraqi	  forces	  had	  been	  attacked	  by	  mustard	  and	  phosgene	  gas	  12-­‐13	  April.	  No	  further	  details	  where	  given.271	  This	  information	  was	  denied	  and	  labelled	  as	  Iraqi	  propaganda	  by	  Velayati.	  He	  once	  again	  claimed	  that	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  been	  victim	  to	  their	   own	   weapons,	   and	   he	   even	   suggested	   that	   Iraq	   used	   poison	   gas	   deliberately	  against	  own	  forces.272	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   claims	   presented	   by	   Velayati,	   Khorrasani	   reported	   that	   Iraqi	  villages	  had	  been	  bombed	  with	  chemical	  weapons.	  24	  villages	   in	   the	  Erbil	  province	   in	  northern	  Iraq	  had	  been	  attacked.	  Khorassani	  claimed	  that	  the	  villagers	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  say	  that	  it	  was	  Iranian	  planes	  which	  had	  dropped	  the	  bombs.273	  	  Allegations	  of	  further	  use	  of	  poison	  gas	  in	  the	  war	  zone	  and	  on	  civilians	  were	  reported	  in	  letters	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  May	  as	  well.274	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   10.4.1987	   and	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   the	   representative	   of	   Iran	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General.	   UNSC	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  from	  Minister	  of	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  Affairs	  of	  Iran	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  from	  the	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  of	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  to	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  UNSC	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  269	  Letter	  16.4.1987	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  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	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  270	  Letter	   from	   Deputy	   Minister	   and	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   of	   Iraq	   15.4.1987	   in	   letter	   from	   the	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18806.	  271	  Letter	  16.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18810.	  272	  Statement	  18.4.1987	  in	  letter	  21.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18820.	  273	  Letter	  27.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18828.	  274 	  Letters	   7.5.1987	   and	   8.5.1987	   from	   the	   representative	   of	   Iran	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General.	   UNSC	  documents	  S/18851	  and	  S/18855.	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The	   letters,	   which	   contained	   information	   about	   chemical	   attacks	   in	   the	   spring,	  show	  again	  that	  the	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  warfare.	  Both	  mustard	  gas	  and	  nerve	  gases	  had	  been	  used,	  according	  to	  Iran.	  The	  attacks	  claimed	  low	  casualties	  though.	  This	  supports	  the	  idea	  that	  Iraq	  used	  chemical	  weapons	  as	  a	  method	  for	  scaring	  Iranian	   soldiers	   and	   civilians,	   a	  method	   that	  was	   successful.	  Mustard	   gas	  was	   also,	   as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  a	  gas	  that	  could	  persist	  over	  time	  in	  the	  landscape.	  By	  deploying	  gas	  in	  an	  area,	   Iraq	  prevented	   the	   Iranians	   from	  using	   the	  area.	  One	  should	  once	  again	  be	  reminded	   of	   that	   Iranian	   authorities	   might	   have	   exaggerated	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons.	  	  	  	  	  A	  New	  UN	  Mission	  to	  investigate	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  	  	  	  Iran	  had	  requested	  several	  times	  that	  a	  mission	  should	  be	  sent	  to	  investigate	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  Iran.	  When	  Iraq	  had	  alleged	  Iranian	  use	  of	  poison	  gas	  in	  1986,	  Iraq	  had	  declined	  a	  UN	  mission	  to	  come	  and	  investigate	  the	  claims.	  They	  changed	  their	  stand	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1987,	  however,	  and	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  thus	  sent	  a	  group	  of	  experts	  to	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  22	  April	  to	  3	  May.275	  	  The	   team	   interviewed	   government	   officials	   in	   both	   Iran	   and	   Iraq,	   visited	   war	  zones	   in	   both	   countries	   and	   examined	   victims	   exposed	   to	   chemical	   gas	   during	   the	  Karbala	  5	  offensive.	   Investigations	  were	  first	  conducted	  in	  Iran.	  The	  mission	  examined	  both	  combatants	  and	  civilians,	  and	  the	  conclusion	  was	  clear	  that	  all	  the	  examined,	  which	  the	  mission	   chose,	   had	   been	   victims	   to	  mustard	   gas.	   The	   injuries	  were,	   however,	   less	  severe	  than	  the	  injuries	  seen	  in	  previous	  investigations.	  This	  could	  be	  related	  to	  the	  time	  elapsed	  since	  the	  attacks.	  Traces	  of	  mustard	  gas	  were	  also	  found	  in	  the	  Khorramshahr	  area,	  in	  air	  samples	  taken	  from	  the	  war	  zone,	  and	  in	  a	  bomb	  fragment.	  The	  UN	  mission	  added	   that	   a	   group	   of	   Iranian	   journalists	   and	   photographs	   had	   followed	   them	   during	  their	   stay	   in	   Iran,	   to	   the	  mission’s	   dissatisfaction.	   The	  mission	   and	   the	   investigations	  were	  broadcasted	  on	  Iranian	  television	  to	  show	  how	  inhumane	  Saddam	  Hussein	  was.276	  	  	  	  After	  investigations	  in	  Iran,	  the	  mission	  continued	  to	  Iraq.	  Iraqi	  victims	  had	  clear	  signs	  of	  injuries	  caused	  by	  mustard	  gas	  and	  some	  of	  phosgene	  gas.	  Soil	  samples	  from	  the	  area	   east	   of	   Basra	   also	   showed	   traces	   of	   mustard	   gas	   and	   a	   degradation	   product	   of	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   of	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   dispatched	   by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General:	   note	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mustard	  gas,	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  precursory	  agent	  of	  mustard	  gas.	  The	  team	  did	  not	  find	  any	  shells	  with	   traces	   of	   gas	   or	   shells	   that	   could	   contain	   gas.	   The	  mission	   could	   thus	   not	  conclude	  how	  the	  injuries	  were	  caused,	  since	  no	  weapons	  were	  found.277	  	  In	   the	   report’s	   conclusion,	   the	  mission	   ascertained	   that	   Iraq	   had	   used	  mustard	  gas	   and	   nerve	   agents	   against	   Iranian	   forces	   and	   civilians.	   The	  mission	   also	   concluded	  that	   Iraqi	  combatants	  had	  been	   injured	   from	  mustard	  gas	  and	  probably	  phosgene	  gas,	  but	   it	  did	  not	   specify	  by	  whom.278	  In	  other	  words,	   the	  mission	  did	  not	   identify	   Iran	  as	  aggressor	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  and	  thus	  left	  the	  question	  open	  for	  further	  speculations	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  victims	  had	  been	  subject	  to	  Iraqi	  poison	  gas	  that	  had	  gone	  wrong	  or	  that	  Iraq	  had	  used	  gas	  deliberately	  on	  its	  own	  population.	  This	  was	  of	  course	  a	  victory	  to	  Iran,	  and	  a	  blow	  to	  Iraq.	  The	  mission	  also	  recommended	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  anything	  more	  technical	   to	  contribute	  with,	  but	  to	  assist	   the	  UN	  in	  their	  work	  to	  prevent	  more	  use	  of	  chemical	   weapons.	   According	   to	   the	   mission’s	   recommendations	   in	   the	   report,	   only	  political	  measures	  on	  an	  international	  level	  could	  prevent	  further	  use.279	  	  	   In	  his	  note	   to	   the	  report,	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   repeated	   the	  mission’s	   findings,	  and	   regretted	   the	   continued	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons.	   The	   Secretary-­‐General	   agreed	  with	   the	  mission’s	   recommendation	   that	   the	  commitment	   to	   the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  only	  could	   be	   achieved	   at	   a	   political	   level.	  He	   also	   emphasized	   that	   his	   primary	   aim	   at	   the	  present	   time	   was	   to	   end	   the	   war,	   even	   though	   he	   considered	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons	  as	  one	  of	  the	  gravest	  breaches	  on	  international	  law.280	  	  	  Responses	  from	  Iran	  and	  the	  European	  Community	  	  The	  Security	  Council	  followed	  up	  with	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  the	  president	  14	  May,	  where	  they	   recalled	   previous	   statements	   again	   condemned	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   by	  Iraq	  against	   Iranian	   forces.	  The	  Council	   also	   condemned	   the	  use	  of	   chemical	  weapons	  against	  civilians	  and	  Iranian	  forces.	  They	  urged	  the	  two	  belligerents	  to	  accept	  resolution	  582	  (1986)	  and	  supported	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  further	  work	  for	  peace.281	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  Report	   8.5.1987	   of	   the	  mission	   dispatched	   by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General:	   note	   by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  UNSC	  document	  S/18852	  and	  add.1.	  278	  Idem.	  279	  Idem.	  280	  Idem.	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  Resolutions	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The	  Iranian	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Velayati,	  thought	  the	  Council	  to	  be	  too	  vague	  in	  its	   statement,	   and	   that	   it	   simply	   repeated	   itself.	   So	   far,	   condemnation	   of	   chemical	  weapons	  had	  not	  prevented	  Iraq	  from	  using	  it	  so	  he	  turned	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  and	  asked	  for	  specific	  actions	  to	  be	  taken.	  Missions	  and	  reports	  regarding	  the	  matter	  was	  in	  the	   first	   place	   an	   effective	   measure,	   but	   it	   had	   also	   proved	   unable	   to	   stop	   the	   use.	  Velayati	  thus	  suggested	  that	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  called	  on	  Iraq	  to	  commit	  itself	  to	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  report.282	  The	   European	   Community	   issued	   a	   statement	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   report,	  where	   the	  member	   countries	   condemned	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   by	   Iraq.	   They	  would	  continue	   their	  efforts	   to	  see	   the	  Protocol	   respected.283	  It	   is	  noteworthy	   to	  point	  out	   that	   also	   a	   big	   organization	   like	   the	   European	   Community	   condemned	   Iraq	   for	  disrespecting	   the	   Protocol,	   which	   shows	   both	   the	   gravity	   of	   the	   breach,	   but	   also	   the	  attention	  it	  got.	  	  	  	  The	  Land	  War	  in	  1987	  	  	  Iran	  continued	  to	  report	  of	  continued	  use	  of	  poison	  gas	  against	  both	  military	  personnel	  and	  civilians	  in	  May.284	  Bombs	  with	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  dropped	  from	  planes	  over	  two	  villages	  in	  the	  Baneh	  region	  in	  Iran,	  not	  far	  from	  the	  border	  to	  northern	  Iraq,	  7	  May.	  92	  civilians	  were	  injured.285	  Iran	  also	  used	  new	  means	  to	  attract	  international	  attention,	  namely	  sending	  pictures	  of	  gas	  victims,	  and	  distributing	  videos	  of	  a	  BBC	  documentary	  called	   Secrets	   of	   Samarra,	   which	   dealt	   with	   how	   Iraq	   obtained	   chemicals,	   how	   they	  produced	  chemical	  weapons	  and	  so	  on.286	  	  In	  June	  1987	  Kurdish	  fighters	  with	  Iranian	  weaponry	  supported	  by	  Iranian	  forces	  launched	  Operation	  Fatah,	  which	  means	  victory,	  in	  Suleimaniyah	  in	  northern	  Iraq.287	  	  It	  was,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  previous	  offensives	  in	  both	  northern	  Iraq	  and	  of	  course	  the	  battles	  for	  Faw	  and	  Basra,	  a	  small	  offensive.	  Chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	  frequently	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  282	  Letter	  from	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Iran	  26.5.1987	  in	  letter	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18878.	  283	  Statement	  25.5.1987	  	  by	  the	  Foreign	  Ministers	  	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  the	  12	  States	  members	  of	  the	  EC	  in	  letter	  27.5.1987	  to	  the	  UN	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Belgium	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18879.	  284	  Letter	  11.5.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18859.	  285	  Letter	  2.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18890.	  286	  Letters	   11.5.1987	   and	   15.5.1987	   from	   the	   representative	   of	   Iran	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General.	   UNSC	  documents	  S/18860	  and	  S/18866.	  287	  Johnson,	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  War,	  158.	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both	  the	  northern	  and	  the	  southern	  front,	  according	  to	  the	  Iranian	  representative	  to	  the	  UN.288	  Another	  major	   attack	   on	   civilians	   also	   occurred,	   according	   to	   Rajai-­‐Khorassani.	  Citizens	  of	  Sardasht,	  a	  city	  not	  far	  from	  Baneh	  in	  northwestern	  Iran,	  were	  attacked	  with	  chemical	  weapons	   28	   June.	   650	   civilians	  were	   injured	   and	   10	   killed.	   Once	   again,	   Iran	  called	   for	   a	   UN	   mission	   to	   investigate,	   and	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   and	   the	   Security	  Council	  to	  take	  both	  preventive	  and	  punitive	  actions.289	  	  The	  land	  war	  settled	  down	  to	  small-­‐scale	  fighting	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  autumn	  of	  1987.	  Robert	  Johnson,	  who	  has	  a	  Phd.	  in	  war	  strategies	  and	  conflict	  thinking	  at	  Oxford	  University,	  views	  the	  autumn	  of	  1987	  as	  an	  evidence	  of	  that	  Iran	  had	  reached	  its	  limits.	  Financial	  problems,	  lack	  of	  equipment	  and	  lack	  of	  men	  had	  pushed	  the	  Iranian	  warfare	  to	  a	  point	  where	  Iran	  was	  unable	  to	  launch	  offensives	  in	  the	  same	  scales	  as	  it	  had	  done	  in	  the	  previous	  years.	  Iraq,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  counter	  attack	  either.290	  	  	  	  	  	  Resolution	  598	  (1987)	  	  The	  Security	  Council	  met	  again	  20	  July	  1987	  to	  vote	  over	  the	  new	  resolution,	  which	  the	  five	   permanent	   member	   states’	   ambassadors	   had	   put	   together.291	  This	   time,	   all	   the	  foreign	   ministers	   (except	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union)	   met	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   war.	   The	  discussion	  reflected	  a	  shared	  opinion	   that	   the	  war	  had	   lasted	   too	   long,	  and	   that	  peace	  had	  to	  be	  restored.	  Other	  aspects	  of	  the	  war,	  like	  the	  chemical	  warfare,	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  PoW	  and	  attacks	  on	  civilians,	  were	  all	  subordinate	  to	  the	  overall	  aim;	  peace.	  Several	   representatives	   mentioned	   the	   other	   aspects	   though,	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	  argumentation	   of	   how	   grave	   the	   situation	   was.	   In	   this	   connection,	   it	   should	   be	  mentioned	   that	   the	   representative	   of	   Ghana,	  Mr.	   Gbeho,	   clarified	   how	   destructive	   the	  war	  had	  been	  on	   the	  Geneva	  Protocol.	  The	  delegation	   from	  Ghana	  viewed	   the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  as	  no	  longer	  effective,	  and	  urged	  the	  United	  Nation	  as	  organization	  to	  review	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  288	  Letters	  10.6.1987,	   17.6.1987,	   23.6.1987,	   25.6.1987	   and	  29.6.1987	   from	   the	   representative	   of	   Iran	   to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  documents	  S/18919,	  S/18928,	  S/18941,	  S/18947	  and	  S/18952.	  289	  Letter	  29.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  UNSC	  document	  S/18953.	  290	  Johnson,	  The	  Iran-­Iraq	  War,	  158.	  291	  Members	  of	   the	  Security	  Council	  per	  20.7.1987	  were	  Argentina,	  Bulgaria,	  Congo,	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	   (FRG),	   Ghana,	   Italy,	   Japan,	   United	   Arab	   Emirates,	   Venezuela	   and	   Zambia	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  permanent	  members.	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in	   regard	   to	   the	  many	   loopholes	   the	   Protocol	   had.292	  This	  was	   the	   first	   time	   that	   any	  representative	  had	  officially	  uttered	  in	  the	  Security	  Council	  that	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  had	  played	   its	   role,	   and	  needed	   to	  be	   edited.	   It	  was	  of	   course	  dramatic,	   as	  most	   countries	  only	  had	  stated	   that	   it	  was	  weakened,	  not	   ineffective.	  However,	   it	   set	   the	   topic	  on	   the	  agenda,	  and	  as	  we	  know	  in	  retrospect,	  changes	  came	  in	  the	  following	  years.	  	  	  In	  resolution	  598	  (1987),	  the	  Security	  Council	  reaffirmed	  resolution	  582	  (1986),	  and	  repeated	   its	  concerns	  over	   the	  continuation	  of	   the	  conflict	  and	   the	  scale	  of	   it.	  The	  Council	  deplored	  the	  bombing	  of	  civilians,	  attacks	  on	  neutral	  shipping	  and	  aircraft,	  and	  violation	   of	   humanitarian	   law	   and	   other	   laws	   in	   armed	   conflicts.	   The	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons	  was	  particularly	  deplored.293	  	  	  	  The	  resolution	  marked	  differed	  from	  previous	  resolution	   in	  that	   it	  “acted	  under	  articles	  39	  and	  40	  of	  the	  charter”.294	  Article	  39	  says:	  	  
	  
The	   Security	   Council	   shall	   determine	   the	   existence	   of	   any	   threat	   to	   the	   peace,	  
breach	   of	   the	   peace,	   or	   act	   of	   aggression	   and	   shall	   make	   recommendations,	   or	  
decide	   what	   measures	   shall	   be	   taken	   in	   accordance	   with	   Articles	   41	   and	   42,	   to	  
maintain	  or	  restore	  international	  peace	  and	  security.295	  
	  Article	  40	  says:	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  prevent	  an	  aggravation	  of	  the	  situation,	  the	  Security	  Council	  may,	  before	  
making	  the	  recommendations	  or	  deciding	  upon	  the	  measures	  provided	  for	  in	  Article	  
39,	  call	  upon	  the	  parties	  concerned	  to	  comply	  with	  such	  provisional	  measures	  as	  it	  
deems	  necessary	  or	  desirable.	  Such	  provisional	  measures	  shall	  be	  without	  prejudice	  
to	  the	  rights,	  claims,	  or	  position	  of	  the	  parties	  concerned.	  The	  Security	  Council	  shall	  
duly	  take	  account	  of	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  such	  provisional	  measures.296	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  292	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  20.7.1987	  of	   the	  2750th	  meeting	  of	   the	  Security	  Council	  UNSC	  document	  S/PV.2750.	  293	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  598	  (1987)	  of	  20	  July	  1987.	  294	  Idem.	  295	  UN,	  ”Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations:	  Article	  39.”	  296	  UN,	  ”Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations:	  Article	  40.”	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Article	  41,	  which	  article	  39,	  refers	  to,	  says:	  	  	  
The	   Security	   Council	   may	   decide	   what	   measures	   not	   involving	   the	   use	   of	   armed	  
force	   are	   to	   be	   employed	   to	   give	   effect	   to	   its	   decisions,	   and	   it	  may	   call	   upon	   the	  
Members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  apply	  such	  measures.	  These	  may	  include	  complete	  
or	  partial	  interruption	  of	  economic	  relations	  and	  of	  rail,	  sea,	  air,	  postal,	  telegraphic,	  
radio,	   and	   other	   means	   of	   communication,	   and	   the	   severance	   of	   diplomatic	  
relations.297	  	  Article	  42	  says:	  	  
Should	  the	  Security	  Council	  consider	  that	  measures	  provided	  for	  in	  Article	  41	  would	  
be	  inadequate	  or	  have	  proved	  to	  be	  inadequate,	  it	  may	  take	  such	  action	  by	  air,	  sea,	  
or	  land	  forces	  as	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  or	  restore	  international	  peace	  and	  
security.	  Such	  action	  may	   include	  demonstrations,	  blockade,	  and	  other	  operations	  
by	  air,	  sea,	  or	  land	  forces	  of	  Members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.298	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  resolution	  specified	  what	  measures	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  to	  stop	  the	  conflict,	   and	   it	   also	   opened	   for	   UN	  military	   intervention	   in	   the	   conflict.	   The	   war	   had	  lasted	  for	  seven	  years,	  had	  been	  devastating	  for	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq,	  threatened	  to	  spread	  to	  other	  countries	   in	   the	  region,	  and	   international	   law	  had	  been	  violated.	  The	  Security	  Council	   finally	   responded	   according	   to	   their	   responsibilities	   manifested	   in	   the	   UN	  Charter.	  Such	  actions	  were	  only	   to	  be	  considered	   if	   Iran	  and	   Iraq	  did	  not	  halt	   the	  war	  themselves,	  however.	  The	  Security	  Council	  demanded	  an	   immediate	  ceasefire	  on	   land,	  sea	  and	  in	  the	  air,	  which	  would	  be	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  process	  of	  a	  negotiated	  peace.	  A	  team	  dispatched	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  should	  observe	  the	  ceasefire,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  steps	  would	  then	  be	  taken	  so	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  could	  implement	  the	  resolution.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  other	  states	  should	  restrain	  from	  doing	  anything	  that	  could	  cause	  an	  escalation	   of	   the	   conflict.299	  The	   Council	   voted	   on	   the	   resolution,	   and	   the	   Security	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Council	  adopted	  it	  unanimously.300	  Still,	  the	  war	  continued,	  and	  the	  Council	  did	  not	  take	  the	  steps	  they	  warned	  about	  in	  the	  resolution.	  	  	  The	  response	  to	  resolution	  598	  (1987)	  from	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  	  	  The	   responses	   from	   the	   two	   belligerents	  were	   divided,	   as	   they	   had	   been	   to	   previous	  resolutions.	   Iran’s	   first	   response	  was	   that	   the	   resolution	   had	   defects,	   and	   that	   it	   was	  obviously	   influenced	   by	   American	   propaganda.301	  Iraq	   welcomed	   the	   resolution,	   and	  was	  ready	  to	  implement	  it	  in	  co-­‐operation	  with	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.302	  	  	  No	   final	   response	   to	   resolution	   598	   (1987)	   was	   given	   from	   Iran.	   Instead,	   the	  Iranian	   representative	   turned	   his	   focus	   to	   the	   American	   presence	   in	   the	   Gulf,	   about	  which	  he	  sent	  a	  number	  of	  letters	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  the	  early	  autumn	  of	  1987.	  	  Iran	  sent	  a	  letter	  11	  August,	  however,	  where	  Iran	  made	  it	  clear	  what	  areas	  that	  were	  important	   to	   them.	   Iran	   was	   interested	   in	   stability	   and	   security	   in	   the	   Persian	   Gulf,	  freedom	  of	  navigation	  and	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  oil,	  determination	  of	  the	  aggressor	  in	  the	  war,	  i.e.	   Iraq,	   repatriation	   of	   prisoners	   of	   war,	   and	   practical	   measures	   to	   end	   the	  bombardment	  of	  civilian	  areas	  and	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.303	  Iran	  also	  welcomed	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  8-­‐point	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  plan	  from	  1985,	  and	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  called	  for	  the	  five	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Council	  to	  discuss	  whether	  or	  not	   it	  was	  possible	   to	   implement	   individual	   elements	   at	   a	   time,	   and	   approach	   peace	   that	   way.	  However,	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   insisted	   that	   a	   ceasefire	   should	   be	   implemented	   first.	  The	   four	  points,	  which	   Iran	   focused	  on,	  showed	  how	  important	   the	  aspect	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  for	  Iran.	  The	  opening	  in	  arrangements	  seemed	  to	  please	  the	  Iranians	  and	  negotiations	   based	   on	   resolution	   598	   (1987)	   began	   in	   New	   York	   24	   August	   1987.304	  Meanwhile,	  the	  war	  continued	  and	  threatened	  to	  accelerate	  to	  new	  proportions.	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The	  Security	  Council’s	  official	  statement	  in	  regard	  to	  resolution	  598	  (1987)	  	  The	  Security	  Council	  made	  a	  statement	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  resolution	  598	  (1987),	  where	  they	  declared	  that	  they	  supported	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  work,	  and	  where	  they	  continuously	  considered	  taking	  further	  steps	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  resolution.305	  	  	  Where	  the	  United	  Nations	  had	  had	  a	  focus	  on	  chemical	  weapons	  previously	  in	  the	  war,	  especially	  between	  1984	  and	  1986,	  other	  events	  in	  the	  war	  now	  made	  a	  peace	  more	  necessary	   than	   ever.	   The	   situation	   in	   the	   Gulf,	   where	   the	   US	   was	   in	   direct	   armed	  confrontations	  with	   Iran,	   threatened	   to	  escalate	   the	  war	   to	   the	  entire	   region,	  and	  as	  a	  result	   of	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   became	   subordinate.	   It	   is	   also	   likely	   to	  believe	   that	   the	   work	   with	   halting	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   had	   been	   so	  unsuccessful,	   that	   the	   Security	   Council	   and	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   abandoned	   it	  deliberately.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  point	  at	  the	  increasing	  involvement	  of	  the	  US	  in	  the	  war.	  The	   inability	   to	  prevent	   Iraq	   from	  using	   chemical	  weapons	  would	  prove	   fatal.	  As	  the	   war	   closed	   in,	   Saddam	   Hussein	   was	   desperate	   to	   keep	   his	   power	   in	   Iraq,	   and	   to	  control	  the	  Kurdish	  population	  in	  northern	  Iraq.	  	   	  The	  land	  war,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  limited,	  and	  had	  been	  so	  since	  the	  spring	  of	  1987.	  Iran	  reported	  of	  a	  new	  chemical	  attack	  on	  another	  Iranian	  city,	  Sumar,	  8	  October,	  but	  no	  other	  details	  were	  submitted.306	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  November	  that	  Tehran	  announced	  that	  a	  new	  series	  of	  offensives	  would	  occur.	  It	  started	  with	  small-­‐scale	  attacks	  on	  the	  central	  front	  and	  shelling	  of	  Basra	  in	   November	   and	   December.	   The	   attacks	   kept	   the	   Iraqis	   alert,	   but	   a	   major	   offensive	  never	  came.307	  Instead,	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  Gulf	  escalated.	  	  	  	  The	  fighting	  in	  the	  first	  months	  of	  1988	  	  Iran	   launched	   one	   offensive	   in	   northern	   Iraq	   in	   January	   1988,	   but	   the	   scale	   of	   it	   and	  whether	  Iran	  managed	  to	  gain	  any	  significant	  areas	  of	  land	  are	  disputed.308	  Iraq	  attacked	  the	  oil	  refinery	  Rey	  in	  the	  end	  of	  February,	  and	  caused	  major	  damage	  on	  it.	  As	  response,	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Iran	  fired	  three	  Scud	  missiles	  at	  Baghdad,	  and	  thus	  was	  the	  War	  of	  the	  Cities	  reignited.	  Iraq	  retaliated	  by	  firing	  long-­‐range	  missiles	  at	  Tehran	  and	  Qom.309	  	  	  The	  War	   of	   the	   Cities	  was	   reignited	   in	   the	   end	   of	   1987	   and	   the	   first	  month	   of	  1988.	  Iraq	  fired	  missiles	  on	  Tehran	  and	  other	  big,	  Iranian	  cities,	  while	  Iran	  fired	  missiles	  on	  Baghdad.	  The	  attacks	  did	  not	  cause	  any	  severe	  material	  damages	  or	  many	  injuries	  or	  deaths,	  but	   the	  bombings	  of	   Iranian	  cities	  affected	   the	  population.	  The	  population	  had	  heard	  about	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  on	  the	  front,	  and	  lately	  against	  civilian	  villages.	  What	   hindered	   Saddam	   Hussein	   from	   using	   gas	   on	   Tehran?	   Cordesman	   and	  Wagner	   see	   a	   clear	   connection	   between	   the	   fear	   of	   being	   attacked	   with	   gas	   and	   the	  shrinking	  moral	  among	  the	  population,	  which	  became	  apparent	  as	  the	  war	  lingered.310	  	  Khomeini	  had	  since	  1983	  used	  the	  Iraqi	  attacks	  with	  chemical	  weapons	  as	  a	  proof	  of	  the	  inhumanity	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  his	  regime,	  and	  thus	  a	  way	  of	   legitimizing	  the	  war	  against	   him.	   	   Instead,	   it	   worked	   the	   opposite	   way,	   and	   scared	   people.	   The	   Iranian	  population	   feared	   that	   Iraqi	   planes	   would	   drop	   chemical	   bombs	   over	   major	   Iranian	  cities.311	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Bombing	  of	  Halabja	  	  	  Iranian	   and	   Kurdish	   groups	   launched	   new	   offensives	   in	   northern	   Iraq	   in	   March.	   One	  offensive	  targeted	  the	  city	  of	  Khurmal,	  the	  second	  the	  city	  of	  Sulaymaniah,	  and	  the	  third	  the	   town	  Halabja.312	  Iraqi	   forces	   fled	   Halabja.	   The	   exact	   details	   of	   the	   context	   around	  Halabja	   are	   uncertain	   even	   today,	  more	   than	   25	   years	   later,	   but	   Iranian	   and	   Kurdish	  forces	  had	  not	  entered	  Halabja,	  according	   to	  soldiers.	  They	  stayed	   in	   the	  mountainous	  area	  around	  for	  strategic	  reasons.313	  	  16	  March,	   Iraqi	   planes	   flew	   in	   over	   the	   town	  of	  Halabja,	  which	   is	   situated	   in	   a	  valley	  surrounded	  by	  mountains,	  and	  is	  quite	  sheltered	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Iraq.	  The	  planes	  dropped	  a	  number	  of	  bombs	  over	  the	  town,	  and	  a	  smoke	  appeared	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  bombs	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hit	   ground.314	  In	   the	   following	   days,	   pictures	   of	   men,	   animals,	   women	   and	   children	  victims	  to	  chemical	  attacks	  flared	  over	  TVs	  and	  were	  showed	  in	  newspapers	  all	  over	  the	  world.315	  The	  injuries	  showed	  that	  the	  gas	  had	  worked	  quickly,	  and	  suffocated	  many	  of	  its	   victims,	   a	   sign	  of	  nerve	  gas.316	  It	   has	   later	  been	  estimated	   that	  3200-­‐5000	   civilians	  died	  in	  the	  attack,	  while	  another	  7000-­‐10,000	  were	  injured.317	  Saddam’s	   bombing	   of	   his	   own	   population	   with	   chemical	   weapons	   sparked	   an	  outrage	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  when	  the	  event	  made	  headlines	  in	  Western	  media	  a	  few	  days	  later.	  	  The	   first	   statement	   from	   the	   American	   government	   regarding	   the	   incident	  condemned	   Iran	   for	   it,	   and	   encouraged	   an	   investigation	   of	   Iran’s	   use	   of	   chemical	  weapons.	  The	  condemnation	  was	  later	  modified,	  and	  Iraq	  was	  blamed	  for	  it	  as	  well,	  but	  it	  is	  in	  retrospect	  obvious	  that	  the	  US	  government	  tried	  to	  protect	  Iraq	  from	  it.318	  	  Other	  states,	   like	  the	  UK,	  condemned	  Iraq	  immediately.	  The	  Security	  Council	  waited	  to	  comment	  on	  it	  until	  a	  report	  confirmed	  what	  happened.	  	  The	  bombing	  of	  Halabja	  showed	  that	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  come	  out	  of	  control,	  and	  it	  showed	  how	  important	  it	  was	  to	  achieve	  peace.	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  increased	  his	  peace	  efforts,	  but	  focused	  yet	  again	  on	  a	  comprehensive	  peace	  agreement	  instead	  of	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  plan,	  which	  he	  had	  worked	  for	  the	  past	  years.	  	  The	   Secretary-­‐General	   sent	   a	   medical	   expert	   to	   investigate	   the	   bombing	   of	  Halabja	  on	  his	  own	  initiative.	  It	  was	  claimed	  that	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  mission,	  the	  US	  and	  France,	   two	   of	   Iraq’s	  most	   important	   suppliers	   of	  weapons,	   had	   tried	   to	   convince	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   not	   to	   send	   it.319	  The	   report,	   which	   was	   published	   in	   the	   midst	   of	  April,	  once	  again	  confirmed	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	  on	  a	  more	  intensive	  scale	  than	  before.	  As	  a	  response	  to	  the	  mission’s	  report,	  the	  Security	  Council	  met	  9	  May	  1988	  to	  vote	  on	  a	  draft	  resolution	  submitted	  by	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  (BDR),	  Italy	   and	   Japan.	   Resolution	   612	   (1988)	   was	   the	   first	   resolution	   based	   directly	   on	   a	  Secretary-­‐General’s	   report	   regarding	   chemical	  weapons.320	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	   a	  resolution	  is	  more	  powerful	  than	  a	  statement,	  as	  it	  expects	  the	  addressed	  to	  comply	  to	  it.	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The	  resolution	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  and	  affirmed	  that	  it	  was	  more	  important	  than	  ever	  to	  respect	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol.	  The	  Security	  Council	  expected	  both	  sides	   to	   refrain	   from	   using	   chemical	  weapons,	   and	   called	   on	   other	   states	   to	   establish	  export	   controls	   on	   chemical	   products,	   which	   could	   be	   used	   to	   manufacture	   chemical	  weapons.321	  Resolution	  612	  (1988)	  was	  adopted	  unanimously.322	  	  The	   Council	   had	   previously	   specified	   who	   the	   user	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   was.	  Resolution	  612	  (1988)	  did	  not	  do	  that,	  and	  Joost	  R.	  Hilterman	  thinks	  that	  was	  due	  to	  US	  diplomats,	  who	  worked	  specifically	  for	  a	  condemnation	  of	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq.323	  	  In	  other	  words,	  resolution	  612	  (1988)	  had	  its	  positive	  sides	  and	  its	  negative	  sides.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	   it	  was	  a	  step	  forward	  that	  the	  Council	  responded	  to	  the	  Halabja	   incident	  with	   a	   resolution	   rather	   than	   a	   statement.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   failed	   to	   have	   any	  implications	  for	  Iraq.	  In	  addition,	  the	  American	  response	  showed	  that	  the	  US	  no	  longer	  tilted	  towards	  Iraq,	  but	  sided	  openly	  with	  Iraq.	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The	  End	  of	  the	  War	  	  	  Turn	  of	  the	  tide:	  Iraq	  strikes	  back	  	  To	  be	  able	  to	   launch	  a	  major	  offensive	   in	  northern	  Iraq,	   Iran	  had	  to	  move	  troops	  from	  the	   southern	   front	   to	   the	   northern	   front.	   At	   this	   time,	   Iran	   did	   no	   longer	   have	   the	  capacity	  to	  conduct	  a	  full-­‐force	  war	  on	  both	  fronts	  at	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  war.	  This	  led	  to	  an	  automatic	  weakening	  of	  the	  Iranian	  southern	  front,	  which	  created	  a	  possibility	  for	  Iraqi	  forces	  to	  take	  over	  the	  initiative.	  	  From	  April	   1988,	   Iraq	   started	   to	   push	   the	   Iranian	   forces	   back	   towards	   its	   own	  border.	   Iraq	   launched	   the	  offensive	  Blessed	  Ramadan	  17	  April	   at	   Faw,	   and	   retook	   the	  peninsula	  within	  35	  hours.324	  Chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	  as	  an	  integrated	  part	  of	  their	  offensive.	   Instead	   of	   using	   mustard	   gas,	   as	   Iraq	   had	   used	   when	   they	   were	   on	   the	  defensive,	   they	   used	   tabun,	   a	   nerve	   gas,	   when	   attacking.	   Tabun	   is	   more	   lethal	   than	  mustard	  gas,	  but	  is	  a	  lighter	  gas	  and	  does	  not	  linger	  in	  an	  area	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  That	  way,	  Iraqi	   forces	   could	   proceed	   through	   the	   attacked	   area	   in	   relatively	   short	   time	  afterwards.325	  This	  was	  the	  first	  major	  Iraqi	  counterattack	  since	  the	  initial	  offensives	  in	  1980,	  and	  the	  situation	  for	  Iran	  was	  no	  better	  in	  the	  Gulf	  either.	  	  There	  had	  been	  few	  attacks	  on	  vessels	  in	  the	  Gulf	  in	  February,	  but	  the	  lull	  did	  not	  last	   for	   long.	  Despite	   the	   threats	  of	   involvement	   from	  the	  US,	   Iran	  continued	  to	  harass	  ships	  and	  place	  mines,	   and	  14	  April	  USS	  Samuel	  B.	  Roberts,	   an	  American	   frigate,	  hit	   a	  mine.	  The	  ship	  was	  seriously	  damaged,	  but	  no	  lives	  were	  lost.	  Still,	  the	  US	  was	  forced	  to	  react,	  and	  four	  days	   later	  two	  Iranian	  oil	  platforms	  in	  the	   lower	  Gulf	  were	  attacked	  by	  the	  US.	  The	  same	  day,	  a	  number	  of	  armed	  clashes	  occurred	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Iran	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  which	  ended	  with	  considerable	  reduction	  of	   the	  Iranian	  fleet,	  estimates	  claim	  that	  50	  %	  of	  it	  was	  destroyed,	  and	  Iran	  retreated	  back	  to	  its	  shores	  with	  its	  remaining	  vessels.326	  The	  US	  was	   in	  armed	  conflict	  with	   Iran,	   though	   the	  Americans	  claimed	   that	  they	  were	  only	  protecting	  American	  interests.	  	  The	   Gulf	   States	  welcomed	   the	   attacks,	   and	  western	   European	   states	   supported	  the	   American	   action,	   and	   sent	  more	  minesweepers	   and	   ships	   to	   the	   Gulf.	   Two	   of	   the	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permanent	  members	   of	   the	   Security	   Council	   were	  more	   reluctant	   to	   the	   new	   events,	  however.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  approve	  of	  the	  involvement,	  and	  China	  declared	  that	  they	   would	   not	   halt	   its	   export	   of	   weapons	   to	   the	   region.327	  The	   Security	   Council	   had	  disagreed	   on	   several	  matters	   during	   the	  war,	   and	   the	   events	   in	   the	   Gulf	   had	   led	   to	   a	  further	   split	   between	   the	   permanent	   members.	   The	   Soviet	   Union	   had	   several	   times	  warned	  of	   an	   escalated	  presence	  of	   the	  US	   in	   the	   region.	  Moscow	  viewed	   the	  military	  presence	  of	  the	  US	  as	  a	  way	  to	  influence	  and	  exploit	  the	  situation	  to	  the	  US’	  advantage.328	  No	  doubt,	   the	   situation	   led	   to	  difficulties	   for	   the	   two	  superpowers	   to	   cooperate	   in	   the	  Security	  Council,	  which	  eventually	  led	  to	  a	  locked	  situation	  in	  regard	  to	  many	  decisions	  in	   the	   Council.	   Behind	   closed	   doors,	   the	   Security	   Council	   discussed	   an	   eventual	   arms	  embargo	  on	  Iran,	  but	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  opposed	  this	  measure,	  and	  the	  embargo	  was	  thus	  never	  implemented.329	  	  	  The	  fighting	  and	  peace	  efforts	  in	  spring	  1988	  	  Despite	  there	  being	  a	  resolution	  and	  perhaps	  because	  of	  its	  vague	  language,	  resolution	  612	  (1988)	  did	  not	  prevent	  Iraq	  from	  using	  gas	  again.	  Iraq	  launched	  a	  new	  attack	  on	  the	  southern	  front	  in	  the	  end	  of	  May.	  Iran	  did	  not	  make	  the	  attack	  easy,	  but	  a	  combination	  of	  conventional	  weapons	  and	  chemical	  weapons	  eventually	  broke	  through	  the	  Iranian	  lines,	  and	  Iraq	  recaptured	  the	  border	  city	  of	  Shalamcheh,	  25	  km	  east	  of	  Basra.330	  During	  this	  period,	  Iraq	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  attacks	  in	  northern	  Iraq	  as	  well,	  which	  forced	  Iranian	  forces	   to	   withdraw.	   Despite	   these	   setbacks,	   Khomeini	   refused	   to	   negotiate.331 	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  invited	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  to	  participate	  in	  new	  peace	  talks	  in	  the	  end	  of	   May,	   but	   neither	   of	   them	   was	   really	   interested	   in	   it.	   In	   addition,	   the	   split	   in	   the	  Security	  Council	  made	  the	  situation	  difficult.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  both	  declared	  their	   unwillingness	   to	   implement	   sanctions,	   which	   were	   quite	   essential	   to	   limit	   the	  warfare	  as	  the	  two	  countries	  sold	  war	  equipment	  to	  both	  Iran	  and	  Iraq.332	  The	  situation	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seemed	   impossible	   to	   solve,	   but	   it	   is	   known	   in	   retrospect	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  continued	  his	  peace	  efforts	  in	  silence.333	  	   Iran	  tried	  to	  counterattack	  on	  13	  June,	  but	  the	  attack	  only	  lead	  to	  intense	  fighting,	  and	   the	   Iranian	   forces	   were	   driven	   back	   by	   Iraqi	   artillery,	   airstrikes	   and	   chemical	  weapons.334	  It	  was	  obvious	   that	   Iraq	  had	  acquired	   the	   initiative	   in	   the	  war.	   Iraq’s	  next	  move	  was	  to	  launch	  an	  offensive	  in	  the	  Mehran	  area	  on	  the	  central	  front.	  An	  important	  part	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  forces	  that	  attacked	  was	  the	  Chemical	  Corps,	  and	  substantial	  amounts	  of	  nerve	   gas	  were	  used	   in	   the	   attacks.	  Most	   of	   the	   civilians	  had	   fled	  Mehran	   though,	   but	  Iranian	  forces	  still	  tried	  to	  hold	  the	  city,	  because	  of	  its	  strategic	  importance.335	  	  	  Iraq	  also	  attacked	   the	  northern	  part	  of	   the	  northernmost	  of	  Majnoon	   Islands	   in	  the	  end	  of	  June.	  The	  area	  fell	  easily	  to	  Iraqi	  artillery	  and	  poison	  gas.	  Iran	  later	  claimed	  that	   4000	   Iranian	   combatants	   had	   nerve	   gas	   related	   injuries,	   while	   60	   of	   them	   had	  succumbed	  from	  it.	  	  Iraq	  had	  denied	  the	  use	  of	  gas	  in	  response	  to	  Iran’s	  first	  allegations	  of	  the	  use	  of	  it.	  After	  the	  initial	  correspondence,	  Iraq	  had	  ignored	  the	  allegations,	  and	  did	  not	  bother	  to	  deny	  it.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1988,	  the	  Iraqi	  foreign	  minister,	  Tariq	  Aziz,	  admitted	  the	  use	  of	  gas,	  but	  excused	  it	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  Iran	  had	  used	  it	  first.	  The	  Geneva	  Protocol	  only	  forbid	   first	  use	  of	  chemical,	  biological	  and	  asphyxiating	  gases,	  not	  retaliation,	  and	  Aziz	  thus	   claimed	   that	   Iraq	  had	  not	   broken	   the	  Protocol.	   In	   response	   to	   criticism	   from	   the	  West,	  he	  said:	  “There	  are	  different	  views	  on	  this	  matter	   from	  different	  angles.	  You	  are	  living	  on	  a	  civilized	  continent.	  You	  are	  living	  on	  a	  peaceful	  continent.”336	  	  	  	  The	  final	  weeks	  of	  the	  war	  were	  dramatic.	  Iranian	  gunboats	  attacked	  more	  ships	  on	   2	   and	   3	   July	   in	   the	   Gulf,	   and	   American	   ships	   rushed	   to	   it	   to	   counterattack	   and	   to	  relieve	  the	  vessels	  attacked	  by	  the	  gunboats.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  encounters	  in	  the	  Gulf,	  one	  of	  the	  American	  war	  ships	  there,	  USS	  Vincennes,	  spotted	  an	  approaching	  plane	  on	   its	   radar.	  The	  plane’s	   flight	  path	  was	  direct	  on	   the	  Vincennes,	   and	   the	   crew	  on	   the	  American	  warship	  failed	  to	  identify	  the	  aircraft,	  but	  thought	  it	  to	  be	  an	  F-­‐14.	  It	  did	  not	  respond	  to	   the	  warnings	  Vincennes	  sent	  out	  on	   the	  MAD	  (Military	  Air	  Distress)	  or	   the	  IAD	   (International	   Air	   Distress)	   frequency	   either.	   The	   plane	   was	   shot	   down.	   Later	   it	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showed	   that	   it	  was	   the	   Iran	  Air	   flight	   655	  on	   its	  way	   from	  Tehran	   to	  Dubai	  with	  290	  civilians	  onboard.337	  The	   incident	   shocked	   the	  world	  and	  especially	   Iran,	  whose	   rulers	  now	   most	   likely	   understood	   that	   the	   US	   was	   a	   real	   threat.	   Still	   Iranian	   gunboats	  continued	  to	  harass	  tankers	  the	  following	  days,	  and	  new	  encounters	  with	  the	  American	  navy	  occurred.338	  	  Iraq	  launched	  new	  offensives	  to	  pressure	  Iranian	  forces	  out	  of	  Iraqi	  territory,	  and	  accomplished	   that	   on	   the	   southern	   and	   central	   front	   by	   12	   July.	   Iraq	   also	   advanced	  almost	  40	  km	  into	  Iran	  on	  the	  central	  front,	  but	  withdrew	  after	  a	  couple	  of	  days.339	  	  Iran	   still	   held	   positions	   in	   northern	   Iraq,	   but	   Iraq	   gave	   Iran	   a	   choice:	  withdraw	   from	  northern	  Iraq	  or	  southern	  Iran	  would	  be	  invaded.	  Iran	  withdrew.340	  	  17	   July,	  Khomeini	  sent	  a	   letter	   to	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  where	  he	  declared	   that	  Iran	  was	  ready	  to	  accept	  UNSC	  resolution	  598.	  The	  next	  day,	  Saddam	  Hussein	  declared	  that	   Iraq	   did	   not	   have	   any	   intentions	   to	   continue	   the	   war,	   and	   requested	   peace	  negotiations.341	  In	   a	   letter	   from	   Khomeini	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   18	   July,	   Khomeini	  gave	   up	   the	   downing	   of	   the	   Iranian	   airliner	   and	   the	   increasing	   and	   aggressive	   use	   of	  chemical	   weapons	   as	   reasons	   for	   the	   acceptance	   of	   resolution	   598	   (1987).342	  Iraq	  conducted	  bombings	  of	  Iranian	  industrial	  plants	  the	  following	  days,	  but	  Khomeini	  finally	  accepted	  a	  ceasefire	  20	  July,	  despite	  it	  being	  “more	  deadly	  than	  taking	  poison.”343	  Discussions	   started	   the	   following	   days	   and	   lasted	   for	   weeks,	   because	   Iran	   and	  Iraq	  disagreed	  on	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  an	  agreement,	  and	  because	  many	  details	  had	  to	  be	  sorted	  out.	  In	  addition,	  Iran	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  direct	  talks	  with	  Iraq.	  Clashes	  occurred	  the	  following	  week	  until	  Iraq	  agreed	  to	  a	  cease	  fire	  6	  August,	  and	  the	  fighting	  was	  officially	  ended	  two	  days	  later.344	  The	  Security	  Council	  announced	  that	  the	  ceasefire	  came	   into	   effect	   0300	   hours	   GMT	   on	   20	   August	   1988.	   Direct	   talks	   between	   the	   two	  belligerents	  followed	  the	  next	  months	  in	  Geneva	  under	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  auspices.	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The	  lessons	  from	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  War	  regarding	  chemical	  weapons	  	  The	   final	   resolution	   regarding	   chemical	   weapons	   in	   the	   Iran-­‐Iraq	   war	   was	   issued	   26	  August	  1988.	  This	  draft	  resolution	  was	  drafted	  by	  Western	  Germany,	  Italy,	  Japan	  and	  the	  UK.345	  The	  Security	  Council	  recalled	  resolution	  612	  (1988)	  from	  May,	  and	  based	  its	  new	  resolution	  on	  the	  reports	   from	  20	  and	  25	   July,	  2	  and	  19	  August,	  which	  confirmed	  that	  chemical	  weapons	  had	  been	  used	  continuously,	  and	  in	  an	  escalated	  way	  against	  Iranians.	  The	  use	  was	  condemned,	  and	  the	  council	  expressed	  concern	  by	  the	  possibility	  that	  such	  weapons	  would	  be	  used	  in	  the	  future.	  To	   prevent	   use	   in	   the	   future,	   the	   Council	   encouraged	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   to	  investigate	  all	  allegations	  that	  might	  come,	  so	  facts	  could	  be	  established.	  All	  states	  were	  called	   upon	   to	   restrict	   its	   export	   of	   substances	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   manufacture	  chemical	   weapons,	   especially	   to	   states	   involved	   in	   conflicts.	   If	   more	   incidents	   of	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  committed,	  either	  by	  Iran	  or	  Iraq	  or	  other	  states	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  subject	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol,	  the	  Council	  would	  consider	  using	  effective	  measures	  to	  stop	  the	  use	  immediately.346	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6. Conclusion	  	  The	   primary	   aim	   of	   this	   thesis	   was	   to	   find	   out	   how	   the	   Security	   Council	   and	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  responded	  to	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  	  The	  presentation	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  Secretary	  General’s	  responses	  to	  the	  use	  of	   chemical	  weapons	  has	   shown	   that	   they	   failed	   to	  halt	   the	  use,	   and	   that	   Iraq	  continued	   to	   use	   chemical	   weapons	   repeatedly	   from	   1983	   until	   1988	   because	   the	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  Secretary	  General	  never	  responded	  decisively	  or	  hard	  enough.	  The	  hypothesis	   “The	  Security	  Council	   did	  not	   respond	  hard	  enough	   to	   stop	   the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons”	  is	  thus	  correct.	  The	  first	  Security	  Council	  resolutions	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  but	  did	  not	  condemn	  Iraq	  as	  violator	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol.	  Iranian	   soldiers	   and	   civilians	   were	   identified	   as	   victims	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   in	  statements	   after	   two	   years,	   but	   the	   Council	   condemn	   Iraq	   for	   it.	   The	   Security	   Council	  never	  imposed	  any	  preventive	  or	  punitive	  measures	  either,	  and	  it	  is	  argued	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  response	  led	  to	  an	  escalation	  of	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  It	  should	  be	  highlighted	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   approached	   the	   issue	   of	   chemical	   weapons	   a	  number	  of	  times.	  He	  sent	  missions	  to	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  frequently	  to	  investigate	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons.	  He	  was	  also	  worked	  for	  peace,	  and	  realized	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  one,	  which	  had	   to	  be	  approached	   if	  peace	  should	  be	  achieved.	  However,	  his	  powers	  were	   limited.	  The	  real	  power	  to	   take	  measures	   to	  stop	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  lay	  within	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  So	   why	   did	   the	   Security	   Council	   respond	   the	   way	   it	   did?	   The	   answer	   is	   a	  combination	  of	  different	  factors,	  which	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  individually,	  but	  must	  be	  seen	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other.	  	  The	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  tilted	  towards	  Iraq	  	  	  Iraq	   was	   an	   ally	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   when	   the	   war	   broke	   out	   in	   1980.	   The	   other	  Superpower	  in	  the	  Cold	  war,	  the	  US,	  had	  lost	  its	  ally	  Iran	  when	  the	  Islamic	  regime	  seized	  power	  in	  Iran	  and	  held	  Americans	  hostage	  at	  the	  American	  Embassy	  in	  Tehran.	  The	  US	  was	  therefore	  hostile	  to	  Iran,	  and	  tilted	  more	  and	  more	  towards	  Iraq	  as	  Iran	  gained	  the	  initiative	   in	   the	  war.	   Saddam	  Hussein	  was	   not	   a	   reliable	   ally	   he	   either,	   but	   he	  was	   to	  prefer	  over	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini.	  The	  tilt	  became	  especially	  evident	  when	  Iran	  harassed	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and	  attacked	  oil	   tankers	   in	   the	  Gulf.	  The	   Iran-­‐Contra	  Scandal	  revealed	   that	   the	  US	  had	  sold	  weapons	  to	  Iran,	  but	  the	  US	  still	   favoured	  Iraq	  over	  Iran.	   Iraq	  was	  thus	  a	  country	  that	   both	   the	  US	   and	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   tilted	   towards	   and	   eventually	   supported	   in	   the	  Cold	  War.	  None	  of	  the	  other	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  tilted	  towards	  Iran	   either.	   The	  hypothesis	   “The	   Security	   Council	   did	   not	  want	   to	   implement	   efficient	  measures	  against	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  because	  the	  Council	  favoured	  Iraq	  over	  Iran”	  is	  therefore	  also	  correct.	  	  	  Measures	  to	  stop	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  never	  discussed	  	  The	  conclusion	  above	  shows	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  “The	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  disagreed	  on	  what	  measures	  which	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  punish	  and	  prevent	  further	  use	  of	  chemical	   weapons”	   was	   wrong.	   Since	   all	   of	   the	   permanent	   members	   of	   the	   Council	  favoured	  Iraq	  or	  stayed	  neutral	  in	  the	  war,	  they	  did	  not	  disagree	  on	  any	  measure.	  Indeed,	  no	   documents	   indicate	   that	   any	  measures	   to	   stop	   the	   use	   of	   chemical	   weapons	  were	  discussed	  at	  all.	  	  	  	  The	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  minor	  problem.	  	  One	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  was	  that	  “The	  conflict	  and	  also	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  were	  perceived	  as	  a	  minor	  problem	  in	  a	  bigger	  picture.”	  This	  is	  partly	  true.	  The	  overall	  aim	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  was	  to	  end	  the	  war,	  but	  he	  realized	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  achieve	  peace	  if	  he	  did	  not	  address	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  as	  well.	  the	  Security	  Council,	  however,	  paid	  very	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  chemical	  weapons,	  because	  it	  was	   a	   minor	   problem	   to	   them.	   The	   Tanker	   war	   and	   the	   flow	   of	   oil	   was	   much	   more	  important,	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  individual	  actors	  paid	  mush	  more	  attention	  to	  that.	  	  	  Iraq	  was	  willing	  to	  negotiate,	  while	  Iran	  was	  not.	  	  Iran	  had	  boycotted	  the	  Security	  Council	  since	  1980,	  when	  the	  Council	  failed	  to	  condemn	  Iraq	   for	   the	   invasion	   of	   Iran.	   Iraq,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   cooperated	   with	   the	   Security	  Council	  and	  was	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  peace.	  By	  condemning	  Iraq	  for	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	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  24	  October	  2014.	  	   	   Available	  from:	  	  http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1987.shtml	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S/RES/612:	  UNSC	  Resolution	  612	  (1988)	  of	  9.5.1988.	  	   	   Consulted	  24	  October	  2014.	  	   	   Available	  from:	  	  	   	   http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1988.shtml	  	   	   	  S/RES/619:	  UNSC	  Resolution	  619	  (1988)	  of	  9.8.1988.	  	  	   	   Consulted	  24	  October	  2014.	  	   	   Available	  from:	  	  	   	   http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1988.shtml	  	   S/RES/620:	  UNSC	  Resolution	  620	  (1988)	  of	  26.8.1988.	  	   	   Consulted	  24	  October	  2014.	  	   	   Available	  from:	  	  	   	   http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1988.shtml	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United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  [Archives]	  Printed	  in	  The	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Security	  	   Council,	  New	  York.	  Consulted	  at	  the	  Nobel	  Institute,	  Oslo.	  	  	  	   Vol.	  38,	  1983	  	   	   S/16128:	  Letter	  3.11.1983	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	   	   General.	  	  	   	   S/16139:	  Letter	  10.11.1983	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	   	   General.	  	  	   	   	  S/16140:	  Letter	  9.11.1983	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	   	   	  General.	  	   	   	  S/16154:	  Letter	  16.11.1983	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	   	   	  General.	  	  S/16181:	  Letter	  22.11.1983	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  General.	  	  S/16193:	  Letter	  29.11.1983	  from	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  General.	  S/16214:	  Report	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  13.12.1983.	  S/16220:	  Letter	  15.12.1983	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  General.	  S/16235:	  Letter	  27.12.1983	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  General.	  S/15834:	  Report	  20.6.1983	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/PV.2493	  and	  Corr.1:	  UNSC	  2493rd	  meeting	  31.10.1983.	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Vol.	  39,	  1984.	  	  	   	   S/16337:	  Letter	  10.2.1984	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  	  	   	   Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Iraq.	  	   	   S/16338:	  Letter	  10.2.1984	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  	   	   Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Iran.	  	  	   	   S/16342:	  Letter	  13.2.1984	  from	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  	   	   S/16378:	  Letter	  29.2.1984	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	   	   S/16380:	  Letter	  29.2.1984	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  	   	   S/16408:	  Letter	  9.3.1984	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	   	   S/16433:	  Report	  of	  the	  specialists	  appointed	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  	   	   to	  investigate	  allegations	  by	  Iran	  concerning	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons:	  	   	   Note	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  (Published	  26.3.1984)	  	   	   S/16438:	  Letter	  27.3.1984	  from	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary	   	   General.	  	  S/16572:	  Letter	  10.5.1984	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	   General.	  	   S/PV.2524:	  UNSC	  2524th	  meeting	  30.3.1984.	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   Vol.	  40,	  1985.	  	  	  	   	   S/16941:	  Letter	  5.2.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  S/17031:	  Letter	  14.3.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  	   	   S/17039:	  Letter	  18.3.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	   	   S/17046:	  Letter	  21.3.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  	   	   S/17059:	  Letter	  26.3.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	  	   	   General.	  	   	   S/17088:	  Letter	  9.4.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  	   	   S/17095:	  Letter	  11.4.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  	   	   S/17096:	  Letter	  11.4.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	  	   	   General.	  	   	   S/17097:	  Report	  12.4.1985	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  his	  visit	  to	  Iran	   	   and	  Iraq.	  	   	   S/17181:	  Letter	  13.5.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  	  	   	   S/17127	  and	  add.1:	  Letter	  17.4.1985	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  the	   	   President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  	  	   	   S/17342:	  Letter	  16.7.1985	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	   	   S/PV.2576:	  UNSC	  2526th	  meeting	  25.4.1985.	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   Vol.41,	  1986.	  	   	  S/17824:	  Letter	  13.2.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  S/17826:	  Letter	  13.2.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  General.	  S/17843:	  Letter	  18.2.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  General.	  	  S/17864:	  Letter	  25.2.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  General.	  S/17897:	  Letter	  3.2.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   General.	  	  S/17911:	  Report	  12.3.1986	  of	  the	  mission	  dispatched	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  investigate	  allegations	  of	  the	  use	  of	  chemical	  weapons	  in	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  and	  Iraq:	  note	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/17925:	  Letter	  18.3.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	   	   S/17944:	  Letter	  26.3.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	   	   General.	  	  	   	   S/17949:	  Letter	  27.3.1986	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  	  	   	   General.	  S/18266:	  Letter	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  UK	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐	  General.	  S/18305:	  Letter	  29.8.1086	  from	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  S/18480:	  Report	  26.11.1986	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  S/18522:	  Letter	  15.12.1986	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  S/18549:	  Letter	  26.12.1986	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  S/PV.2663:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2663rd	  meeting	  18.2.1986.	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S/PV.2664:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2664th	  meeting	  19.2.1986.	  	  S/PV.2665:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2665th	  meeting	  20.2.1986.	  S/PV.2666:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2666th	  meeting	  24.2.1986.	  S/PV.2667:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2667th	  meeting	  21.3.1986.	  	  S/PV.	  2709:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2709th	  meeting	  3.10.1986.	  S/PV.2710:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2710th	  meeting	  3.10.1986.	  S/PV.2711:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2711th	  meeting	  6.10.1986.	  S/PV.2712:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2712th	  meeting	  7.10.1986.	  S/PV.2713:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2713th	  meeting	  8.10.1986.	  S/PV.2730:	  Provisional	  verbatim	  record	  of	  UNSC	  2730th	  meeting	  22.12.1986	  	  UNSC	  Resolution	  582	  of	  24	  February	  1986.	  	  UNSC	  Resolution	  588	  of	  8	  October	  1986.	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   Vol.	  42,	  1987.	  	   S/18601:	  Letter	  14.1.1987	  from	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  letter	  from	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18657:	  Letter	  3.2.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18679:	  Letter	  9.2.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18636:	  Letter	  27.1.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Belgium	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18652:	  Letter	  30.1.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  US	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18723:	  Letter	  25.2.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18727:	  Letter	  27.2.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  US	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18728:	  Letter	  27.2.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18796:	  Letter	  10.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18799:	  Letter	  13.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18800:	  Letter	  13.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18809:	  Letter	  16.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18806:	  Letter	  16.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18810:	  Letter	  16.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iraq	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18820:	  Letter	  21.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	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S/18828:	  Letter	  27.4.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18851:	  Letter	  7.5.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  S/18855:	  Letter	  8.5.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  S/18852	  and	  add.	  1:	  Report	  8.5.1987	  of	  the	  mission	  dispatched	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General:	  note	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  	  S/18878:	  Letter	  26.5.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18879:	  Letter	  27.5.1987	  to	  the	  UN	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Belgium	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18859:	  Letter	  11.5.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18890:	  Letter	  2.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  	  S/18860:	  Letter	  11.5.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18866:	  Letter	  15.5.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  S/18919:	  Letter	  10.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18928:	  Letter	  17.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18941:	  Letter	  23.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18947:	  Letter	  25.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18952:	  Letter	  29.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  S/18953:	  Letter	  29.6.1987	  from	  the	  representative	  of	  Iran	  to	  the	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Samandrag	  
	  Denne	  masteroppgåva	  i	  historie	  tek	  føre	  seg	  korleis	  kjemiske	  våpen	  vart	  nytta	  i	  krigen	  mellom	  Iran	  og	   Irak	  1980-­‐1988,	  og	  korleis	  Tryggingsrådet	   i	  FN	  og	  Generalsekretæren,	  Javier	   Pérez	   de	   Cuéllar,	   responderte	   på	   bruken.	   Oppgåva	   tek	   også	   opp	   kvifor	  Tryggingsrådet	  handla	  som	  dei	  gjorde.	  	  Irak	  nytta	  kjemiske	  våpen	  for	  fyrste	  gong	  i	  1983.	  På	  dåverande	  tidspunkt	  hadde	  Iran	   teke	   over	   initiativet	   i	   krigen,	   og	   hadde	   pressa	   irakiske	   styrker	   tilbake	   på	   eige	  territorium.	   Iran	   rapporterte	   om	   bruken	   til	   FN,	   men	   Generalsekretæren	   ignorerte	  skuldingane	  i	  tre	  månadar	  før	  han	  sende	  ei	  spesialgruppe	  for	  å	  undersøkje	  skuldingane.	  Gruppa	  bekrefta	  at	  kjemiske	  våpen	  var	  blitt	  nytta,	  og	  at	  Geneveprotokollen,	   som	  både	  Iran	  og	  Irak	  hadde	  signert,	  var	  broten	  for	  fyrste	  gong	  sidan	  den	  vart	  underskriven	  i	  1929.	  Både	   Tryggingsrådet	   og	   Generalsekretæren	   gjekk	   ut	   og	   fordømte	   bruken,	   men	  adresserte	   ikkje	   Irak	   som	   syndar,	   ei	   heller	   innførte	   dei	   andre	   tiltak	   for	   å	   hindre	   at	  kjemiske	  våpen	  vart	  nytta	  igjen.	  Iran	  heldt	  fram	  med	  å	  presse	  Irak,	  og	  sidan	  bruken	  av	  kjemiske	  våpen	  ikkje	  fekk	  nokon	  	  konsekvensar,	  utvikla	  Irak	  sitt	  kjemiske	  våpenarsenal	  og	   eskalerte	   bruken	   av	   det.	   I	   dei	   fyrste	   fasane	   var	   det	   berre	   militære	   mål	   som	   vart	  åtekne	  av	  gass,	  men	  i	  dei	  siste	  fasane	  vart	  også	  sivile	  offer.	  Dette	  må	  sjåast	  i	  samanheng	  med	   Tryggingsrådet	   og	   Generalsekretæren	   sin	   famlande,	   for	   svake,	   og	   til	   tider	  fråverande	  respons.	  	  Gangen	   i	  krigen	  påverka	   ikkje	  berre	   Irak	   til	   å	  byrje	  å	  nytte	  gass	   i	   forsvaret	   sitt,	  men	   det	   påverka	   også	   Tryggingsrådet	   sin	   respons	   til	   det.	   Det	   islamske	   regimet	   i	   Iran	  hadde	   distansert	   seg	   frå	   både	   USA	   og	   Sovjetunionen	   ved	   ei	   rekkje	   anledningar	   sidan	  regimet	  kom	  til	  makta	  i	  1979.	  Båe	  stormakter,	  og	  særleg	  USA,	  støtta	  difor	  opp	  om	  Irak,	  både	   indirekte	   og	   etterkvart	  meir	   openlyst,	   i	   ei	   tid	   der	   verda	   var	   prega	   av	   den	   kalde	  krigen.	  I	  følgje	  dei,	  ville	  Midtausten	  bli	  ein	  ustabil	  og	  fiendtleg	  region	  dersom	  Iran	  vann	  krigen.	  	  	  Etterkvart	  som	  krigen	  spreidde	  seg	  til	  å	  omfatte	  åtak	  på	  tankarar	  i	  den	  Persiske	  Golf	   også,	   vart	   bruken	   av	   kjemiske	   våpen	   ei	   underordna	   sak	   for	   Tryggingsrådet:	   for	  fleire	  av	  medlemsstatane	  var	  det	  viktigare	  at	  olje	  vart	  eksportert	  frå	  regionen.	  Sidan	  Iran	  vart	   skulda	   for	  å	  hindre	   flyten	  av	  olje,	   vart	  difor	   Irak	   sin	  bruk	  av	  kjemiske	  våpen	  mot	  Iran	  oversett.	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